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SEBASTIEN RALE VS. NEW ENGLAND: A CASE STUDY OF FRONTIER CONFLICT
By Kenneth M. Morrison
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (in History).
June, 1970.
A study was made of the Jesuit missionary, Sebastien Rale, and 
his role in New England-New France relations. French and English 
primary and secondary materials were examined to give the broadest 
possible view of the man and to place him in historical context.
It was found that Sebastien Rale was not an agent of New France. 
The conflicting opinions surrounding the mission of Norridgewock and 
the border war of the 1720's were traced to the problems of 
Massachusetts-Abnaki relations. Rale's frequent and testy letters to 
the government of the Bay Colony were blunt reactions to what he 
viewed as religious and territorial threats against his mission.
The frontier conflict between 1713 and 1722 was not the result 
of French Imperial policy. The French insisted that the Abnakis were 
allies but refused active participation in the Indians' quarrel with 
New England. Policy was developed in Maine by the Jesuits. The 
missionaries were only secondarily interested in Quebec's desire to 
prevent Massachusetts' settlement of the Kennebec. With the declara­
tion of war in July, 1722, however, the Jesuits left the Abnakis in 
the hands of the governor and the intendant of New France on whom the 
Indians relied for vital war supplies.
Finally, the controversial attack on Norridgewock was appraised. 
It was found that no secondary account had fully evaluated the sources. 
Examination led to the discovery of crucial inconsistencies in the
primary accounts of New England. The French sources were found to be 
based on the understandably confused impressions of the fleeing 
Indians. In large measure the English sources present the more valid 
picture: the sudden attack, the panicked confusion, and Sebastien
Rale dying with gun in hand. After Rale's death the war drew to a 
close. Without Sebastien Rale's persuasion and determination, the 
Abnakis were not able to present a united front against colonial 
expansion.
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PREFACE
Since his death at the age of seventy-two on August 23, 1724, 
Sebastien Rale's life has fascinated the historians of New England and 
New France. Both basic approaches are understandable. The French- 
Canadians with their historical tradition of remarkable frontier 
priests can hardly be censured for championing a similiar view of 
Rale. Then too, New England's equally fervent denunciation of the 
man as a foXmentor of cruel Indian wars is as comprehensible. There 
are, nonetheless, exceptions to this simple dichotomy. Many New 
England, American, and Canadian historians have insisted on a middle 
ground and have repudiated the emotional judgements of their country­
men.
What is unfortunate is that Rale has been too long considered 
apart from the tragic events for which he has been held responsible. 
It is futile to separate Rale from the rapidly deteriorating relations 
between the Abnakis and colonial Massachusetts. Effectively buffered 
from the French colonists by the rugged forests of northern Maine, 
the Abnakis' relations with them were free of conflict, but the same 
cannot be said of Massachusetts.
It is dangerous to judge the Abnakis by their actions after 
European contact. It is equally misleading to accuse the English 
settlers of intentional wrong-doing. In reality, no single race was 
responsible for the frontier conflict of the 1720's. At the same 
time, attitudes on the part of both red and white races can be 
identified as contributory causes.
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European notions of superiority in confronting a native culture 
which was, by all standards of western progress, inferior, can be 
understood. Yet it was that very attitude which caused much of the 
subsequent cultural conflict. The Indian, existing in what soon 
became an archaic context-in European phraseology 'savage’-was denied 
absorption into the dominant culture. This left the Indian bewildered, 
confused and often, in the final analysis, fighting mad. Unfortunately, 
the colonists found that extermination, whether planned or unintention­
al, was an immediate, prompt, and effective solution to the Indians’ 
opposition. The Indians themselves were not to learn complacent 
acceptance of their equivocal position in relation to the European 
colonization until it was much too late. Indian culture became a 
pre-eminently reactive one, conditioned not only by any given quarrel 
but by bitter experience. Sebastien Rale must be seen in the middle 
of that conflict.
For too long, Rale has been censured as being a major cause 
of the animosity between New England and New France without placing 
him in the context of Imperial relations. The fact that he was French 
and Catholic explains much of the tension underlying the conflict 
between Massachusetts and the Abnakis. It does not justify condemna­
tion of the man as a French partisan, or for that matter, a French 
agent. A case can be made, in fact, that he caused severe headaches 
for the administrators of New France. If he relentlessly reminded 
the Governor and Council of Massachusetts of their roughshod treatment 
of the Kennebecs, he was no less tireless in badgering Vaudreuil and 
Begon into activating their supposed alliance with the Abnakis. 
Though Rale was French, his sentiments were clearly and irrevocably on 
4
the side of the Abnakis.
My debts in researching and writing this thesis are many and 
varied. I have first, to thank Professor Alice R. Stewart for her 
helpful direction of the thesis through many drafts as well as her 
generous gift of her valuable time. I wish also to thank Professors 
Jerome J. Nadelhaft, Edward 0. Schriver, and Leslie Decker, for their 
unfailing and excellent criticism.
I owe much to many institutions whose staffs were invariably 
kind and helpful. I am especially grateful to the staff of the Fogler 
Library of the University of Maine. The ladies of the Interlibrary 
Loan Office were extremely helpful in retrieving volumes of forgotten 
lore. Though space forbids expressing my real appreciation, I must 
acknowledge my debts to: Bangor Public Library; Boston Public 
Library; Maine Historical Society; Maine State Library; Massachusetts 
Historical Society; Massachusetts State Archives; McLennan Library, 
McGill University; Millinocket Community Library; and the Public 
Archives of Canada.
I wish to thank Professor Edgar McKay of the New England- 
Atlantic Provinces-Quebec Center at the University of Maine, and my 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Percy E. Stewart for their generous grants which 
made it possible for me to do research at the Public Archives of 
Canada.
And to my roommates, who suffered much with great patience, I 
give my thanks.
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CHAPTER I
OF FRENCH AND INDIANS
In 1689 a struggle began between England and France for the 
control of the North American continent.’ That contest went erratical­
ly through various phases. It began with King William's War and did 
not end until the surrender of Quebec in 1763. Queen Anne's War, a 
highly virulent outbreak of the Imperial conflict, ended in 1713 with 
the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. For a time the great powers 
suspended their more aggressive designs and peace seemed to be a 
tangible reality. By the early 1720's the borders between New England 
and New France exploded into a bloody Indian war that threatened to 
fracture the delicate balance. England and France skirted the issues, 
however, and avoided a major confrontation.
New England was not so happily spared. Her relations with the 
Abnaki nation on her northern frontier had never been good. During 
both King William's and Queen Anne's Wars those Indians allied them­
selves with the French in a terrifying confederacy. After the Peace 
of Utrecht the Abnakis approached the Massachusetts settlers hoping to 
end the war. But despite the propitious peace, the wounds of the pre­
vious wars did not heal. Discussion and compromise failed and both 
sides finally again had recourse to war.
’On the Imperial conflict see: Francis Parkman, A Half-Century 
of Conf 1ict (Boston: Brown, Little and Company, 1905); Douglas E. 
Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966); Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689- 
1762 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
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A central issue between New England and New France throughout 
the Imperial wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries was the three Jesuit missions among the Abnakis on the 
Kennebec, Penobscot and St. John rivers. One missionary stands out 
among all others. Sebastien Rale, stationed on the Kennebec at 
Norridgewock, was not only closest to Massachusetts but her most 
vigorous opponent as well. Rale's role in King William's and Queen 
Anne's Wars remains largely undisputed because of a lack of primary 
materials.
As an impediment to Massachusetts-Abnaki reconciliation after 
Queen Anne's War, however, Rale's mission has aroused considerable 
controversy. There are several important, underlying issues. Did 
the Treaty of Utrecht cede the northern colonial frontier to Great 
Britain? Were the Kennebecs and later the Penobscots caught in a 
power struggle between England and France or was the conflict merely 
local? Did the Jesuits violate the terms of the peace to preserve the 
area for France? Although the official purpose of Rale's mission was 
the christianizing of the Abnakis, he was necessarily 'man on the 
scene' for New France. Though far removed in time, few historians 
have been able to approach him with more than a nominal degree of 
objectivity. His mission has frequently been evaluated on racial, 
national, or religious premises. Was he in fact an agitator of Indian 
warfare, or was he a holy, if not saintly, man who lived in loneliness 
for thirty years only to meet his death at the hands of the English 
while protecting his Indians?
Sebastien Rale was born in Portalier, France, on January 4, 
1652. He received his early education from the Jesuit fathers and on
10
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September 24, 1675, he entered that order as a novice at Dole. 
Eventually Rale became an instructor of grammar and humanities first
A 1
at Carpentras, and later at Nimes and Lyon. Thus, Sebastien Rale was 
equipped for a life of luxury and intellectual attainment among the 
elite of Louis XIV's France. His destiny lay elsewhere, however, where 
he was to earn fame as a notable political intriguer.
At an age when most men have chosen their life careers, 
Sebastien Rale dedicated himself to the Canadian missions. Rale was 
thirty-seven years old when he embarked for New France on July 23, 
1689. Arriving at Quebec in mid-autumn, he was assigned to the mission 
of the Reverend Fathers Bigots whose Indians had largely come from
2Maine after King Philip's War. Here he set about acclimatizing 
himself-both to the weather and to the Indians. Their food disgusted 
him, and though he found snowshoes cumbersome, he astounded the 
savages with his adeptness in their use; indeed, they hardly believed
Georges Goyau has discovered Rale's baptismal certificate 
which has corrected what has traditionally been held to be his birth­
date. "Le P. Sebastien Racle," Revue d'Histoire des Missions, I 
(Sept., 1924), p. 163; Thomas Charland, following older views, gives 
the date as Jan. 4, 1657. "Rale, Sebastien," Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, II, 1701-1740, David M. Hayne and Andre Vachon, eds. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 542. There are many spellings 
of the Jesuit's name; Ralle, Rasies, Racle, and even Rawley. I have 
chosen Rale. It is most commonly used, and he used that form himself.
Q
Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien Racle," pp. 164-65; James Phinney 
Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England (Albany: John Munsell's 
Sons, 1894), p. 35; Arthur Melanjon, Liste des Missionaires-Jesuites; 
Nouvelle France et Louisiane, 1611-1800^ (Montrea1: Co 11fege Sa i n te- 
Marie, 1929), p. 65; For a sketch of the Fathers Bigot see: Thomas 
Charland, "Bigot, Jacques," and "Bigot, Vincent," Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, II, pp. 63-65.
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that it was his first attempt.’
It was there, in 1691, that he began his dictionary of the 
Abnaki language. He spent hours in the smoky quarters of the Indians 
trying to master their difficult gutterals. Though his admirers assure 
us of his proficiency in Indian languages, the Indians laughed up­
roariously at his faltering efforts. These early days were undoubtedly 
frustrating, uncomfortable, and probably characterized by what today 
is called cultural shock.
Sebastien Rale's apprenticeship under the Bigots was consistent 
with the aims of the Society of Jesus. Realistically, the Jesuits 
emphasized that the Indian could not absorb Catholicism in European 
forms. They had learned from bitter experience that "knowing the 
physical, political, social and moral 
necessary prerequisite to conversion, 
nized the importance of their classic 
preparation for the ministry but they
conditions of Indian life" was a
Typically, the Jesuits recog- 
theologi cal-philosophical 
coupled this with rigid study
of native languages and cultures. "Their success depended," J. H.
Kennedy believes, "upon their ability to transcend their natal 
inheritance while retaining their inspiration and then to bridge the *2
See Rale's description of his first years. "Letter from 
Father Sebastien Rasies, Missionary of the Society of Jesus in New 
France, to Monsieur his Brother, Oct. 12, 1723',1 Reuben Gold Thwaites, 
ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (New York: Pageant 
Book Company, 1959), LXVI I, pp. 133-77.
2
Rale's manuscript dictionary was taken by Captain Westbrook 
during his sudden attack on Norridgewock in the winter of 1721/22. It 
is now in the possession of Harvard University. It has been published 
by John Pickering, ed., Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, I, New Series (Cambridge, 1833), pp. 370-574.
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broad abyss between European and Indian culture."^
This almost surprised appreciation was similiar to Rale's 
reaction to the Indians. He believed that their oratorical abilities
2 
surpassed that of "most able Europeans." Rale's acute observations 
of Indian folkways enabled him to become as expressive. He noticed 
that there was nothing to "equal the affection of the Savages for their 
children"^ and he used the image not only to explain his own relation­
ship to them, but that of his God as well.
After being introduced to missionary life among the Abnakis, 
Rale was then ordered to the Illinois mission to assist Father Jacques 
Gravier. Having gone about half-way he was forced to winter at 
Mi chi1imackinac. With the spring thaw he was again trudging through 
the wilds. The Illinois welcomed him with a feast of roasted dog­
flesh, a tid-bit reserved for the most festive occasions. Here he 
remained for two years, until in 1694, he was assigned to the village 
of Norridgewock, the major town of the Abnakis on the Kennebec river.^
J. H. Kennedy, Jesuit and Savage in New France (New Haven; 
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 61, 91; see also George R. Healy, 
"The French Jesuits and the idea of the Noble Savage," William and 
Mary Quarterly, XV (April, 1958), pp. 143-67.
2
Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXV1I, p. 163.
Ibid., p. 139, pp. 185-91. Rale impressed the Indians when he 
put this paternalism to practical use. The Indians had captured and 
adopted a young English child. Sebastien Rale took her into his care 
"and he taught her as did later Father Aubery...." She'u1timate1y be­
came an Ursuline sister. Emmas Lewis Coleman, New England Captives 
Carried to Canada (Portland: The Southworth Press, 1825), II, pp. 389- 
90.
^Baxter, Pioneers of New France, pp. 36-39; Rale to Brother, 
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I, pp. 14-9-77; Charland, "Rale, 
Sebastien," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, II, p. 543.
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Norridgewock was the most important of the Abnaki villages 
because of its strategic location rather than its size.^ It was there, 
within the bounds of the present town of Madison, that the Society of 
Jesus maintained, in Massachusetts' estimation, a notorious outpost of 
New France. Prior to the 1690's, however, Massachusetts had ignored 
the French missionaries on the northern frontier. Soon afterward the 
two Bigots, and then Sebastien Rale, became embroiled in the 
Norridgewock Abnakis' relations with Massachusetts Bay.
Maine-Acadia had been a legitimate ground for the Jesuits since 
the early seventeenth century. In 1607 Henry IV assigned Fathers Biard 
and Masse to Port Royal. By 1613 they had begun their own mission, 
St. Sauveur, on Mt. Desert Island. Within months, however, Samuel 
Argali had destroyed the fledgling colony on an expedition patrolling
2
Virginia's northern waters.
Norridgewock was never large. In 1708 the number of warriors 
was given as 25. At the same time, the Penobscot village had 78 men. 
Census of the Indians, 1708, Acadia, Public Archives of Canada, M. G. 
18, F 18, p. 26. Later, during Rale's War the number increased when 
the Abnakis' Indian allies came to their aid. In September, 1722, 
there were 160 warriors at the village. Rapport de Messieurs de 
Vaudreuil et Begon, Oct. 17, 1722, Collection de Manuscripts contenant 
lettres, Memoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs a la 
Nouvelle-France (Quebec: Legislature de Quebec, 1884), 111, p. 87.
^Rev. P. F. X. de Charlevoix, History and General Description 
of New France, J. G. Shea, ed. (New York: Francis P. Harper, 1900), 
I, pp. 260-83; John Fiske, New France and New England (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1902), pp. 7^-78; J. Bartlet 
Brebner, New England's Outpost, Acadia before the Conquest of Canada 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), pp. 19-20; cf. Lucien 
Campeau, Monumenta Novae Franciae, La Premfere Mission d'Acadie, 
(1602-1616) (Quebec: Les Presses de L'Universite Laval, I967).
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The Jesuits were more successful in the 1640's and their work, 
though well known to the English, was not contested. Gabriel 
Druillettes, the first missionary on the Kennebec, left Quebec in 
August, 1646.1 The [nc|ians on the rjver were pleased with his arrival 
though he demanded that they repudiate liquor, their petty jealousies, 
as well as their sorcerors. He returned to Quebec the following year 
with high praises from the Kennebecs. "This man is not like our 
Sorcerors and medicine men," they marveled, "they always demand some­
thing for regard, he never; they spend no time with our sick; he is 
with them night and day."
Druillettes was soon to return to Norridgewock. He was on the 
Kennebec in 1650 and 1651. On both occasions he had another duty in 
addition to his missionary ones. He was sent to Boston and Plymouth 
to sound out the authorities on a proposed alliance between New France 
and New England against the Iroquois. Though his career as a diplomat 
was notable for its failure, his presence on the Kennebec was decisive 
for the future of the Abnakis. Druillettes gained the Abnakis1 con­
fidence and they remembered the Kennebec-Chaudiere route to Quebec 
and the black-robes. Significantly, Massachusetts had not opposed 
Druillettes? presence on the river.
By the time of Sebastien Rale's arrival on the Kennebec in 1694, 
however, the Bay Colony had begun to view the missions with more
Ijohn Marshall Brown, "The Mission of the Assumption on the 
River Kennebec, 1646-1652," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ections, 2nd ser. 
(Portland: The Society, 1890), I, pp. 87-99; Lucien Campeau, 
"Druillettes, Gabriel," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, I, pp. 281-82.
2Brown, "The Mission of the Assumption on the River Kennebec, 
1646-1652," pp. 92-94.
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hostility. Bearing the full brunt of the colonial wars, Massachusetts 
consistently attempted to convince the Abnakis that they should oust 
the Catholic missionaries, though she was invariably unsuccessful.
In I698, for example, the Abnakis told the commissioners from
Massachusetts that "the good missionaries will not be driven away."^
On the other hand, Rale's task was made immensely more difficult because 
the Abnakis knew that the English despised the Jesuits. The Indians 
were not above using a political asset to good advantage, and, on one 
occasion, they told the commissioners that they wished the priests 
removed.
When the Indians reversed their position, it is understandable 
that the English accused the Jesuits of political intrigue. "We will 
do nothing of the kind," the Abnakis answered on another occasion.
3 
"You may try to make us pray as you do, but you will not succeed."J 
The English were determined to strike at what they saw as the cause of 
the Abnakis1 refusal to accept their authority and passed a law in 1700 
to effect the French priests removal.
In the same year the Jesuits built a new chapel at
Norridgewock which Massachusetts inevitably viewed as "a French 
encroachment.Recognizing the Abnakis1 tardiness in carrying out
1Quoted by John Gilmary Shea, The Catholic Church in Colonial 
Days, 1521-1763 (New York: John G. Shea, 1886), p. 596.
^Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," in Charles H. Lincoln,
ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699 (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 273.
^Letter by Jacques Bigot, Oct. 26, 1699, Thwaites, Jesu i t 
Relations, LXV, pp. 93-95.
^Mass. Arch. 11: 148-14-9A.
Sto Mr. Stoughton, Oct. 30, 1700, Mass. Arch. 28; 80.
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her law against the priests, Massachusetts resolved that "Three able
Learned Orthodox ministers should be sent speedily to the Eastern
Indians and those of Merrimac River...."’ But the Abnakis had accepted
Catholicism and they were determined to preserve it. "I assure you," 
an Abnaki representative told Governor Callieres, "that I wish to pray 
to God like the French.
The Abnaki spokesman underscored the fact that it was the 
missionaries who tied the Indian so strongly to the French. Ironically, 
it was in the Abnakis1 interest to ally themselves with the English
3 
because they depended upon them for trade and often for food. But
the English settlers directly challenged their way of life, and coupled 
with the Abnakis1 conversion by the Jesuits caused them to lean heavily 
towards the French.
Unlike the Indians of southern New England, the Abnakis were
not sedentary. While they also maintained permanent villages where 
their agriculture centered, these were little more than base camps. In 
the spring and fall, they went to the sea at the mouths of the rivers 
where they lived on shellfish. During the long hard winters their 
hunters could be found in the forest around Moosehead and Mt. Katahdin
’Emma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives, I, pp. 60-61.
^Conference entre les sauvages Abenakis et M. Callieres, Oct. 1, 
1702, Arch. Col. Serie F 3, Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2, 
PP. 381-83.
^Bomazeen and Skanwenes of Norridgewock requested on one 
occasion, for example: "Supplies of Corne, Meale, White Blankets, white 
Stockin cloth, red pennistone, Shirts, Dussils, Hatchets, Kettles, Duck 
Shot and Powder. They also asked for some "blew Broadcloth, Tobacco, 
Scissors, Needles, and Thread," Message of Indians, Dec. 27, 1701, 
Baxter Manuscripts, Documentary History of the State of Maine (Portland: 
Lefavor-Tower Company, 1916), XXIII, p. 3^-.
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where game was more plentiful.’
The slowly advancing settlements of Massachusetts threatened to 
block the Abnakis' route to the sea. The fur trade also cut to the 
heart of Indian existence. English desire for furs led the Abnakis 
unwittingly to overhunt moose, deer and caribou to the point where 
these animals were faced with extinction and the Indian with starvation. 
Massachusetts added insult to unintentional injury and insisted that 
the Indians acknowledge the British sovereign. The Abnakis were left 
confused. A great deal of the interracial dialogue passed over their 
heads. Those points which conflicted with their interests they con­
veniently ignored. This behavior the Massachusetts government could 
not understand and refused to tolerate. And there were always the 
Jesuits, who, in the eyes of Massachusetts, bore the brunt of the 
responsibility for the Abnakis1 intransigence.
^Jaimes Phinney Baxter, "The Abnakis and their Ethnic Relations," 
Me. His. Soc. , Col lections, 2nd ser. (Portland: The Society, 1892),
III, pp. 13-4-0; Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Indians of Maine," in L. C. 
Hatch, ed., Maine: A History (New York: The American Historical 
Society, 1919), I, pp. 4-3-64.
Some of the English settlers, however, realized that the 
Abnakis had some real complaints. One settler, writing from Pemaquid 
in September, 1675, made observations that can be applied to the 
Abnakis throughout their relationship with the English. "Sir," Thomas 
Gardner began, "I do not find by any thing I can discerne that the 
Indians East of us ar in the least our Ennimies...." If they fled from 
approaching boats or from English men generally, they had "good 
Reason," Gardner continued, "for thay well Know it may Cost them their *III,
19
Lives if the wild fisherman meet with them".’
A more acute assessment of Massachusetts' impact on the Abnakis 
was made by Thomas Bannister in his testimony before the Council of 
Trade and Plantations In July 1715. Bannister thought the English 
settlers had "untaught them (the Abnaki0 the genuine dictates of 
Nature and...simplicity wch. was verry remarkable at our arriveall, 
and instead thereof implanted our own vices and follies." Thus, while 
he believed that French machinations among the Abnakis made 
Massachusetts' task more difficult, he noted that the "repeated 
injuries and provocations" of the settlers were also responsible for 
bad relations. "No wonder then," he said, "that they have conceiv'd an 
opinion that our design is wholly to exterminate and destroy them; and 
to this our faithlessness in Treatys has verry much concur'd...." It 
was a sorry picture he sketched before the Council: "We villifie them 
with all manner of names, and opprobrious language, cheat abuse and 
beat them, sometimes to the loss of limbs, pelt them with stones and
2 
set dogs upon them."
Contemporary English opinion was not, however, always so 
generous to the Indians. Samuel Penhallow said the Abnakis were "as 
implacable in their revenge, as they are terrible in the execution 
of it.... No courtesy will ever oblige them to gratitude; for their 
greatest benefactors have frequently fallen as victims to their fury."^
’Letter Thos Gardner to Gov. Leverett, Sept. 22, 1675, Baxter, 
VI, pp. 92-93.
n
Thomas Bannister to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 
July 15, 1715, Cal, of St. Pap. XXVIII, pp. 233-35.
^Samuel Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England with 
the Eastern Indians (Cincinnati: J. Harpel, 1859), 13.
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Penhallow's and Bannister's assessments differed, perhaps, because 
their objectives were different. Penhallow was determined to resettle 
Maine after Queen Anne's War; Bannister pleaded for reasonable limits 
to those settlements. But Penhallow correctly noted that the Abnakis 
pursued their wars with single-minded fervor.
Both Bannister and LaPotherie mention an incident which in­
furiated the Abnakis and reinforced their impressions of English 
treachery. During King William's War several of the Indians had gone 
to Pemaquid, under a flag of truce, to parlay with the English about 
several of their tribe being held captive in Boston. Contrary to all 
normal conventions of truce the Indians were arrested and four others 
under similiar circumstances were "pitilessly killed" at Saco. 
LaPotherie was sympathetic to the Abnakis but stoically noted that "in 
some cases misfortune is beneficial" in keeping the Abnakis attached 
to the French.’
If such incidents could be discontinued as acts of war, they 
might be excused as insignificant. But the Abnakis' trust had been 
strained by similar actions long before. "These Indians are much 
attached to us," de Champigny assured Pontchartrain in 1691, "and 
irreconciIiable enemies of the English in consequence of a piece of 
treachery the latter had perpetrated on them some years ago, killing 
and massacring a large number of their people who had visited them in 
o 
good faith."*'
’Narrative of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada, 1694, 
1695, E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial 
History of New York (Albany: Weed, Parson and Company, 1855), IX, 
pp. 613-16.
2M. de Champigny to M. de Pontchartrain, May 10, 1691,
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 498.
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When Rale arrived on the Kennebec these incidents had created a 
situation beyond his control. Norridgewock's proximity to the English 
was in itself responsible for much of the turmoil that marred Rale's 
stay among the Abnakis. Equally important was the legacy of bitterness 
between the Kennebecs and Massachusetts Bay. As Rale was to discover 
later, Massachusetts would, on the weakest of evidence, accuse him of 
causing that animosity. In reality, however, Rale's first years on 
the Kennebec were innocuous. It has traditionally been held that 
Norridgewock was under his sole care in 1694, but that is not correct. 
Rale was, as Lord, Sexton and Harrington discovered, Father Vincent 
Bigot's companion.1
Their early relationship was probably excellent, for Bigot had 
guided Rale after his arrival in New France. But later, during the 
short interval of peace between King William's and Queen Anne's Wars 
there seems to have been some dispute between Rale and Vincent Bigot. 
While their differences are unclear, it may have been due to Vincent 
Bigot's advocacy of Abnaki-Massachusetts conferences to settle out­
standing issues. The problem was resolved by removing Rale and by 
sending Jacques Bigot in his place. The squabble and Rale's removal 
seems consistent with Governor Callieres policy at that time. By 1699 
he felt that an entente between the English and the Abnakis was
^For the older view see J. P. Baxter, Pioneers of New France 
in New England, pp. 36ff; but see also Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton 
and Edward T. Harrington, The History of the Archdiocese of Boston 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944), H P. 56.
2
Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 56.
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des i rable. ’
Father Rale's absence was shortlived. In 1698 the Fathers Bigot 
established a new mission for a group of Indians who had been converted
2 
by Sebastien Rale. By 1701, one of the Bigots was also involved in 
difficulties with the authorities. Brouillan, Governor of Acadia, 
noted that Bigot did not give the King's interests the same care as 
Father Gaul in had on the Penobscot. The Bigots were recalled and 
Father Rale was sent back to the Kennebec.-^
In view of these and like altercations between the Jesuits and 
the King's agents, it is difficult to make meaningful generalizations 
about the priests prior to 1713. Parkman remarked that "before the end 
of the seventeenth century the functions of the Canadian Jesuit had 
become as much political as religious...."^ But individual priests 
had their own idio syncrasies. The official government viewpoint is 
obvious, as the incident between Rale and Bigot and later the Bigots 
and Brouillan indicates. "If from 1690 an interest is evinced in 
thei r Qzhe priests{| work," Shea noted of New France's administrators,
’Lettre de Monsieur de Callieres au Ministre, March 17, 1699, 
Collection de Manuscripts, II, p. 312; Governor Lincoln, "Mss. papers: 
Account of the Catholic Missions in Maine," Me. His. Soc., Col lections, 
1st ser. (Portland: Day, Fraser £- Co., I83I), I, p. 329.
2
Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, pp. 183-93; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 67.
^Memoire Joint'a la lettre de Monsieur du Brouillan, Oct. 6, 
1701, Arch. Col., C 11 D, vol. 4, part 1, p. 146; Abrege d'une lettre 
de Monsieur de Brouillan au Ministre, Oct. 30, 1701 , Col 1ection de 
Manuscripts, II, pp. 385-86; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 
I, p. 80.
Parkman, Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 215.
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"it was rather to use them as instruments of the government to further 
its political, military, or commercial views....11’ Yet it is erroneous 
to insist that their sole inspiration was concern for the interests 
of Louis XIV. The Jesuit was, it is true, subject to God, his superiors, 
and his king. Not surprisingly, these demands sometimes clashed. The 
Jesuits' concern "for
the conversion of the
the corporate goal of the mission in Canada: 
heathens" seems to have been primary, nonethe-
. 2 less.
The variety of the missionaries' personal viewpoints sometimes
led the priests to see things differently from their political
superiors. Father Simon, missionary among the Malecites on the St.
John River, was known to have upbraided
against the Engli sh. "'I reprehended you many times for
committing barbarities on captives' the franciscan thundered at the
Indians." John Gyles, an
that the priest continued
English captive among the Malicites related 
his denunciations: "The English are better 
people than yourselves," and he said that "the Almighty thinks kindly 
of them, for He forgives the wayward who know no better. And He will 
remarkably punish the wretches who inflict tortures on them."-2
Father Simon was harshly condemned for those words.
The king regarded another incident more seriously. Fathers
Baudoin and Petit had refused absolution to the Indians who were
’shea, The Catholic Church in Colonial Days, p. 592.
n
Kennedy, Jesuit and Savage in New France, p. 80.
^Stuart Trueman, The Ordeal of John Gyles (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, Ltd., 1966). pp. 68-69: Baxter, Pioneers of New France in 
New England, p. 33.
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engaged in warfare against the English. Louis XIV became quite annoyed 
with the conduct of two priests. The minister wrote a strong note 
to the Bishop of Quebec insisting that he "stop the continuation of 
these disorders, that these ecc1esiastiques no longer interfere in 
temporal affairs...." Parkman's characterization of the eighteenth 
century Jesuit as "half-missionary and half agent of the king"^ 
requires significant modification.
More often than not, however, the Jesuit in Acadia accepted the 
practical implications of French colonial policy though he attempted 
to mold it to his views. If the colony was at war, the Jesuit was 
caught in an even more delicate situation than was usual. At such times 
the Indians worked directly with and under French soldiers. There 
was little that the Jesuit could do but make the best of the situation. 
Thus Sebastien Rale's statements as to his role in Queen Anne's War 
must be put into their proper context.
Just prior to the outbreak of war, Massachusetts attempted to 
assure the Abnakis' neutrality. According to Rale, Dudley pleaded 
with him not to "influence your Indians to make war upon us." When 
Rale suavely replied "My religion and my office of Priest were a
2 
security that I would give them only exhortations to peace," he was
^Lettre du Ministre a Monsieur L'Ev^que de Quebec, May 8, 1694, 
Collection de Manuscripts, II, pp. 155-56; Parkman, A Half-Century of 
Conf 1i ct, I, p. 217.
2Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, pp. 197-203. It should be noted that Rale's presence at this 
meeting is not substantiated by English testimony. Penhallow, who was 
present, fails to mention it. Rale's statement to that effect is 
important, nonetheless, because of his later statement to Vaudreuil. 
cf. Penha 11ow, History of the Wars of New England, pp. 16-17.
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seemingly accepting the Abnakis1 neutrality. Soon after, however, 
the Abnakis became actively engaged in war. Rale’s comments to them are 
revealing: "I exhorted them," he later recalled, "...to observe
’Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, p. 197.
2
Beauharnois et Vaudreuil au Ministre, Nov. 15, 1703, Col 1ection 
de Manuscripts, II, pp. 405-06; Arch. Col. C 11 A, vol. 21, ppT 13-16; 
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 756.
^Cited by Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 84.
strictly the Laws of war, to practice no cruelty, to kill no person 
except in the heat of combat, to treat humanely those who surrender 
themselves prisoners, etc."’
Rale’s insistence that "the only band which has united £the 
AbnakisJ] to us so closely is their firm attachment to the catholic 
Faith" underscores the nature of his influence. Not long after his 
memorable confrontation with Governor Dudley he assured Governor 
Vaudreuil that "the Abnakis would take up the hatchet whenever he 
pleased.But the contradiction between Rale’s statements to Dudley 
and his words to Vaudreuil is more apparent than real.
It is clear that Rale did not accept war as quickly as his words 
suggest. Rale’s position on English-Abnaki relations had been radically 
different in 1702. Governor Brouillan reported that the Abnakis had 
made a treaty of neutrality with the English. More to the point, he
3 accused Rale of being responsible for the Indians' capitulation.
When the Minister of Marine heard this he reacted vigorously. 
"I was very much surprised," he wrote the Superior of the Jesuits, *2
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"to learn that one of your fathers was mixed up in such a business, and 
I believe that you will judge it proper to withdraw him from there...," 
He preferred, he said, "some one who knows better how to manage the 
interests of religion and those of the King, which are inseparable."’ 
Nevertheless, by June, 1703, Pontchartrain had decided to inter­
pret the Abnakis1 treaty of neutrality as beneficial to New France if 
the Iroquois could also be persuaded to that course. He stated tersely, 
however, that "His Majesty considered it wrong [jnauvai0 that their 
missionaries interfered on the side of this neutrality; and I have 
written in his name to Father De la Chaize to have Father Ralle Qs ic] 
recalled [retired] and to send another £priestj in his place.
Yet Sebastien Rale was not removed. After the conference at
Casco in June, 1703, some Englishmen initiated hostilities by sacking 
the home of Castin, an act which the Indians considered an attack 
upon themselves. At this juncture, Governor Vaudreuil turned the 
misconceived English attack to his advantage. He had learned that 
the minister was displeased with the Abnakis1 neutrality and unlike 
his predecessor, Governor Callieres, he believed that the Abnakis should 
be kept involved in warfare. "Sieur de Vaudreuil’s opinion is," 
the minister commented, "that the English and the Abenakis must be kept 
irreconci1iable enemies.To effect that purpose Vaudreuil sent
’Quoted in Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 84.
2
Quoted in ibid.
^Abstract of certain parts of a Despatch from Messrs, de 
Vaudreuil and Beauharnois; with Notes by the Minister, Nov. 15, 1703, 
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 755-56.
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Frenchmen to Acadia to excite the Indians. The result was the attack 
on Casco and Wells in August, 1703.
Sebastien Rale was not responsible for the outbreak of hostili­
ties. He had, it can be said, a rather notorious reputation for inde­
pendence in thought. But by November, 1703, Vaudreuil had already 
encouraged the Abnakis to go to war. Rale understandably tried to 
absolve himself of the pro-English stigma. It was for this reason 
that he wrote Vaudreuil that "the Abnakis would take up the hatchet 
whenever he pleased."
Judging from the reactions of the other missionaries to the 
open warfare in Maine it may be safely assumed that Rale had the 
interests of the Abnakis in mind. Throughout the war years the 
missionaries carefully exchanged their views on the problems of the 
missions. In 1703 they seem to have decided to thwart Vaudreuil’s 
war policy, and more significantly they convinced him of the wisdom 
of the change.
Fathers Gaul in and Aubry proposed to Vaudreuil and Beauharnois 
that they move the Abnakis to Canada. The Indians could not live on 
territory controlled by the English because they were dependent upon 
them for food and ammunition. They could not remain, the Jesuits 
warned, without dying of hunger. They convincingly noted that the 
Indians did not protect Port Royal and that in Canada they could serve 
as a buffer against the Iroquois.’ That Sebastien Rale was directly
\ord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 86. Note 
that the authors ignore Rale's statement that he would excite the 
Indians to warfare. Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to M. de 
Pontchartrain, Nov. 17, 1704, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial 
Documents. IX, p. 7^2.
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involved in the planned move is seen from the fact that the priests 
"and the Indians met at Norridgewock and told the Indians that they 
must look out for some other country, for that it was impossible for 
them to live there."’
In May, 1704, the Abnakis of the Androscoggin hurried to assure 
Beauharnois that they would move. But not all of the Indians were so 
anxious to leave. In June another group told the French governor 
that they served French interests better in Maine and that they did
2
not want to move elsewhere.
It is not known who these Indians were. It is certain that 
Penobscots and Kennebecs were among those who went to Canada. In 1705, 
Colonel Church's expedition to the Penobscot carefully "made diligent 
search in those parts for the enemy; but could not find, or make any 
discovery of them...." Another group of 260 men under Captain Hilton 
was sent against Norridgewock in the winter of 1705. They "found that 
the enemy was gone and had left their rough household stuff, and corn 
behind them."^ Hilton's men had to be satisfied with burning the chapel 
and wigwams to the ground.
1 Thomas Church, The Old French and Indian Wars, from 1689 to
1704, in Benjamin Chur ch, The History of the Great Indian War of 1%75 
and 1676, Commonly Called Philip's War, Samuel G. Drake, ed. (Hartford: 
Silas Andrus & Son, 1851), p. 283.
2
Consil entre les sauvages d'Amesoquenty et Monsieur de 
Beauharnois, May 12, 1704, Collection de Manuscripts, II, pp. 411-13.
^Thomas Church, The Old French and Indian Wars, p. 284, Lord, 
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 87. Boston News-Letter, 
March 5, 1705. Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p. 38.
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Though the surviving records are highly unsatisfactory, it is 
significant that the Jesuits persuaded most of the Abnakis to leave 
Maine. The retreat dramatically underlines the peculiar problems of 
the Abnaki missions. To insist that these men were more politically 
active than their seventeenth century predecessors is not wholly 
correct. Unlike the earlier missions, those of the Kennebec and 
Penobscot were unavoidably involved in the affairs of New England. 
Furthermore the location of the villages made it necessary that the 
Abnakis look to the English, rather than to the French, for material 
ass i stance.
When involved in war, however, the Abnakis became totally 
dependent upon the French for food and ammunition. War simplified 
the Jesuits' problems. In time of conflict, the Abnakis were directed 
by the officials of New France. In peacetime it was the Jesuits who 
had to cope with the complications of English-Abnaki relations.
In Sebastian Rale's case it has been his peacetime role that 
has been correctly emphasized. Queen Anne's War proved to be devasta­
ting. The French lost, for all practical purposes, their whole southern 
coastline. With the English firmly entrenched to the south and east 
of the Abnaki villages the Jesuits' task became far more difficult.
It was this geographic context that caused Rale's outspokenness. 
In 1703 he was censured for encouraging peaceful relations between 
the English and the Abnakis. He never forgot the lesson so painfully 
learned. Caught in the struggles of New England and New France, the 
Jesuit was faced with a difficult decision. It is all the more remark­
able that the priests kept the Abnakis' interests in mind. As 
Sebastien Rale had discovered, he had to offer the administrators of
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New France practical policies or submit to their direction. Rale and
the other Jesuits never faltered in their concern for the Abnakis.
They became the constant factor which provided some stability in the 
turbulent post-war years. Tempered in war, Sebastien Rale's mettle 
would be tested by peace.
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CHAPTER II
THE DAWN AND DUSK OF PEACE: 1712 - 1716
After the Treaty of Utrecht terminated Queen Anne's War in 1713, 
tension on the frontier grew unabated. The Jesuit priest, Sebastien 
Rale, soon came to symbolize to Massachusetts the duplicity of the 
hated French and Indians. That one name, Sebastien Rale, would by the 
1720' s sum up the collective frustration of thirty years of conflict 
with the French for the control of the continent. By 1720, the English 
believed that he alone prevented them from controlling the Maine fron­
tier.
The English of Massachusetts had always viewed the French 
Jesuits with serious misgivings, but at first they had little direct 
knowledge of Rale's work among the Abnakis. By 1716, they had begun 
to realize what was happening on their frontier. Much to their dismay, 
the Abnakis opposed their efforts to assert their authority. Rale's 
letters to the Massachusetts' Governor and Council showed that he 
encouraged the Indians' opposition. His spirited defense of his and 
the Abnakis' interests infuriated the authorities of Massachusetts.
In their view, nothing could be more malicious.
Massachusetts' reaction to Sebastien Rale was oversimplified. 
Close examination of the largely ignored issues of the period shows 
that Rale's opposition was mainly defensive. Though he viewed the 
Puritans with disfavor, he did not oppose them until they threatened 
his Kennebec mission. Seen in this light, the causes of the later war 
are not simple. The English as well as the French must bear their 
share of the responsibility for it. Peace had dawned auspiciously but 
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by 1716 the basic causes of the future conflict had surfaced.
There were definite reasons for Rale's opposition to the
Massachusetts settlers. Their attempts to settle the Kennebec river 
convinced him that the survival of the Abnaki nation was seriously 
jeopardized. He had reason to tell "the Indians that the intruders 
were corrupt land-grabbers who would rob them alike of their property 
and their faith."’ His initial suspicions turned to open distrust 
when Massachusetts ignored her treaty obligations and failed to set 
up satisfactory trading conditions.
When the Bay Colony turned from trade to religion, telling the 
Indians to accept an English minister in place of their scheming 
French priest, Rale was personally threatened. He did not need, and 
did not receive, directions from Quebec telling him that his mission 
rested on keeping the settlers from the Kennebec. Massachusetts 
recognized that her frontier policy threatened the Abnakis. Governor 
Dudley had no hope, he said, of keeping the Abnakis' "fidelity untill 
some English settlements be established...to govern them, and their
2
priests be kept from them...." Neither Rale nor the Abnakis were 
much impressed with Dudley's notions of progress.
Nor could Rale forget the basic antagonism between French and 
British in America. In 1710, after Francis Nicholson captured Port 
Royal and after the abortive expedition against Q.uebec, Q.ueen Anne's
’George M. Wrong, The Rise and Fall of New France (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1928), I I, p. 662. Wrong implies, however, 
that Rale did not have substantial reasons for opposing the English.
2
Gov. Dudley to Council of Trade and Plantations, Dec. 2, 1712, 
Cal of St. Pap., XXVI, pp. 102-103.
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War ground to a halt. The peace treaty made at Utrecht left the borders 
between New France and New England undefined; the area adjacent to 
each, the present State of Maine, became a bone of contention. By 
the Treaty of Utrecht, Louis XIV ceded to the British all of "Nova 
Scotia or Acadia, comprehended within its ancient boundaries...."’ 
But because there were several notions about the ancient limits of 
Acadia, the two crowns agreed that the final settlement would be
2 
decided by a commission.
Unlike Sebastien Rale, the French ministry did not appreciate 
the importance of the Maine lands. Pontchartrain, the Minister of the 
Marine, tried a variety of tactics to secure the best terms for France. 
On August 10, 1712, he told the plenipotentiaries that though Louis 
XIV would agree to cede Acadia to England, it was imperative that the 
British receive only present-day Nova Scotia. If, on the other hand, 
Great Britain would allow the French a toehold on the peninsula, Louis 
was willing to give them the land between the St. Georges and the 
St. John rivers. When the British representatives failed to take the 
bait, Pontchartrain tried a different course. He wrote to the 
plenipotentiaries that His Majesty wanted them "to insist that the
Francis Gardner Davenport, European Treaties on the History 
of the United States and its Dependencies (Washington: Carnegie 
Institute of Washington, 1934),111, pp. 197-98.
2Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, pp. 91-92;
W. S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces; The Emergence of Colonial 
Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), p. 42.
^Lettre de M. de Pontchartrain, August 10, 1712, Min. Aff. 
Etr., vol. 24, part II, pp. 173-76.
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limits be regulated after the peace by the commissioners."’
In the early negotiations the French were willing to cede the 
Maine lands. Having failed in his attempt to get better terms on the 
fisheries and on Cape Breton, Pontchartrain countered by claiming the 
territory as far west as the Kennebec river. In pressing his claim, 
Pontchartain conveniently forgot that the border between New England
2 
and New France had been defined in 1700 as the St. Georges river.
Acadia, he said, was divided into two parts, east and west. He was 
willing to relinquish the western part from the Kennebec to the bay of 
Fundy, but the eastern section was vital to the French for "their 
fishing and navigation towards Canada.Pontchartrain was not to have 
his way, nonetheless. With the understanding that the border was to 
be defined by a commission, the French relinquished all claim to Acadia 
in May, 1713.^
’Lettre de M. de Pontchartrain aux P. P., December, 21, 1712, 
Ibid., pp. 138-39.
2
At that time the arms of the two countries were set up to mark 
the boundary. "Memoire pour servir regler les 1imites....", Oct. 8, 
1718, Arch. Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, p. 203; and Baxter, The Pioneers of 
New France in New England, p. 342.
^Memoire sur les Pays de l'Amerique que la France doit ceder 
aux Anglois par le Paix prochaine, Jan. 13, 1713. Arch. Col., C 11 E, 
vol. 2, pp. 7-10; Drake thought the English should have been warned 
about future difficulties by France's determination to retain Acadia 
in the Treaty negotiations. Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New 
England (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), pp. 290-91.
^Precis de ce que s'est passeTpendant la negoication du Traite 
d'Utrecht au sujet de l'Acadie, Juillet 171l...Mai, 1713, Arch, des 
Col., c 11 D, vol. 8, pp. 3-48; MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces, p. 12.
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Massachusetts, though aware of the vagueness of the Treaty, 
argued that all of the Maine lands were unquestionably hers.’ The 
French were frantically searching for documentary evidence to hold 
British territory to the peninsula of Nova Scotia. Governor Vaudreuil 
and Intendant Begon heartily concurred in the necessity of that 
policy. Father Aubry, a Jesuit formerly stationed on the St. John 
River, wrote an extended memoir in response to a request by Ponchartrain 
for more information. Aubry's point was that the first map of the 
area, drawn by Samuel de Champlain, had called only the peninsula of 
Nova Scotia by the name Acadia. Champlain had referred to the mainland 
by other names. Thus, through Father Aubry, the officials of New 
France took the position that Utrecht gave the British no rights to
2
the mainland.
Pontchartrain's attempt to barter the Maine lands had far- 
reaching implications for Rale's Norridgewock mission. When Great
Britain refused his various offers she said, in fact, that the French 
had no valid claims to the Kennebec. After Vaudreuil learned of the 
terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, he defined the border as the St.
Georges River, which is east of the Kennebec, leaving the remainder
Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jan.
31, 1710, Cal. of St. Pap., XXV, pp. 25-26; Address of the Governor 
and Company of Rhode Island and Plantations to the Queen, November 21, 
1710, Ibid., p. 275; Jeremy Dummer jr. to Lord Dartmouth, Jan. 3, 1711, 
Ibid., p. 334.
Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to M. de Pontchartrain, Nov. 15, 
1713, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 931. 
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to the British.’ Sprague thought that both England and France were 
confused about the "whereabouts" of the boundaries. Actually the
French claim that the Kennebec belonged solely to the Indians was 
quite definite and Rale acted on that assumption. In this manner the
French could maintain at least nominal control of the territory 
because the Jesuits would keep the Abnakis
2 
in the French alliance.
Massachusetts was not impressed with claims of an Abnaki-French 
alliance. Though the Governor and General Court sputtered for years 
about the "Eastern Rebels," the Abnakis had never had close ties with 
them. The fact is, Massachusetts' Indian policy had been and was inept. 
Unlike the French, the Boston authorities did not try to understand 
the Abnakis1 wishes. Nor did they have the advantages of centralized 
administration. Indian treaties were ratified by the executive but 
depended upon the General Court for execution, and Massachusetts was 
prey to the usual feuding between Governor and provincial politicians.J 
The legislators of the Bay colony were unreasonably expedient and true
^Mrs. Le marquis de Vaudreuil et Begon A Rambouillet, June 18, 
1713, Arch, des Col., Serie B, vol. N-35, p. 156; MacNutt, The Atlantic 
Prov i nces, p. 273.
2John Francis Sprague, Sebastien Rale: A Maine Tragedy of the 
Eighteenth Century (Boston: The Heintzemann Press, 1906), pp. 71-72. 
"If it is proper to maintain the Abenaquis in our alliance," Father 
Charlevoix wrote, "the Governor of Boston must be given to understand 
that, if he undertakes to settle any of the lands belonging to our 
Indian allies, it will be impossible to refuse assistance to them...." 
Memoire respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, O'Callaghan, New 
York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 878.
^cf. Oliver Morton Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696— 
1765 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), pp. 15^-58. 
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to form they subjected Indian policy to the fortunes of partisan 
politics.
The Maine frontier had been the scene of almost continuous 
warfare for thirty-eight years and by 1713, Rale and the Abnakis 
welcomed peace.’ The savages took the initiative and approached
2
Captain Samuel Moody at Casco Bay saying they were willing to comply
3
with any terms in settling their differences. Moody showed them a 
letter written to him by Father Rale. The Jesuit had told him that he 
would send a runner to Governor Vaudreuil to stop the Indian raids, if 
Moody informed him of any cessation of hosti1itiesThe Abnakis, 
viewing themselves as free agents, became greatly alarmed when they 
heard this. They immediately declared "they would wholly renounce the 
French interest.
But, Governor Dudley and Captain Moody failed to see the 
necessity of easing the Indians' fears of their intentions.
’parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 220.
2 For a biographical sketch on Captain Samuel Moody (Moodey) 
see: Sybil Noyes, Charles T. Libby and Walter G. Davis, Genealogical 
Dictionary of Maine and New Hampshire (Portland Me.: The Southworth- 
Antheonsen Press, 1928-39), II, (Jefford-Z), p. 487.
^Letter from Capt. Samuel Moody to Gov. Dudley, Jan. 3, 1712/13, 
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 315-16; Mass. Arch. 51: pp. 155-56. 
Both Penhallow and Hutchinson agree that peace negotiations were begun 
by the Indians. Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, pp. 77- 
78; Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and Province of 
Massachusetts, Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1936), II, p. 150.
^Letter from Sebastien Rale to Capt. Samuel Moody, Nov. 18, 
1712, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 334-35; Mass. Arch. 51: 
p. 253.
^Letter from Capt. Samuel Moody to Gov. Dudley, Jan. 6, 1712/13, 
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 317-19.
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Dudley began the preliminary negotiations through Moody by 
telling the Abnakis that he would ignore them if they remained allies 
of the French. Dudley was taking no chances. He asked that they 
voluntarily surrender several of their chiefs as insurance for their 
future peaceful conduct.’ Father Rale disliked that proposition. In 
fact, the very idea of hostages repelled him. "I had so often and so 
strongly talked about it," he reported to Governor Vaudreuil, "that 
they Q\bnakisJ agreed with me...." Evidently Captain Moody heard of 
Rale's opposition, for the hostages were not mentioned at the formal 
conference.
This conference at Portsmouth, held in July, 1713, faltered 
from the start. Governor Dudley was widely respected for his ability 
to confer successfully with the Indians. "No man, it was said, was 
fit to manage Indians unless he had eaten a bushel of salt; and 'Coll.
3 
Dudley had eat more as two,1 wrote one of his enthusiastic admirers." 
Dudley began on the wrong foot, nonetheless, by insisting that the
Indians meet him at Portsmouth, rather than at Casco Bay as they had 
u 4
requested.
The resulting treaty emphasized the vagueness of the Treaty of
Utrecht, as well as the problems of the English and the French with
’Letter from Gov. Joseph Dudley to Capt. Samuel Moody, Jan.
17, 1712/13, Ibid., pp. 317-19.
^Lettre de R. P. Rasle A Monsieur le Gouverneur General, Sept. 
9, 1713, Collection de Manuscripts, 11, p. 562.
^Everett Kimball, The Public Life of Joseph Dudley, A Study of 
the Colonial Policy of the Stuarts in New England, 1660-1715 (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), p. 129.
^'Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, II, p. 150. 
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the Abnakis. Fundamental to Dudley's position was his assertion that 
the savages were subjects of Queen Anne.' The Abnakis were told that 
the King of France had surrendered all their lands to Great Britain. 
This was incomprehensible and they remarked that the "French never said 
anything to us about it and wee wonder how they would give it away
2
without asking us, God having at first placed us there...."
The Abnakis' dismay did not impede the final settlement. By
the treaty, Massachusetts was confirmed in all her "rights of land and 
former settlements" in the eastern parts of the provinces of 
Massachusetts-Bay and New Hampshire. The Abnakis agreed that the 
English might settle the Maine lands without "molestation or claim by 
us or by any other Indians...."^ They were told, moreover, that as 
British subjects they could have no relations with the French.
The Treaty of Portsmouth was no more enlightened than previous 
Indian treaties. It did not represent a mutual understanding between 
the English and the Indians. To an Abnaki it was, like all other 
treaties, so many words. It was a negative document because it bound 
them to refrain from action against the English settlements. Though 
Palfrey called it another of the Abnakis' "untrustworthy pacifications"
'Frederic Kidder, "The Abnaki Indians and Their Treaties of
1713 and 1717," Me. His. Soc., Col lections, 1st ser., (Portland: The 
Society, 1859), VI, p. 251.
2
Journal of Commissioners at Portsmouth, July 13, 1713, Baxter, 
Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 4-9. Rale notes the Abnakis declared: 
'"As for me I have my own land, that the Great Spirit has given me on 
which to live; as long as there shall be a child of my Tribe, he will 
fight to retain it.'" Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, 
Jesuit Relations, LXVI I, pp. 209.
^Kidder, "The Abnaki Indians and Their Treaties of 1713 and 
1717," p. 251; Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p. 79. 
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it is clear that only the English benefited from its terms. The 
treaty's basic premise, that the Abnakis were British subjects, was 
highly questionable. Massachusetts had maintained that pretension 
throughout the previous war but Parkman truthfully said that "when they 
called themselves subjects of Queen Anne, it is safe to say that they 
did not know what the words meant." John Gilmary Shea contended that 
"no intelligent man will believe they understood" the treaty. Rale 
himself remarked that "there is not one savage Tribe that will patiently 
endure to be regarded as under subjection to any Power whatsoever...."’ 
The treaty fully aroused French interest in the affairs of the 
Abnakis. Governor Vaudreuil had returned to Quebec with the intention 
of strengthening the new French stronghold in the Gulf of the St. 
Lawrence. The Ministry wished to move all the mainland Indians to Cape 
Breton Island. But Vaudreuil's plans were shattered by the Jesuits. 
Father LaChasse, missionary on the Penobscot, immediately expressed 
his disdain for the project. Such a suggestion showed, he said, that 
the authorities "must be ignorant of the extreme attachment that these 
Indians bear their country...." He suggested it would be best to 
apply themselves to the settlement of the boundaries of the two
’john Gorham Palfrey, A Compendious History of New England 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), III, p. 265; Parkman, 
Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 221; Sebastien Rale to Nephew, Oct. 
15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 101-103; Charlevoix, 
History and General Description of New France, V, fn. 2, p. 267.
2
Father Joseph Pierre de la Chasse came to New France in 1700. 
Born in France in May, 1670, he followed the usual Jesuit practice of 
study, profession of vows, and teaching. Soon after his arrival he 
was assigned to the Penobscot until 1718 when he became superior of 
the Canadian missions. He held that post until 1726. He died at 
Quebec on Sept. 27, 1749. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, p. 346.
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nations. ’
It is important that the suggestion to maintain the Abnakis on 
their land came from the Jesuits. When the English told the Indians 
that the French had ceded their land, the Abnakis demanded of the 
missionaries: "By what right did the King of France dispose of their 
country?" Had the Jesuits not appeased them, their alliance with the 
French might have ended immediately. But Rale and LaChasse told them 
that the English had been deceived by "an ambiguous expression Qin the 
Treaty^] and that their country was not included in that which had been 
ceded to the English." Father Rale's mission, unlike Father LaChasse's, 
was not within Vaudreuil's definition of the border as the St. Georges 
river. The geographic location partially explains Rale's outspoken 
letters in the later years. Though LaChasse was relatively unpressured 
by the English, he joined with Rale to convince the French authorities, 
both Canadian and European, of the necessity of supporting the Abnaki 
claim to the Kennebec.
Father LaChasse pointed out that the Kennebec was important as 
a route to Quebec, and suggested that New France would be jeopardized 
if Massachusetts possessed it. By coupling his suggestion for the 
immediate settlement of the boundary with the interests of New France, 
he was assured of getting the Ministry's attention. Vaudreuil lost no 
time. In November, 1713, he wrote the Ministry that he had invited the 
Indians to come to Quebec in the hope of offsetting the impression made
’Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, O'Callaghan, 
New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 879-80.
2|bid., p. 879.
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by the English at Portsmouth.’
The Treaty of Portsmouth represented Massachusetts* policy only 
until it was refined and extended in 1714. Though the English knew 
of the tenuousness of their position on the Kennebec, they failed to 
appreciate the necessity of altering their attitude towards the Indians. 
They underestimated Rale's determination to keep the Indians Catholic. 
If Massachusetts had known how much the French feared that the Abnakis 
would be attracted by the superior and cheaper British goods, she might 
have adapted to the circumstances. As it was, she missed the point.
Governor Dudley was an exception. He recognized the need for a 
strong trade policy and suggested measures to regulate it. He wanted 
rigid control, and though the General Court grumbled, it empowered the 
Governor temporarily to license traders. This the Council immediately 
did in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth. The traders were 
required to present their records of costs and profits to the Governor. 
They were, said the Council, "to dispose of their goods so as to under-
4- 
sei 1 the French."
'vaudreuil au Ministre, Nov. 14, 1713, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 
34, p. 49.
z|t was reported in the Council Chamber on Jan. 1, 171^, that 
the Indians were becoming restless. It was suggested that measures 
be taken to insure that the Indians did not join with those of Canada 
"to comitt fresh hostilities & depredations upon Her Majesty's 
subjects" Massachusett's Council Records, Jan. 1, 1713/14, W. S. 
Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the United States: A Microfilm 
Comp i1 at i on.
^M. Begon au Ministre, Sept. 25, 1715, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 
34, p. 49.
^The Council attempted to enforce these regulations. In March, 
1714, one Richard Carr was arrested for loading his boat for the 
Penobscot trade. Mass. Council, March 22, 1714.
This was a judicious policy. It guaranteed the good will of the 
Indians, who wished some regulation of the trade.’ It also protected 
British interests, for it represented the only effective means of 
estranging the Abnakis from the French alliance. However, it was 
ultimately to fail.
When Dudley attempted to renew the policy in May, 1714, he met 
severe opposition from the House. Though he pleaded that the trade 
would be lost to the French, the “House voted to admit the Indians to 
trade with anyone or in any part of the province." The trading in­
terests in the House were opposed to the Governor's power to control 
it. By usurping centralized control the House made it difficult, if 
not impossible, to control the liquor traffic and it was not long
2 
before the traders were again plying the Abnakis with rum.
The new policy also ignored the Abnakis' wishes. In January, 
1714, five Indians appeared before the Council in Boston. Their first 
request was for regular trading houses. They also complained of high 
and irregular prices, as well as the haughtiness of the traders. Dudley 
could not respond adequately; his hands were tied until the General 
Court met in February. Meanwhile, he told the sachems that they were 
to ignore orders from the French Governor. Dudley also said that he 
expected them to convince the Abnakis settled at the Jesuit missions in 
Canada to return to "their Own places upon English grounds....
’At a Meeting with the Delegates of the Eastern Indians, July 
26, 1714, Mass. Arch.: 29, p. 42; p. 46.
2
On the liquor traffic see: Gov. Nicholson to Gov. Dudley, 
Dec. 25, 1714, Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, p. 262; Kimball, The Public 
Life of Joseph Dudley, pp. 130-31.
^A Conference was held with Five of the Eastern Indians, Jan.
11-13, 1713/14, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 51-57.
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But there was little chance that the Indians would obey the governor 
once they realized that trade concessions would be denied them. 
Thus, the recalcitrant House had stripped the province of the one 
ground upon which it could have been truly effective.
Sebastien Rale had some very definite ideas on Massachusetts' 
trade policy. At the end of the year he wrote a blistering letter to 
the English authorities. He deplored the "Disorders and Outrages 
committed among the Eastern Indians by interloping Traders selling 
them ^RumJ and other Strong Liquors...."’ Governor Nicholson of Nova 
Scotia heatedly rejected Rale's testimony: "I know no business a 
French Jesuit has with English subjects," he said. But Massachusetts 
was concerned: her authority was rapidly slipping away. Evidently 
Rale was able to name the culprits for the Council set about investiga-
2 
ting the matter. The truth was clear enough. The petty politicians 
in the House had sabotaged any hope for a planned, effective trading 
policy.
Trade policy was only one part of English bungling. Although 
they stood at least an outside chance of enforcing their will in 
economic matters, when they began talking about religion they were on 
very dubious ground.
The Indians had been having difficulty getting workers to 
rebuild their chapel which had been destroyed by the English in 1705. 
Father Rale needed carpenters, and he wanted his chapel, so he
’Mass. Council, December 27, 171^.
^Governor Nicholson to Governor Dudley, December 25, 171^, 
Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, pp. 262-63; Kimball, The Public Life of 
Joseph Dudley, p. 132.
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explained to Vaudreuil that he had decided to let the Indians try 
to get the workingmen from the English.’ The Kennebec sachem, Bomazeen 
asked Dudley for help, remarking that the Indians were willing to pay 
for the service. He was told that the governor would consider the
2
proposal.
But the matter did not rest there. Rale later reported that 
Dudley said he would build the chapel if the Abnakis would accept a 
Protestant minister, and he ordered the sachem to “send back to Quebec 
the French minister who is in your village." Rale said the Indians 
preferred him to an Englishman.^ His version of the entire exchange, 
however, must be viewed with caution. The minutes of the conference 
make no mention of any comment by the governor on the proposed Church. 
Rale's story has caused a minor controversy nonetheless. Some his­
torians, like Connally, have reported that Vaudreuil "sent workmen to 
rebuild" the chapel. Others deny the French governor's intervention 
after Dudley's supposed refusal and correctly point out that English 
workingmen constructed the church, though with French funds.’4’
’Lettre du R. P. Rasle A Monsieur Le Gouverneur General, Sept.
9, 1713, Collection de Manuscripts, II, p. 564.
2A Conference was held with Five of the Eastern Indians, Jan. 
13, 1713/14, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 57.
^Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, pp. 209-11.
^Rev. Arthur T. Connolly, Fr. Sebastien Rasle, Catholic 
Historical Society, Publication 5 (Boston: The Society, 1906), 
p. 19; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 97; Parkman, 
Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 218.
If this particular event is in question, others are not. During *9
4-7
the summer of 1714, Governor Dudley held a formal conference with the 
Indians at Portsmouth. He expressed his pleasure at the Indians' good 
behavior. While speaking of the responsibilities of the Christian 
faith, Dudley felt moved to offer ministers to the Indians to instruct 
them in the Protestant religion.' His real motive became apparent when 
he complained that the Jesuits attempted to keep the Abnakis hostile 
to the Engl i sh. 2
The Jesuits would have agreed with Dudley's accusation. They 
realized that the success of their work depended upon keeping the 
Abnakis allied with the French. Father LaChasse had remarked to 
Governor Vaudreuil that among the savages the work of God needed the 
cooperation of man, and that the temporal interest served as the basis 
for the savages' faith.It is for this reason that Sebastien Rale 
took so readily to political tools. He wrote his brother that "the 
only band which had united the [^Abnakis} to us so closely is their firm 
attachment to the catholic Faith."^
Governor Vaudreuil worked on more earthly premises. When he 
wrote his annual report in September, 1714, he assured the minister 
that, in his opinion, war with England was more favorable to France 
than peace. He believed, in fact, that the Abnakis were wavering in
'Att a Meeting with the delegates of the Eastern Indians on
Tuesday the 27th July 1714, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, p. 75. 
2|bid., p. 79.
^Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Sept. 16, 1714, 
Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 5.
4
Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
LXVII, p. 197.
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the i r aliiance.’
The French fear that the Abnakis would go permanently into the 
English camp was misplaced. Rale's outrage over the rum trade was 
shared by the Indians. By 1715 they realized that Governor Dudley 
would not fulfill the promises he had made at Portsmouth.
But it was not only trade policy and insinuations against Rale 
that disturbed the frontier. By 1715, the Bay Colony had begun to 
resettle the lower Kennebec river. At the end of May the General Court 
authorized the settlement of two towns, Brunswick and Topsham, one on 
each side of the Androscoggin river. The settlement of the Pejebscot 
purchase, as the lands were called, is a good example of how Indian 
policy took a poor second to the wishes of a special interest group. 
On November 5, 171^, the Governor's Council appointed a committee for 
the "regular prosecution of new Settlements." On the same day, a 
group of seven men purchased the Kennebec lands from the executor 
of the estate of Richard Wharton.3
The seven Proprietors immediately pressed to have their title 
validated, for the Wharton land claim was based on old seventeenth 
century land patents. In February, 1715, they addressed the Land
’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Sept. 16, 1714, 
Collection de Manuscripts, 111, p. 5. Intendant Begon also feared the 
possibility of an Abnaki-English alliance. M. Begon au Ministre, 
Sept. 25, 1715, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 35, pp. 208-11.
2
The Generali Courts Confirmation of our Purchase, May 25, 1715, 
Pejebscot Records, I, in Jenkins, ed., Records of the States of the 
United States...., p. 31.
^Robert Earle Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607-1763," (Ph.D 
dissertation, Yale University, 1933), p. 357; cf. also George A. 
Wheeler and Henry W. Wheeler, History of Brunswick, Topsham, and 
Harpswell Maine (Boston: A1fred Mudge & Son, I878), pp. 21-30.
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Committee and asked that their land be settled “as may make a Strong 
Frontier to the Eastern Parts....11’ The Proprietors did not fear an 
adverse decision because three of their members, Oliver Noyes, John 
Winthrop and Stephen Minot, sat on the Land Committee. Further to 
persuade the Committee, the Proprietors went to the considerable expense 
of taking the members on a tour of the lower Kennebec lands. The
’proprietors Proposals to the Committee appointed by the General 
Court, Feb. 18, 1714/15, Pejebscot Records, I, p. 36.
2
Pejebscot account N? 2, Pejebscot Records, I, p. 31.
^Proprietors Proposals to the Committee appointed by the
General Court, Feb. 18, 1714/15, Pejebscot Records, I, p. 36.
’’’Col. Nicholson to Mr. Popple, Aug. 13, 1715, Cal. of St. Pap., 
XXVIII, p. 261.
^By order & in behalf of the Comittee, May 27, 1715, Pejebscot 
Records, I, pp. 38-39.
9
Committee reported in the Proprietors1 favor.
The General Court and the Proprietors realized that the new 
settlements would provoke the Indians. The Proprietors had promised 
to build four or five towns, each with fifty or more families, within
3
seven years, “if Peace continue with the Indians....11 Colonel 
Nicholson commented: “If that affair is not very cautiously managed, 
it may make ye Eastern Indians jealous....11’* 24 Then too, the Proprietors 
wisely noted that the new towns would “dislodge the Indians from their 
Principal Fishery, keep them from Chief carrying Places & be possibly a 
Means of removing them further from us, if another war should happen. 
A few English colonials recognized that war, under the circumstances, 
was inevitable. The Proprietors' plan said nothing about the sentiments 
of the Abnakis. “I essay'd," said Supreme Court Justice Samuel Sewall, 
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"to prevent Indians and Negroes being Rated with Horses and Hogs; but 
could not prevail.11'
'Samuel Sewall, "Diary", Mass. His. Soc., Col lections, 5th 
ser. (Boston; The Society, 1882), VII, p. 87.
2
Mass. Council, June 28, 1715. Brunswick and Topsham were con­
stituted townships on June 7, 1715. W. C. Ford, ed., Journals of the 
House of Representatives of Massachusetts (Boston: Massachusetts 
Historical Society, 1919), I, p. 19.
o
^Petition to the House of Representatives, July 28, 1715, 
Pejebscot Records, I, pp. 48-49; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, I, 
July 28, 1715, pp. 62-63; Mass. Council, Sept. 16, 1715, Dec. 5, 1715, 
Dec. 24, 1715.
4
William Durkee Williamson, The History of the State of Maine
(Hallowe 11: Glazier, Master & Co., 1832), II, p. 89.
It is not surprising, then, that the Council soon took measures 
to put the new townships into a state of defense "upon consideration 
of the danger of an eruption of the Indians...." The Proprietors 
petitioned in July, asking the House to appropriate 500 and the service 
of fifteen men to repair the old stone fort at Brunswick. They promised 
to bear any expense in excess of that amount and said they hoped to 
finish the reconstruction by winter, "if not obstructed by the 
Indians." The House agreed and the work went ahead.
Arrowsic and Parker's Islands were also being resettled; the 
two were constituted the municipality of Georgetown in 1716. "It was 
a frontier," Williamson said, "more remote than any other place 
attempted to be resettled, and might be a barrier in the emergency of 
war;—therefore an object of the government's special favor.In 
fact, the Council thought the area so vital that it agreed to pay 
for the garrisons at Fort George at Brunswick and Fort Menaskoux at *24
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Arrows i c. ’
The Abnakis reaction to the settlements was soon evident.
Early in 1716 there were rumors that the Indians were arming against
the English. The Council immediately ordered Colonel Partridge to put
the frontiers into a state of defense. A scouting party was sent out
"under pretence of hunting" to investigate the Indians' movements.
At the same time the Kennebec area was reinforced with men and
2
supplies. It was reported in May that the savages were "assembling 
in great numbers...."^ As if to confirm suspicions, an Indian, John
Hegin by name, told Captain Harmon at the Kennebec river that "it 
would not be sage for him to tarry there long."24'
In the midst of this confusion, Bomazeen and Bamegiscog of
Norridgewock, arrived in Boston. Lieutenant-Governor Vaughan did his 
best to find out their business but all he discovered was what they 
too wondered what was behind the persistent rumors of war.^
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, I, June 13, 1716, p. 98;
Convers Francis, "Life of Sebastien Rale," in the Library of American 
B i ography, Jared Sparks, ed. (Boston: Charles C. Little and James 
Brown, 1848), VII, 2nd ser., p. 245; Mass. Council, Feb. 27, 1715/16; 
Henry E. Dunnack, Maine Forts (Augusta: Charles E. Nash & Son, 1924), 
p. 236.
^Mass. Council, March 10, 1715/16;
^Mass. Council, May 28, 1716.
I).
Indian Conference, June 6, 1716, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, 
XXI11, p. 81; Mass. Arch. 29: 53-54; For a biographical sketch on
Captain Johnson Harmon see: Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, 1, p. 311-
^Ibid., pp. 80-82; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, I, p. 97;
The Lieutenant-Governor decided that the Indians were restless because 
of "false Reports of a War likely to break out between Great Britain 
and France." Mass. House Journal, I, p. 82.
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It was soon obvious what was happening. With the onset of 
English settlement, the Indians had split into two groups, one for and 
one against the English. Bomazeen understood what was happening but 
he was notorious for his pro-English sentiments. Father Rale wrote 
directly to the Massachusetts government, and he minced no words. 
He said the sachems were displeased with Bomazeen and Bamegiscog 
because they had not told the governor what the Abnakis wanted.’ 
Bomazeen should have said that the Indians realized the English were 
building forts and settlements to drive them from their lands, just 
as the French governor had told them. Rale continued, saying that the 
Indians knew that no one could buy their land because they could not
2 
sell it. They had to preserve it for future generations of Abnakis. 
Thus, with bluster, Sebastien Rale attempted to halt English expansion.
3
In the Council's words, these were "very bold demands."
There was another letter to the government before the summer 
was over. It left the English with no doubt as to Rale's role in the 
matter. Rale asserted that the English deeds to the land were illegal. 
The English received them, he said, by giving the Indians liquor. He 
said that he constantly reminded the Indians that since they had re­
conquered the land three times, it made no difference what their
’Mass. Council, July 10, 1716.
2Copy of Letter from Sabastian Ralle, 1716, Nathaniel Boulton 
ed., New Hampshire Provincial Papers, Documents and Records relating 
to the Province of New Hampshire, from the earliest period of its 
settlement, 1623-1686 (Concord: George E. Jenks, State Printer, 1874), 
VIII, pp. 753-54.
^Mass. Council, July 10, 1716. cf. also Ford, ed., Mass. House 
Journal, I, August 1, 1716, p. 125.
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ancestors had done.’ These were interesting arguments, but Rale was 
forgetting, in the heat of the moment, that the Indians had validated 
all English titles by the Treaty of Portsmouth, though perhaps he wrote 
the letters with that treaty in mind.
By 1716 the stage was set for the larger conflict. All the 
important issues had materialized, and all the participants,—the 
English, the French, Rale and the Abnakis,--had taken stands. Not 
yet materialized, though still real, was the misunderstanding between 
the English and the French, which would catch the Indians between them. 
The French were as sure that the English were deliberately advancing 
up the Kennebec valley to possess the lower shore of the St. Lawrence, 
as the English were that the French were unjustly attempting to bar them 
from their rightful possessions.
It was not English policy alone that determined Sebastien Rale’s 
opposition to them. He wrote his brother that the English knew of his 
resistance to them during Queen Anne’s war. "These Gentlemen," Rale 
said, "were rightly persuaded that 1, by upholding my Savages in their 
attachment to the catholic Faith, was drawing more and more closely
9 
the bond which unites them to the French."
It is important to note that the Jesuits and Rale had not fully 
determined their policy in regard to the English, for the period was 
a transitional one. In this sense, English actions were extremely
'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 68; Lord, 
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 11. Parkman doubted the 
validity of the English titles. Half-Century of Conflict, I, p. 214.
^Rale to his brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, p. 205.
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significant. The Jesuits were convinced that the English had nothing 
to offer the Indians. Rale said, in fact that; the Bay Colony had 
"employed all sorts of wiles and artifices to separate the Abnakis 
from me."’ LaChasse was more moderate in his statements than Rale 
but his mission was not directly threatened by English settlements. 
Rale was not entirely fair in upbraiding Massachusetts for the liquor 
traffic. The Governor and Council were as anxious as he to stop the 
practice and they took measures to do so, but the House had not agreed 
and the policy had failed. Rale was not convinced, however, by a mere 
show of good intentions.
Sebastien Rale was not, strictly speaking, an agent for the 
French political authorities. As McFarlane noted, "Rale’s position 
as a priest depended on keeping...Norridgewock free from English 
settlement. His political activities were a prerequisite to his 
spiritual duties." Because the French appreciated the importance 
of barring the English they gave him their moral and financial support. 
The Abnakis took a middle position. They said the land was theirs 
alone. They refused to recognize any foreign sovereign though they 
had no aversion to an alliance. As long as they leaned towards the 
French, Sebastien Rale supported their positions.
’Rale to his brother, Oct. 12, 1723, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, p. 205.
2 R. 0. McFarlane, "Indian Relations in New England, 1620-1760: 
a study of a regulated f ront ier," (unpub 1 .i shed Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1933), p. 130.
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CHAPTER 1 I I
THE UNCERTAIN YEARS 1717--1718
During the years from 1712 to 1716 the situation on the
Kennebec became serious. Faced with danger to their Eastern settle­
ments, the English attempted to soothe the alarmed Kennebecs with 
gifts and assurances of their peaceful intentions. For a time the
policy seemed to work. Massachusetts misjudged, however, the persis-
tence of Sebastien Rale. His continued outrage at English attempts to
ally themselves with his Indians effectively nullified their seeming
success.
Since 1715 Rale's growing purpose was to halt all English ex-
pansion on the Kennebec. The rum trade, Massachusetts' attempts to
undermine his authority, and above all, the new settlements aroused
his opposition. Events in 1717 and 1718 underlined the necessity of 
his opposition to Massachusetts. Another treaty, at Arrowsic in 1717, 
warned him that the English would not compromise on their land claims. 
A Protestant minister on the Kennebec drove him to new, frenzied efforts 
against them. By 1718 it seemed as if his policy would be successful. 
The French court, alerted by Rale's tireless efforts, proposed the 
immediate settlement of the boundary to ease frontier tensions.
Underlying the story of these years is an issue which has con­
fused the evaluation of Rale's influence. The settlers on the Kennebec 
met many Indians who professed to be their friends and, as a result, 
James Phinney Baxter concluded that Rale was responsible for the 
Abnakis' arrogance. He and Eckstorm made no distinction, however, 
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between the Kennebecs and the other Abnaki villages.' Despite such 
accounts, the Kennebecs were, in the years 1717 to 1718, united in 
opposition to the settlers. A few notable exceptions, coupled with the 
indifference of the Penobscot Abnakis, has obscured the Kennebec's 
anger.
Central to the antagonism was the manner in which the English
and the French viewed the Abnakis. French-Abnaki relations had, since
1689, represented a vital cornerstone of French Imperial policy. They 
were the only tribe in close proximity to the English colonies on 
whom the French could depend. To the administrators of New France they 
were, if not subjects, then trusty allies. As such, their conduct, 
wishes and disposition were closely heeded. The Jesuits were the 
natural agents of this expedient care.
The Society of Jesus had much influence in the determination 
of French policy. This was especially true of Sebastien Rale. Annual 
reports to the Ministry on the Abnakis were always based on his 
recommendations. The administrators went further: they usually 
included copies of his letters in their annual dispatches. The 
Ministry was in turn influenced by his reports as they were by those 
of Fathers LaChasse and Aubry. When Father LaChasse became Superior
'a typical statement by Baxter illustrates the point. "Though 
fickle and unreliable, the savages dreaded war with the English whose 
power they realized; but Rale was advised by Vaudreuil to urge them 
to prevent English settlement." Pioneers of New France in New England, 
p. 92. "The more desperately the priests worked for France," Eckstorm 
vaguely referred to Rale and the Norridgewocks, "the more firmly did 
their own Indians oppose them." Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Attack on 
Norridgewock, 1724," New England Quarterly, VII (Sept., 1934), p. 547. 
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of the Jesuits in 1718. Rale's opinions were reinforced by an in­
fl uential voice.’
Massachusetts, on the other hand, viewed the Abnakis as a 
problem which warranted a local solution. Thus, Massachusetts' reports 
to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations were largely limited to 
two subjects. First, all grants of land belonged in the royal domain. 
As such, Massachusetts had to convince the Commissioners that the 
Treaty of Utrecht had ceded all the French territory below the 
St. Lawrence to the British crown. It had, then, to argue that the 
Abnakis were true subjects of the Crown, and that the petitioners for 
land from Massachusetts had valid deeds from the Indians. Secondly, 
Massachusetts wished the British government to halt what they saw as 
French interference in colonial matters. They realized that the French 
influence among the Abnakis could be forestalled only by Great Britain.
By 1716 the dissatisfaction of the Indians with the Treaty of 
Portsmouth was apparent. Samuel Shute replaced Joseph Dudley as 
Governor of Massachusetts in the tense atmosphere of an impending
2
Indian war. The serious situation on the Kennebec impressed him, 
and he soon called a conference with the Abnakis.^ The ensuing meeting 
was a dramatic encounter between the English and the Abnakis. Governor 
Shute was not nearly as sympathetic to them as Joseph Dudley had been, 
and the tragedy of the conference rests squarely on his shoulders. In 
his view, Indians were decidedly inferior to the English, and neither
’Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I , p. 346.
governor Shute arrived at Boston on Oct. 4, 1716. Lord, 
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 106.
3Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 68. 
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capable of thought or of significant sentiment. The conference was, 
simply, a solution to Massachusetts* alarm at the threat of an Indian 
war.’ Shute would overawe the Abnakis with the superior might of the 
Engli sh.
The Governor and his attendents waited at Georgetown in a large 
tent for the Indians to arrive. They came down the Kennebec river 
with the British flag the governor had sent them in the lead canoe. 
After the interpreters John Gyles and Samuel Jordan were sworn in by 
Judge Samuel Sewall, the governor addressed the assembled sachems. 
He told them that they were fellow subjects of King George. They 
should avoid all contact with the French, he said, and if they did 
so they would find "themselves safest under the Government of Great 
Britain."
He directed the interpreters to tell the Abnakis that the Bible 
was the only guide for their "Faith, and Worship, and Life." The 
English were anxious, he said, to have the Indians of the same religion 
as themselves. They had therefore agreed to support a Protestant 
missionary for them. He then introduced the Reverend Joseph Baxter,
’The Kennebec settlers were still uneasy about the Indians. 
Edward Hutchinson and John Watts petitioned the House to continue the 
services of the soldiers on Arrowsick Island for another year. Ford, 
ed., Mass. House Journal, I, June 18, 1717, p. 207.
2
Except as otherwise noted, the account of the conference is 
taken from a contemporary pamphlet entitled "Georgetown on Arrowsick 
Island Aug. 9th, 1717." It is printed in "Indian Treaties," Me. His. 
Soc., Col lections, 1st ser., (Portland: The Society, 1853), III, PP- 
361-75. Convers Francis called it the "original and most valuable 
authority concerning this transaction...." "Life of Sebastien Rale," 
p. 24-5. It was originally printed by order of the House of 
Representatives. Mass. House Journal, I, Nov. 18, 1717, P. 251.
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warning them to accept him "with all affection and respect."
Shute explained that the recent English settlements had been 
undertaken for the Indians' benefit. He told them they would profit 
by having the "Trade brought so near them, besides the advantage of 
the Neighbourhood and Conversation of the English...." Closing his 
remarks with an assurance that he was always at their disposal, he 
invited the Indians' comments.
Wiwurna, the appointed Abnaki orator, rose and expressed great 
pleasure in attending the governor, saying the Abnakis hoped "the 
Angels in Heaven rejoyce with us." But he asked to defer his answer 
until the following day. This had been expected and Shute gave the 
Indians an ox on which to feast.
The delegates reassembled the next morning, August 10. A hot 
exchange almost immediately ensued, for Governor Shute disregarded 
time-honored form and continually interrupted Wiwurna. Each time the 
orator begged "leave to go on."
"We have had the same Discourse from other Governors, as from 
your Excellency," Wiwurna started, "and we have said the same to them; 
Other Governours have said to us that we are under no other Government 
but our own." Samuel Shute awoke with a start and demanded: "How is 
that?" Wiwurna explained he had to be frank. "Your Excellency," he 
began again, "was pleased to say that we must be obedient to KING 
GEORGE, which we shall if we like the Offers made us." By this time 
the governor had gotten the Abnakis1 point and was steaming: "They 
must be Obedient to KING GEORGE," he retorted.
And so it went, on and on. As the governor continued to 
interrupt Wiwurna became more defensive. "All people have a love for 
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their Ministers,” the Abnaki explained, "and it would be strange if we 
should not love them that come from GOD. And as to the Bibles your 
Excellency mentioned, We Desire to be Excused on that Point, God has 
given us Teaching Already, and if we should go from that we should 
displease GOD.” The Governor had no comment on this but again inter­
rupted Wiwurna to bring him to the point—the land. The Abnaki 
backed off, temporarily delaying his answer.
The exchange that afternoon was even more vital than the 
morning's. The land question was a delicate one with the Abnakis. 
Fully realizing that they must accept the status quo, they attempted 
to place a limit on further expansion. "We are willing," Wiwurna 
said, "to cut off our Lands as far as the Mills and Coasts to 
Pemaquid." Wiwurna limited Massachusetts expansion, therefore, to 
south of Merrymeeting bay and west of the Pemaquid peninsula. "Tell 
them," Shute interjected, "we desire only what is our own, and that 
we will have. We will not wrong them, but what is our own we will be 
Masters of." Wiwurna pleaded that "It was said at Casco Treaty, that 
no more Forts should be made." Cloaking himself with ail the official 
dignity he could muster, Samuel Shute again interrupted. "Tell them 
the Forts are not made for their hurt, and that I wonder they should 
speak against them, when they are for the security of both, we being 
all Subjects of King George." Expressing his official position, the 
governor noted that he expected "their positive Answer and Compliance 
in this matter, that the English may be quiet in the possession of 
the Lands" they had acquired. By this time the Abnakis were incensed 
with Shute's haughty manner and walked out "without taking leave and 
left behind their English Colours."
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Sebastien Rale had accompanied the Indians to the conference. 
That evening he sent a letter to the governor, telling Shute that 
enquiries had been made on the cession of territory by the Treaty of 
Utrecht. The French king had replied, Rale said, that he had not 
ceded the Abnakis1 land. He had said, furthermore, that he was pre­
pared to aid the savages if the English persisted in their encroach­
ments. Shute rejected the note outright as "not worthy of his regard."
The next morning the governor went aboard his ship and "acted 
as if he were going away." Shute had decided, in the Reverend Baxter's 
words, "not to buckle" to the Abnakis.’ Immediately a canoe appeared 
with two Indians who begged the governor not to leave. Shute told 
them that he would confer with them again but only "if they quitted 
their unreasonable Pretensions to the English Lands, and Complied with 
what he said...."
The chieftains returned at six that evening, leaving Wiwurna 
behind in evident disgrace. The remaining chiefs completely repudiated 
their spokesman and agreed to all the governor's demands. On Monday, 
August 12, the Indians signed a Treaty confirming all previous agree­
ments and "they manifested a desire yt the English might peaceably 
enjoy all their lands, and yt they might live in friendship with ye 
English as long as the sun and moon endured...." Their only positive 
achievement was getting the governor to promise them supplies and a 
good gunsmith.
’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, in possession of 
Me. His. Soc., Portland, Me., p. 6.
2Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., 
pp. 7-8.
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The General Court of Massachusetts was more than pleased with 
the outcome of the conference. Shute had asserted, they believed, 
the "just Right and Title11 of the English to the Kennebec lands and 
the House judged it "a hopeful Prospect of Quiet and Safety to£the 
subjects of] His Majesty who are Resettling in those Parts."' Shute 
himself reported to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations that 
the Indians had confirmed all their former treaties "and entred into 
some new ons." He concluded that the conference would guarantee "the
2
quiet and peace of these Provinces."
Despite Shute's self-congratulatory comments many historians 
insist that the Abnakis were unjustly used. Convers Francis thought 
that Shute would have done his province better service by fixing the 
boundary as the Indians had requested. "The Indians showed themselves 
so eager for peace" John Fiske commented, "that even the insults of 
Governor Shute...fai1ed to produce an outbreak." Sprague found Shute 
"haughty in manner and not inclined to be conciliatory." Herbert
Osgood, called the conference "a classic example" of typical New
England-Abnaki relations and said it showed "the inferiority of the
English to the French in the management of Indian relations...."-^
Opinion is not unanimously anti-Shute, however. Several 
historians have insisted that Rale's influence on the Abnakis had much 
to do with the conference's ultimate failure. They have accepted the
'Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Oct. 26, 1717, I, p. 226.
2Gov. Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Nov. 9, 
1717, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, p. 101.
^Convers Francis, "Life of Sebastien Rale," p. 253; Fiske, New 
France and New England, p. 239; Sprague, Sebastien Rale, p. 60; Herbert 
L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1924), III, pp. 168-69.
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Reverend Joseph Baxter's view that Rale's intervention by his 
"scurrilous Letter" was unwarranted. Buffington said that the letter 
constituted clear evidence that Rale was already "instigating the 
Indians to resist." The most hostile case was drawn up by James Phinney 
Baxter, who insisted the letter was "an artful method of influencing 
the savages against the English, and in view of the articles ceding 
Acadia to the English crown, was unfair in the extreme." James Phinney 
Baxter, it should be noted, says nothing of the unsettled condition of 
the boundary.’
Samuel Shute would have been amazed at the eventual outcome of 
his conference. It was to form the watershed for all subsequent con­
flict with the Abnakis. Shute did not overawe either the Abnakis or
Sebastien Rale; he did convince them, however, that communication with 
him was impossible. Shute had remained impervious to what were, for 
them, highly reasonable suggestions. And Rale now recognized that 
there were tractable Indians who would do anything to appease the
English. Most directly threatening were the new Puritan missionary 
efforts.
The English had discussed the possibility of evangelizing the
Abnakis as early as 1715, but they had had difficulty in finding a 
minister. Samuel Moody, the Minister of York, Maine, attempted informal 
contact, however. He suggested to Bomazeen, the Norridgewock sachem, 
that they exchange sons, one to 1eamAbnaki, the other English. 
According to Samuel Sewall, "Bomazeen could not find it in his heart
’Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Joseph Baxter, Me. His. 
Soc., p. 7; Arthur H. Buffington, "External Relations (1689-17^0)," in 
Albert B. Hart, ed., Commonwealth History of Massachusetts (New York: 
The States History Company, 1928), TT^ P« 87; Baxter, Pioneers of New 
France in New England, p. 80.
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to agree with that Noble Offer.11’
’Quoted in William Ke 11 away, The New England Company, 164-9-1776: 
Missionary to the American Indians (London: Longmans, 1961), p. 258.
2William Ke 11 away, The New England Company, p. 258.
Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 105.
^Adams was paid a visit by Sebastien Rale who was troubled by 
rheumatism. "Mr. Adams hoped for the Norridgewock missionary's grati­
tude and favor thereafter to the English." Evidently his hopes were 
sorely shattered. Rev. Henry 0. Thayer, "Ministry on the Kennebec. 
Period of the Indian Wars," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect i ons, 2nd ser. 
(Portland: The Society, 1899), X, p. 265.
^Massachusetts had two reasons to educate the Indians. First, 
it was the "Intention of our Ancestors," and secondly, it was "the 
surest way to fix them in our Interest." Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal 
Nov. 15, 1716, I, p. 140.
&|bid., Nov. 21, 1716, I, p. 14-9.
When confronted with the success of Rale's mission, Massachusetts 
was finally roused into action.* 2 * The people of the lower Kennebec had 
attempted to attract a minister from beginning of their settlement, 
but they did not succeed until August, 1716. At that time, the Reverend 
Hugh Adams settled at Georgetown and "’began to learn the language of 
the Eastern Indians, with hopes to gain them over from the French 
Popish Idolatry by our own True Protestant Gospel.'"3 But Adams 
lasted only five weeks.’4
Massachusetts' legislature was concerned about this consistent 
failure and passed positive measures encouraging the ministry among 
the Abnakis.|n November, 1716, it voted "to provide some ordained 
minister to go to Fort George, Brunswick to learn the language, to 
visit the Indians, to work himself into their friendship, to promise
& 
them a meeting house for the worship of God, if they will attend it." 
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It also provided the hoped for minister with a generous salary, and 
an assistant.
The legislature unsuccessfully sought a willing minister for some 
time. Finally, in July, 1717, the Reverend Joseph Baxter received a 
years leave of absence from his Medfield, Massachusetts parish and 
accepted the call.'
As might be expected, Rale had little charity for rivals and 
he scoffed at Baxter’s efforts. The Jesuit reported that Baxter 
"went to see the children, he flattered them, he made them little 
presents, he urged them to come to see him; in short, he worked for 
two months with much useless activity, without being able to win a 
single child." Baxter, however, does not mention any such activity 
in his journal. Likewise, English historians largely ignore Rale's 
accusation, though French-Canadians generally accept it. There is a 
reason for this. The French-Canadians wrote religious history and 
they were convinced of the correctness of Rale's position. It is open 
to some question, nonetheless. Rale gives the impression that the *23
'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 71-72.
2Rale to Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, p. 97.
3
One exception among the English historians is Lord, H i story 
of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 114, but then, that volume is
religious history. Eckstorm contended that Shea cleared Baxter of the
charge but Shea only noted that Baxter's journal "is silent in regard 
to the children." Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock, 1724," fn.
10, p. 547; Charlevoix, History of New France, V, p. 268; cf. also
Goyau, Le. P. Sebastien Racle," p. 177 J N.-E. Dionne, Le Pere Sebastien
Rasies. Jesuit Missionaire chez les Ab^naquis/Transactions of the
Royal Society, 2nd ser., IX (1903), pp. 117-34; Emile LauvriSre, Les
j£suites en Acadie,11 Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Frangaises, 
XVIII (2e Trimestre, 1925), p. 206.
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minister was obsessed with the project even though Baxter spoke with the
Indians only intermittently. On several occasions he preached to them 
but there were never more than four or five present. Baxter never left 
the settlements, though Rale implied that he did, and could not have met 
many children. It was one of his duties, however, to instruct the 
Indians and special sums were set aside for gifts for the "Indian 
Children, to encourage them to learn...."’ While Rale clearly exag­
gerated Baxter's activity, there was some basis for his assertion.
Though Baxter angered Rale in attacking Catholic doctrine by
telling the Indians of the necessity "of confessing our sins to God 
& not to men" the Indians seemed "well pleased" with his words. It 
is debatable, nevertheless, how much of Baxter's instructions they 
retained. It hardly seems possible that they understood the nuances 
of predestination and sanctification, and certainly Baxter's arguments 
against using guns on the Sabbath were not designed to appeal to the
o
Abnaki mentali ty.
In October some Indians at Fort George petitioned Governor Shute 
to build a chapel "for the English and us to meet in one Sabath days.'M 
They also asked that Baxter, who had been traveling between settle­
ments, remain at Brunswick where there was an interpreter. Baxter 
wrote that these Indians were from the Androscoggin river, and not 
from Norridgewock.21 And yet Parkman would argue that the incident
’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 21, 1716, I, p. 149.
^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., 
pp. 10-11.
^To the Great Gouarnar at Boston, Oct. 3, 1717, Mass. Arch. 31: 
p. 94; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXII I, pp. 82-83.
^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,
p. 14.
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indicates Rale was becoming less popular.’
Fannie Hardy Eckstorm was also surprised that Rale "was dis­
liked by many of his own Indians." She insisted that "the more 
desperately the priests worked for France, the more firmly did their
. 2
own Indians oppose them." While she correctly emphasized the internal 
conflict among the Abnakis as a largely ignored fact, her conclusions 
must be considerably altered. A mis-dated document has led her to 
believe that the Kennebecs were seriously opposed to Rale as early as 
1718, and the identification of the pro-English Indians is more complex 
than she supposed.3 Eckstorm does not make the basic distinction 
between Norridgewock and the other Abnaki villages. The evidence 
seems to indicate that it was the Penobscot and
who were more seriously pro-English. Though it cannot be denied that
there were pro-English Indians at Norridgewock,
1717-18 is
The issue which divided the Abnaki s came to the fore at the
Arrowsic conference. Even the anti-Engl is,h savages feared the
possibility of war. Seeing no chance for compromise, they ski rted the
issue. "Without talking at this time about lines and limits, we de-
clare ourselves willing," the Abnakis 
settle and occupy, where their fathers did; though we
Engli sh should
very much dislike
Iparkman believed that the Indians were from Norridgewock, Half- 
Century of Conflict, I, p. 229.
2Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 547.
3The document Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, in 
O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 878—81, is misdated. 
The same document is found under the title Memoire sur les Limites de 
l'Acadie, envoye de Quebec a Mgr le Due d'Orleans, Regent, par le Pere 
Charlevoix Jesuite, Oct. 19, 1720, Arch Col, C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 76-85. 
It is also correctly dated in the Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 49- 
54. Charlevoix did not arrive in New France until September, 1720. 
William Kingsford, The History of Canada (Toronto: Rowsell & Hutchinson, 
1888), II, fn., p. 174.
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their forts."’ The Abnakis had not repudiated their stated claims or 
Wiwurna's contention that the English might not settle on Merrymeeting 
Bay. They merely deferred comment until another opportunity.
Thus it was English expansion which divided the Abnakis at the 
Arrowsic Conference. Father Rale and the English obviously saw the 
land issue differently. Rale led the Abnakis to believe that they 
could rely on French aid to maintain their title to the Maine lands. 
Grants from the French king for their support and the construction of 
their chapel reinforced the impression. Father Rale had even threat­
ened Governor Shute with the inevitability of French aid at the 
Arrowsic conference. And there is no doubt that the English were 
unwelcome. Even the Penobscots and the St. John Indians had rebuffed 
English agents when they suggested that they acknowledge King George. 
At the same time, they made it clear that English settlements would not 
be tolerated. Such emissaries never visited the Norridgewock mission. 
But the Kennebec made themselves equally clear at Arrowsic. Their 
protests were effectively gagged, however, by Governor Shute.
Soon the English were building beyond Pemaquid point, the 
Indians' declared eastern boundary. St. Georges Fort was constructed 
near the site of present-day Thomaston in 1719-20. Another fort was
’Quoted by William Williamson, History of the State of Maine,
H, P. 97.
^Memoire du Roi aux Sieurs de Vaudreuil et Begon, June 15, 1716, 
and Same to Same, July 15, 1718, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 
18; 28.
^M. Begon au Ministre, Sept. 25, 1715, Arch. Col., c 11 A, vol. 
35, pp. 209-11", P. Camille de Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la Nouvel le 
France au XVI Ile Siecle (Paris: Alphonse Pi card et s i1s, 1906), H 
pp. 452-55; Council of Trade and Plantations to Mr. Secretary Stanhope, 
June 30, 1715, Cal, of St. Pap., XXVIII, p. 214.
69
built at Richmond, opposite Swan Island, on the western bank of the 
Kennebec.' The Island itself was being settled, as was the eastern 
shore, where "several hundred families" erected homesteads "in various 
2
locations." Settlers at Cork, on the eastern shore, were Scotch-Irish 
"members of a company of 1500 procured by Captain Robert Temple and 
Edward Hutchinson."^ It is little wonder that the Kennebecs were 
alarmed, and Rale warned them that the English would soon be at 
Norridgewock itself.The Indians of the Penobscot and the St. John 
were not similiarly outraged simply because they were not in contact 
wi th the Engli sh.
On the other side of the action, the Reverend Joseph Baxter had 
no idea that the Kennebecs differed in opinion from the other Indians 
he met. When the Indians bitterly condemned Rale, Baxter was misled 
into believing that Rale was solely responsible for their agitation. 
The mistake is understandable for it was mainly the pro-English 
Indians who visited him.
One incident is especially misleading and illustrates how widely 
the Indians were divided. After two Englishmen had killed an Indian 
of Father Lauverjat's mission, the Penobscots resolved to inform the 
English of their peaceful intentions, preferring to call the incident
'Williamson, History of the State of Maine, II, p. 97.
^William Willis, "Scotch-Irish Immigrants to Maine..." Me. His. 
Soc., Col lections, 1st ser. (Portland, The Society, 1859), VI, P. 15.
^Moody, "The Maine Frontier," p. 362.
^'Rapport de Monsieur Begon, Nov. 8, 1718, Arch. Col., C 11 A, 
vol. 39, pp. 144-4-7; Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 33.
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"an accident." Lauverjat advised them to wait until they learned 
Shute's reaction, but they insisted that he write the Governor 
immediately. Vaudreuil later found it necessary to criticize the 
Jesuit for doing so, but the priest explained that if he had refused 
the Indians would have had the letter written by Joseph Baxter.’
The Penobscots had not easily adopted this solution. In 
December, 1717, they held a tribal conference at Pemaquid point to 
discuss the issue. The young men were all for war, but they were 
stopped by cooler heads who warned them: "If you do so, you will do ye 
Devils work & the Devil will take you."2 Notably, the young, hot 
blooded men opposed the English and "Les Anciens," as Vaudreuil called 
them, were willing to submit. Thomas Hutchinson said they "were afraid 
at this time of a new war. The old men were loath to quit their 
vi1lages...where they lived at ease...."^ It is clear that Vaudreuil 
was more concerned with the inconstancy of the Penobscots than with 
that of the Kennebecs. But the young men did moderate the acquiesence 
of "les anciens" to some extent. The Indians asked Shute to remove 
"all those capable of setting them at variance...."’1' Even the *111
’Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31, 1718, 
Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, pp. 127-34; Collection de Manuscripts,
111, pp. 31-32; Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 118.
o
Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., 
pp. 25-26.
^Hutchinson, History of the Province of Massachusetts, II, p. 
166. Joseph Baxter called the old chiefs "the wise men." Manuscript 
Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., p. 26. Deposition 
of Lewis Bane, of York, Dec. 2, 1719, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 365- 
66.
^Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31, 1718, 
Arch, des Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, pp. 128-29; Collection de Manuscripts, 
111, p. 32.
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Penobscots did not appreciate the "conversation” of the English.
Another incident surely convinced the English of Rale's dangerous 
influence. Captain Westbrook showed the Indians a letter written by 
Rale to the governor. The Indians listened attentively as he read it 
and then told him "the Jesuit Lied, and he was very wicked.The 
incident led Eckstorm to declare that "they had come to distrust their 
priests and said openly that they lied." It cannot be determined, 
however, that the Indians were from Norridgewock. On another occasion, 
when Westbrook presented the letter to the Indians, they said 
"Penobscot men are good men, S- would not hurt the English." Westbrook 
was shrewd enough to point out that some Penobscot sachems had signed 
the letter. Then the Indians admitted that they were not present when 
the letter was written and when "they were asked if they desired to 
live in love and peace with ye English...they did not readily answer." 
Rale's English contemporaries did not make the distinction between 
those Indians empowered to speak for the whole tribe and those speaking 
only for themselves.
Apparently the establishment of Rale's popularity is more 
difficult than Eckstorm would have us believe. The English settlers 
saw only part of the action. Though they could not have fathomed 
Rale's reasons, their judgment that he was working against them was 
correct. Unfortunately, their expressed opinions have misled 
commentators to believe that Rale maliciously followed orders from
’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., 
p. 40.
^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 546.
^Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc.,
pp. 47-48.
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Quebec against the Kennebecs wishes.
Sebastien Rale must have perplexed the English, for throughout 
the winter of 1717-18 they received reports about his superstitious 
mutterings. In October Baxter heard that Rale had predicted that the 
world would end in forty-nine days.' Later, in April, 1718, he was told 
that Rale had a vision at night and
felt as it were a hand upon his throat yt almost choaked 
him, & saw a great light again, and heard a voice saying 
it is in vain for you to take any pains with these Indians, 
your children, for I have got possession of them, & will 
keep possession of them.^
A man of Rale's education would be most unlikely to worry about an 
impending doomsday. It could be argued, in fact, that the Jesuit was 
so fully occupied with the English invasion that he had no energy for 
a contest with Satanic powers. But it is well known that the savages 
were highly susceptible to rhetorical imagery. What effects these 
supposed apparitions had on Baxter is unknown. Perhaps he reported 
them to the General Court when he made his formal reports in November,
1717, and June, 1718.3
Joseph Baxter and Rale did exchange several letters which did 
little to increase either's understanding of the other. Father Rale 
was infuriated by Baxter's attack on Catholic doctrine, and wrote him a 
long letter in defense of the Church. Baxter, who was about to return 
to Boston, wrote a short note in Latin. Rale immediately added more
’Manuscript Journal of the Rev. Joseph Baxter, Me. His. Soc., 
pp. 14-15.
2 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
3 Ibid., p. 17. Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, II, June, 4,
1718, p. 11.
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remarks against Baxter's doctrinal position and made the insulting 
contention that Baxter's Latin was less than accurate. In April, 1719, 
Baxter re-entered the argument to defend himself. The Jesuit, Warrior 
for the Faith, must have been sorely disappointed, for the minister 
avoided all discussion of doctrinal matters. Certainly Rale was not 
pleased with Baxter's disparagement of his personality as choleric, 
but then he had been less than tactful himself.’
At this point, Governor Shute entered the fray for his orthodox 
proteg^. He delivered Rale a long homily on the duties of a mission­
ary. He said he had not found Rale's conduct amenable to the 
Apostle's exhortation:
What then. Notwithstanding every way, whether in 
pretence or in truth, Christ is preached, and 1 therein 
rejoyce, yea and I will rejoyce.
Shute thought it extremely unworthy of Rale to fault Baxter's Latin. 
A missionary, he said, should have better things to do. He included 
a copy of the law against Roman Catholic priests, which, he pointed
2out in a postscript, Rale would "do well to consider of."
Rale had written Shute in August, 1718. He had warned the 
governor of the temper, or rather the distemper of the Abnakis and 
noted, in particular, their "warlike and terrible genius." The 
Indians were thoroughly dissatisfied with the Treaty of Arrowsic.
’some of these letters are preserved in the Massachusetts 
Historical Society Archives. They are also printed in Baxter, 
Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 85-87; 14-3-53; 397-404. 
cf. also Lord, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 114.
^A Letter from Gov. Shute to Ralle’ the Jesuit, Feb. 21, 1718/19, 
Mass. His. Soc., Col 1ections, 1st ser. (Boston: The Society, 1798), 
V, pp. 112-19.
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Shute shrugged off Rale's complaints with a remark that the English 
had nothing to fear as long as the Indians were used.’
Nevertheless, the liquor traffic continued unchecked as Rale 
had pointed out and as Shute realized. It was, undeniably, a major 
irritant on the Kennebec. On May 29, 1718, Shute attempted to goad 
the House to action by depicting the "fatal Consequences" of the
2
trade. The resulting bill, "An Act in addition to the Act for pre­
venting Abuses to the Indians," was passed on June 21, 1718.Later, 
Samuel Moody confirmed the governor's fears when he declared "that 
all the disorders which happen amongst them are occasioned by Strong
k
Drink, that is sold to them by Coasters...." Even Joseph Baxter 
had harsh words against the itinerant coasters and trading sloops.
The Indians were in an uproar. In reaction to Rale's letter 
the Council sent forty men "to make discovery of^their] designs...& 
if need be to secure the Frontiers from danger....Governor Shute 
informed the Council of Trade that "the Indians by the instigation of 
their Jesuits have of late been very insolent." Some of them were 
killing cattle on the Kennebec. When they were accosted by the English 
who demanded payment, they made what Governor Vaudreuil called a 
vigorous answer: "Complain all you want to the Governor," they said, 
"he is not my judge. And as for the payment for the cattle, ask
’ibid.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, May 29, 1718, II, p. 5.
Ibid., June 21, 1718, p. 37.
Ib id., June 27, 1718, p. 48.
^Mass. Council, Aug. 6, 1718.
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whoever told you to settle there." Shute must have cringed when he 
heard that remark, for he had assured the Council of Trade that he 
would "be able to prevent a war breaking out."’
The situation was equally tense for the French. By the end of 
1718, the administrators of New France realized that the Abnakis had 
nearly reached a crisis. Rale's letters and reports had become more 
and more frantic. The boundary was still not settled, and the English 
were gaining control of the contested area.
Rale advised Vaudreuil that Shute encouraged the expansion on 
the orders of the King of England. He reviewed all the troubles that 
must have haunted the French governor's sleep. The English had the 
advantage in times of peace and they put the occasion to good use. 
There was only one solution to the problem, according to Rale, and
2 that was the prompt settlement of the boundary.
Sebastien Rale's warning that Shute was sending 200 families 
to settle the Penobscot, 500 to the Sieur de St. Castin's Pentagoet 
post and 500 more to the St. John, startled Vaudreuil and Begon into 
action. Vaudreuil told the Council of Marine that he could not and 
would not refuse the Indians aid if they were attacked by the English. 
On the other hand, he softened his strong words with a plea for 
di rections.3
'Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31, 1718, 
Collection de Manuscripts, 111, p. 32; Governor Shute to the Council 
of Trade and Plantations, Sept. 29, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, p. 
358; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, June 12, 1718, II, p. 21; Oct. 
29, 1718, p. 60.
^Rapport de M. Begon, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 39, Nov. 8, 
1718, pp. 144-47; Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 33-34.
3Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil, Oct. 31, 1718, 
Collection de Manuscripts, 111, p. 32.
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Begon also took Rale's advice and wrote a long memoir on the 
boundary. Citing historical precedent, ancient maps, and expedience, 
he favored holding the English to the peninsula of Nova Scotia. While 
he admitted that the St. Georges river was the true boundary, he main­
tained the French claim to the Kennebec. It was best, he advised the 
Council of Marine, to draw a line from the source of the St. Georges 
to the source of the Hudson. Such a line would keep the Abnakis in 
the French alliance. He reminded the Council that though the Abnakis 
were Roman Catholics, they would not remain so for long if the English 
gained control of the territory. As Rale pointed out, the Jesuits 
would be removed, and the Abnakis once docile would become the scourge 
of New France. They could pillage and destroy all the French habita­
tions from the southern coast to the St. Lawrence.’ Rale was no 
French agent. Vaudreuil and Begon used his letters to convince the 
minister of their quandry and prayed his predictions would not come 
true.
Governor Vaudreuil did his best to maintain the French claim 
to the contested area despite an apathetic home government. He en­
couraged the Acadians to move to the St. John which, he said, “is not 
part of the English dominion.112 The Acadians were not so eager as 
Vaudreuil. But assurance came easily to the governor's lips and he 
tersely replied that he would not “suffer the English to take 
possession" of the St. John. He named Father Loyard as his
’Memoire pour servir^ regler les Limites, Nov. 8, 1718, Arch. 
Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 14-29.
2
Marquis de Vaudreuil to M. Louis Al lain at Port Royal, and 
Same to Same, Sept. 22, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 406-07.
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representative with powers to give the settlers land grants.
Meanwhile, Governor Vaudreuil had written Lieutenant Governor
Doucett of Nova Scotia that he would do his utmost to maintain the new 
treaty of alliance between England and France. He made it clear, 
nonetheless, that the French considered the St. John theirs. The 
exchange left Doucett shaken. He pleaded with the absentee Governor 
Philipps to "put a stop to their proceedings, or el Ice they will claim 
everything within cannon shot of this Fort...."' It was clear that 
New France was not going to accept British claims gracefully.
The shrill warnings of Vaudreuil and Begon must have awakened 
the Council of Marine, for it replied, despite the newly concluded 
alliance with Great Britain, that "Justice seems to require that Acadia
2
be reduced to the peninsula." "The English pretensions," they noted, 
"are exorbitant." They finally proposed to do something to ease the 
s i tuat i on.
Louis XV communicated the good news to Vaudreuil and Begon on 
May 23, 1719: The ambassador to England had proposed the nomination 
of commissioners. He had requested that Governor Shute be prevented 
from sending more settlers into the disputed area. Louis XV also 
agreed that the English settlers already there should immediately 
be removed. He added that he could not give Vaudreuil specific in­
structions because he did not know if George 1 had accepted the
'Marquis de Vaudreuil et Lt. Governor Doucett, Sept. 22, 1718, 
Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 405-06; Lt. Governor Doucett to Governor 
Philipps, Dec. 13, 1718, Ibid., p. 405.
council Deliberations on Vaudreuil's letter of Oct. 31, 1718, 
March 14, 1719, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 100.
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proposal. He noted, nonetheless, that Vaudreuil might use the Indians, 
or any other method he saw fit to prevent English settlement. He 
cautioned Vaudreuil to do nothing to jeopardize the alliance with 
Britain.’
The British government was amenable to Louis XV's suggestions.
They realized from the reports of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia that 
the French would take advantage of the unsettled condition of the 
frontier. By the middle of July, 1719, the British had accepted 
France's offer and had appointed Martin Bladen and Daniel Pulteney 
commissioners.^ Their instructions sketched the official British 
position based on the commission of the last French governor of Acadia. 
Such a claim would give Great Britain the land east of the St.
Georges.
Vaudreuil and Begon joyfully greeted the king's decision. But 
they reported that George I had not stopped Governor Shute. They had 
learned from Rale that the governor threatened to send 500 more men 
to the Kennebec. They were not alarmed as Rale also sent two chiefs 
to Quebec. The sachems told Vaudreuil that the Abnakis were determined 
to oppose the English and had invited the other villages to aid them. 
By 1719 then, Rale, the Abnakis and Vaudreuil were confident that 
English expansion on the Kennebec could be thwarted.
’Memoire du Roy a Messieurs de Marquis de Vaudreuil et Begon, 
May 23, 1719, Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 40; O'Callaghan, 
New York Colonial Documents^ Fx^ p. 892.
^Mr. Delafaye, Secretary to the Lords Justices to the Council 
of Trade and Plantations, July 16, 1719, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXI, 
p. 162; The Boston Gazette, March 7, 1719/20.
^Lords Justices Instructions for Daniel Pulteney and Marten 
Bladen, Nov. 4, 1719. Cal, of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 252-53; Mr. Vaughan 
and Mr. Capon to the Council of Trade and Plantations, June 10, 1719, 
Ibid., p. 120.
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Since 1716 the Abnakis had moved from vague apprehension to 
open hostility to the English. Ever behind the scene was Sebastien 
Rale exhorting both the Indians and the French officials to immediate 
action. His efforts were finally bearing fruit. Diplomatic efforts 
were his first recourse. But he was fully prepared to inspire both 
the French and the Abnakis to grapple with the English to protect 
their mutual rights.
’Rapport de M. Vaudreuil et Begon, Oct. 26, 1719, Arch. Col., 
CHE, vol. 2, pp. 34-36; C 11 A, vol. 41, p. 68; Col lection de 
Manuscripts, III, pp. 41-42.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IRRECONCILIABLE CONFLICT 1719—1721
Historians have sought a unifying link for the causes of the 
conflict after 1718 in a variety of factors. James Phinney Baxter 
stressed the increasing malignity of the savages encouraged by 
Sebastien Rale. Eckstorm followed his lead, but her interpretation 
ignores Rale's frantic concern for his Indians.' Thus, the opposing 
view, especially that of the French-Canadian historians, has stressed 
the hostility of the English to the person of Father Rale. A corollary 
of their hypothesis is the belief that the New Englanders were primarily 
motivated by a religious zeal which found Jesuits a particularly 
obnoxious form of popery. Closer examination qualifies but does not 
deny either of these views. The English did come to regard Rale as 
the source of their troubles and the Jesuit did nothing to placate 
them. One factor, however, concerned all the parties involved. Only 
the conflict over the land was basic, irreconci1iable.
While Eckstorm had viewed the division among the Abnakis as 
evidence that anti-English opposition originated with Sebastien Rale, 
she had not noticed a similar disaffection among the English. As the
'Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 92ff; “By 
his sheer personal domination and by his power of excommunication, 
which he threatened to use,11 Eckstorm noted, “Rasies held down the 
peace party and imposed his will upon the tribe." "The Attack on 
Norridgewock," pp. 559-60.
^Edouard Lecompte referred to the English as "the fanatics of 
New England," "L'Apotre des Abenaquis," L'Action Francaise (juillet, 
1924), p. 24; see also Dionne, "Le Pere Sebastien Rasies," p. 126; 
Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien Racle," p. 178.
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disagreement between the Abnakis and the English reached a crisis it 
became apparent that some English men accepted the Indians' complaints. 
Nor could Massachusetts' Executive Council and House of Representatives 
agree on a course of action in regard to the Kennebecs.
There was an obvious contradiction between what Massachusetts 
desired and what she asked. She insisted, in the first place, that
if the Indians were wronged, they 
Crown, to petition the government 
assured the troubled sachems that 
Indians' complaints were ignored, 
provincial interests.’
Long before 1718, the
the flagrant rum trade and the
Indians
had the right, as subjects of the 
for redress. Dudley and Shute 
they would be justly used. The 
however, when they conflicted with
had lamented the grasping traders,
new Kennebec settlements. Both Dudley
and Shute vowed to regulate the trade and to halt the liquor traffic.
Their efforts were only spasmodic, however, and met the often deter­
mined opposition of the House. There was no hope for negotiation on 
the land, and the settlements proved to be the ultimate irritant. On 
that question the English had nothing to discuss. They contented them­
selves with asserting their rights by unearthing moldy patents to prove 
their case. Not surprisingly, Rale remarked: "There is no Justice
of this chapter is a contradiction of what might 
thesis. "What emerges from my investigation...", 
a conviction that the New England Puritans followed 
considerate, and just policy in their dealings with 
T. Vaughn, New England Frontier, Puritans and
L i ttle, Brown and Company, 1965), p. v i i.
H i s
If
’The material
be called the Vaughn 
Vaughn remarked, "is 
a remarkably humane, 
the Indians." Alden
Indians, 1620-1765 (Boston:
Vaughn's book carries Indian-Puritan relations only up to 1675. 
thesis does not explain Abnaki-Massachusetts relations after 1713. 
anything, Massachusetts was caught between her expressed concern for 
Indians and the fact that the policy broke down under partisan political 
pressures.
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among'st the English,"’ and there was substance to the assertion.
Like many unseen, unheard minorities, Rale and the Abnakis
resolved to rectify the situation. They began what was, for the 
eighteenth century, non-violent protest. It was extraordinary that 
the Indians restrained themselves in this manner. They neither scalped
Instead, they killed cattle, for which,
Rale said, the English had only themselves to blame.As long as the
English continued to ignore the Indians' real or even imaginary com-
plaints there would be no peace 
not convince the Abnakis with words, their only recourse was to arms.
Wilcomb E. Washburn, in a particularly succinct account of
Indian versus European ownership of the land, has made some general 
observations that are applicable. He extrapolates his view from a 
conception of 'right' involving natural, speculative and finally 
expedient rights. Washburn's argument is relevant to the conflict on 
the Kennebec after 1715. The clash between each of his notions of
3
right can easily be seen.
There was, first, the Abnakis' natural right to the land. Such 
possession was qualified in the eighteenth century by the Indian 
grants of the seventeenth. The Abnakis were caught in a peculiar 
situation and remarked upon it. They felt that they could not be bound
’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7, 1720, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in 
New England, p. 102.
2 lb i d., pp. 97-98.
^Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justification for 
Dispossessing the Indians," in James Morton Smith, ed., Seventeenth 
Century America: Essays in Colonial History (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1959), PP. 15-32.
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by deeds made by chiefs long since dead. They were supported in their 
argument, surprisingly, by some Englishmen. Thomas Coram of London, 
claimed that Massachusetts had no valid claim to the Indians’ land. 
He contended that the deeds, received some sixty years before, were 
fraudulent, having been received from rum-plied Indians.’
There was also the conflict over speculative rights. Both 
Great Britain and France claimed the northern colonial frontier by 
right of discovery and by formal treaty agreements. After 1713, that 
conflict focused on the settlement of a boundary and on the definition 
of what the Treaty of Utrecht meant by the words "Acadia or Nova Scotia.
The question of effective control, or expedient right, was more 
basic. Since Utrecht proved to be so vague, Massachusetts moved to 
assert her claims by sending settlers to the Kennebec. The French 
were not less active. After the missionaries warned them that French 
interests were in danger, they encouraged the Council of Marine to 
act decisively to save for New France both the land and the Abnaki 
al 1iance.
’"General Nicholson said, he had conquered the said land from 
the French for her late Majesty; that no place had more controverted 
titles than the land now in dispute; to clear which the Assembly of 
Massachusets Bay had lately examined into them; as to the unfair 
clandestine practices, which Mr. Coram said, were used in obtaining 
purchases from the Indians by debauching and making them drunk, Col. 
Taylor said, there had been a general treatment with the Indians by 
Col. Dudley late governor of the Massachusets Bay, and to prevent such 
ill practices for the future, the government of that province allow 
no grants, without registering there." Journal of the Commissioners 
for Trade and Plantations from March 171^-5 to October 1718 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924), June 6, 1717, P. 239. 
Debauched or no, the government of Massachusetts had accepted the old 
Indian titles as legal, and no opposition from Rale or from the Abnakis 
could convince them otherwise.
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But the most important conflict over expedient right was between 
the English and the Abnakis. Massachusetts asserted that she would 
possess what was hers and built forts to insure her ability to do so. 
Utilizing European notions of ownership, the Indians claimed the land 
by conquest. The Abnakis noted that they had driven the English out 
three times, and said they could and would do so again.
More realistically, the Indians recognized the claims of the 
English to the land already settled. Thus, the Abnakis, and even Rale 
were willing to compromise and to allow the settlements of Brunswick, 
Topsham, Georgetown, and Augusta to remain. They refused to consider 
or to permit further expansion up the Kennebec.
Governor Shute made it clear at the Treaty of Arrowsic that he 
would contest the Indians* title to the Kennebec. There were two 
alternatives open to the governor. He could negotiate with the 
Abnakis or he could force them to accede to his wishes. Unfortunately 
for all concerned, he chose the latter course. As Washburn pointed 
out: "Man thinking will continue to tell us what the law ought to be;
man acting will tell us what the law is."’
The implications of Shute's decision were not immediately clear. 
For several years the English and the Abnakis sparred over vaguely 
defined issues. The government at Boston, divided politically between 
House and Executive Council, was equally split over hard or soft-line 
policy. Time and again, reason won out and the government chose to 
send commissioners to treat with the Abnakis. The commissioners,
’washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justification for Dispossessing 
the Indians," p. 32.
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however, did not distinguish between negotiation and assertion of 
right. They did more demanding than discussing. The result, so 
familiar and so seldom avoided, was predictable.
Rale, unlike either the Abnakis or the Massachusetts government, 
remained inflexible. It became apparent that the Jesuit represented 
more his own opinions rather than those of Vaudreuil. Sebastien Rale 
was calling the shots, though often recklessly. With the knowledge 
that the French court was working towards a settlement of the boundary, 
he became increasingly impatient and arrogant.
When Joseph Heath and John Minot arrived at Norridgewock in
April, 1719, Rale's thinly veiled threats convinced them that he was 
"an Incendiary of mischief."’ Rale told them that the Canadian Indians 
had written the Kennebecs "that in giving away their lands, they kild 
themselves and them to, and that they were Obliged to assist them in 
case of any injustice done them by the English...." The Jesuit was 
convinced that letters, remonstrances, and petitions to the English 
were futile. Stronger measures were needed, and he believed a threatened
Indian alliance would frighten Shute.
Rale repeated the Indians' position to Heath and Minot. He 
noted that "rum was the greatest reason of all the disturbances in the 
plantations." The Indians had not given the English permission, Rale
Unless otherwise noted the quotations are from: Joseph Heath 
and John Minot to Gov. Shute, May 1, 1719, Mass. Arch. 51: 316-17;
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 446-47; but see also their other 
accounts: Deposition of Lewis Bane, Dec. 2, 1719, and Deposition of
John Minot, Nov. 27, 1719, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New 
England, pp. 279-80; Gov. Shute to Council of Trade and Plantations, 
Dec. 7, 1719, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXI, pp. 282-83; and Depositions of 
Bane and Minot, ibid., pp. 365-66.
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said, to settle above Arrowsic mills, and yet they had pushed on. He 
reminded them that the boundary between New England and France had not 
been settled and defiantly added that Vaudreuil had been ordered to 
protect the Abnakis.
The Englishmen also spoke with the Indians, who thought the 
disturbances insignificant. They said that the Indians who terrorized 
the English were not their "Bretheren.11 The guilty ones were "prayer­
less." It was Sebastien Rale, they contended, who was inciting them by 
"telling them that...in two years Qthe E nglish] would be so strong 
that they would not be able to remove them."’
Though the Englishmen never realized it, the pro-English Indians 
had contradicted themselves. They accused Rale of engineering the 
crisis and yet said the trouble-makers were "prayerless." That could 
not have been true. It was the pro-English Indians who opposed Rale 
and flattered Joseph Baxter. The others, faithful Catholics all, 
opposed only the English. And yet the Indians were divided and were 
becoming more so. Vaudreuil was beginning to realize that even the 
Norridgewocks leaned heavily towards the English.2
’Deposition of Lewis Bane of York, Dec. 2, 1719, Baxter, 
Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 279.
^Most obvious among the pro-English Indians was Bomazeen. Heath 
and Minot found him "very inclinable" towards the English and sent 
their letter to the governor by him. The Council rewarded him and his 
companions for the service. They gave each coats and shirts of "bleu 
Cloath." Only Bomazeen, however, received a coat of silver thread. 
Later, the Council learned that Bomazeen was quarreling with the other 
Indians. They wondered why. The answer is obvious. Bomazeen, 
resplendent in his new finery, was ridiculed for what he was: pro- 
English. Heath and Minot to Gov. Shute, May 1, 1719, Mass. Arch. 51: 
p. 317; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, p. 447; Mass. Council, May 13, 
1719, May 17, 1719, and Sept. 11, 1719.
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The Indians' protestations of friendship to Heath and Minot 
barely lasted the summer. On November 4, 1719, Shute addressed the 
House of Representatives. He could not believe, he said, that the 
Indians would attempt "an open War with us, so long as the strict 
Alliance continues, between His Majesty and the French king...."’ 
He was not gambling on good will, however. He had already written 
Vaudreuil to remind him of the "strict Alliance" between England and 
France. He also qualified his hopes with a request for legislation 
to halt the "Insolent and Injurious" treatment of the "Inhabitants of
2 
the New Settlements...." His opinion was reinforced the next day 
when the Pejebscot Proprietors asked to be "Protected from...the 
Norridgawog Indians,"* 23 and it was decided to send commissioners to 
talk with the Indians.
’Mass. Council, February 21, 1718/19.
2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 4, 1719, II, pp. 174-75.
3lbid., Nov. 5, 1719, p. 176; Dec. 2, 1719, p. 206. William 
Tailer and John Stoddard were chosen to represent the government. 
Dec. 9, 1719, p. 221.
^For the official minutes see: In re Conference at Falmouth, 
Jan., 1719/20, Mass. Arch. 29: 57-63; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts,
XXIII, pp. 83-87.
In January, 1720, the commissioners went to hear the Abnakis1 
complaints and to seek the causes of their conduct.Their report 
stressed the objections of the Indians to the settlements above and 
north-westward of Merrymeeting Bay, specifically the English on Swan 
Island and the town of Cork on the east side of the river. The 
commissioners had produced a deed to the area but the Indians insisted 
that "the persons Executing that Deed were all Amriscoggin Indians 
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(except one) and never had any Right thereto....11 For once, the English 
had been beaten at their own game. Wiwurna's objections to settlements 
"above the Mills" had been confirmed. The commissioners also advised 
the governor that the Abnakis were being encouraged by Vaudreuil and 
by the "Cunning Insinuations of that Incendiary the Priest...." They 
had no doubt that "the Priest go's on in his inveterate hatred and Malice 
against us."
The commissioners decided the Indians had some valid complaints.
They found that they were often "overcome with Rum and Strong Drink 
Supplyed by many of the English...." To rectify the abuse, they 
suggested that trading houses be built and staffed with "Truck masters 
under Bond and Oath for their Fidelity...." Private traders would be 
thus discouraged and the Indians would become "more dependent on this 
Government...."
It was as though Rale had the results of the commissioners' 
investigation before him when he wrote Captain Samuel Moody on Feb. 7, 
1720. The commissioners had suggested through the faithful Bomazeen 
that some of the Norridgewocks go to Great Britain as guests of 
Massachusetts. Rale warned Moody that "if they do I shall drive them 
forever from the Church."’
Rale had reached the limits of his patience. His frequent 
missives to the Governor, Dudley and Shute had had no effect. The 
English were becoming stronger on the Kennebec, and they were now
’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7, 1719/20, Baxter, Pioneers of New France 
in New England, pp. 96-104. Except as otherwise indicated the quota­
tions that follow come from this letter. Flynt's Manuscript Commonplace 
Book in the Mass. His. Soc. Boston, also quotes the letter. 
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considering expansion towards the Penobscot. Nor had the Abnakis 
successfully frightened the English. Disgusted with his failure, 
Rale's letter was remarkable, its eloquence surviving a rough trans­
lation from the French. Rale was so bitingly sarcastic that the 
councillors in Boston dubbed it "the railing letter."’
Rale tersely analyzed the Treaty of Arrowsic. He said that the 
Abnakis approved of nothing but what Wiwurna had said; they left only 
because there was no ground for further discussion. The English had 
made it clear that "it's vain talking" with them. The Abnakis had set 
limits to the settlements and the English had refused to listen. Thus, 
Rale said that "If the Indians kill Cattle below the Mill towards the 
seaside they must absolutely pay for them...." He added with great 
frustration that "Any treaty...particu1 ar1y that of Arrowsic is Null, 
If I don't approve it, though the Indians have consented, for I bring 
them so many reasons against it that they absolutely condemn what 
they have done."
The Jesuit was particularly angered by Shute's attempts to 
observe his actions, as Heath and Minot had done. "They inquire about 
my words: do they intend to unite against me," he asked, "to drive 
me from my Mission? that would be a retirement from misery...." He 
added, however, that "Whatever you may think you can't move me." He 
called Shute a "Warrior" and warned him of the disasters of an Indian 
war. He suggested that the English save themselves considerable 
embarassment and recall their settlers, "for assuredly, there shall 
not one remain there."
’sewall, "Diary", VIII, p. 245.
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The letter bears the evident marks of Rale's personality.
Confident, proud, uncompromising, Rale reacted to the English threat 
with single-minded purpose. James P. Baxter correctly called the 
letter threatening, arrogant and vain.’ But, it was vanity born of 
frustration. Rale proclaimed that "a Missionary is not a Cipher like 
a Minister," only because the puritan divines were a conspicuous threat. 
He promised to write a book telling the world how "the English treat 
the Indians," how they answer his demands by telling him that the 
Jesuit "bid you say it." Rale pointed out, with some reason, that an 
underlying cause of the misunderstanding was the interpreters who, he
2 
claimed with characteristic relish, spoke "nothing but Gibberish."
Rale also sketched the nature of his influence on the Abnakis.
He couldn't make them declare war; he was, after all, a priest. In­
deed, he declared that he could "absolutely hinder them when they haven't 
solid reasons for it...." But he significantly added that he wouldn't 
stop them if that was the only way to preserve their land. In that 
case, he said, "1'11 tell them they may make war."
His contention that he and the Abnakis were taking a moral 
stand on the issue is true to character. In 1720 some of the 
Norridgewocks gave Shute Rale's translation of the Lord's prayer. The 
words we "must not think or take revenge" substituted for "we forgive 
those who trespass against us," stand out in bold relief.* 3 Rale 
’Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 104.
^Rale's judgement about the English interpreters can be accepted 
for theirs was only a nodding acquaintance with the language. Rale's 
facility came from systematic study, he could read as well as speak 
the language.
3"lndian Terms and Definitions," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect ions,
1st ser. (Portland: The Society, 1857), V, pp. 427-28.
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clearly recognized the vengeful nature of the Abnakis, and instructed 
them that revenge was not the 'Christian way.' He also taught them 
that their duty was to protect their lands for future generations of 
Abnakis. He told them, moreover, that if they did not do so he "would 
go away from them."’
Rale's warnings carried some weight with the Indians for in 
July the House received word that several families had fled and "the 
rest are likely soon to follow if not Protected." Shute took the 
commissioners advice and decided to be conciliatory. He addressed the 
House and suggested that the colony set up a "few Truck-Houses," 
reminding the representatives that they were obliged to do so "by our 
several Treaties...." Rale's letter coupled with the Norridgewock's 
attacks against the settlers deeply impressed the governor for he 
asked that general boundaries be set up between the Indians and the 
Engli sh.
Characteristically, the House held a more poignant view of 
Massachusetts' rights than those of the Indians. It did not feel that 
trading houses would be effective. It asserted, to the contrary, that 
they would arouse "Feuds and Animosities among the Indians...." The 
Representatives were equally adamant about the proposed boundary. In 
their opinion, the boundaries had already been settled "in the former 
Treaties." Finally, the House declared that the Indians would not be
’Rale to Moody, Feb. 7, 1720, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in 
New England, p. 100. This was what Lord called Rale's severe test of 
the Abnakis. History of the Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 122.
2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 19, 1720, II, p. 249.
^Mass. Council, Mar. 3, 1719/20; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, 
July 13, 1720, I I, p. 236.
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disturbed on the lands which "of Right belong to them."’
On July 10, the Indians threatened the people at Cork. One of 
the Norridgewocks told an Englishman that the Indians "had fought three 
times for this land &...would fight Again for it was Never Sold to ye
2
English...." Williamson found the contention an exhibition of "good 
sense and a just regard for their rights."3
The Abnakis also sent a petition to the government of
Massachusetts. They asked that boundaries be determined, and that a 
trading house be built for them and the Council agreed. The Councillors 
pressed for immediate action on the request so that they might avoid 
all "just cause" for complaint.21 But again, the House rejected their 
motion.Barring concrete action, the Council advised the governor 
to assure the settlers that Capt. Moody had been ordered to protect 
them.&
’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 19, 1720, II, p. 247. 
^Belknap Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., 61 A. pp. 89-90.
3wil liamson, History of the State of Maine, II, p. 105.
^Ford., ed., Mass. House Journal, July 21, 1720, II, pp. 255-57.
51 bi d., July 22, 1720, p. 257*, p. 259.
^Mass. Council, July 20, 1720.
/Letter from Capt. John Gyles to Gov. Shute, Aug. 10, 1720,
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 456-57.
In August, John Gyles made his intelligence report. As usual, 
the bearer of the letter was Bomazeen who, he found, was "very Desirous 
to Go to Boston." Gyles noted that the previously complacent Penob- 
scots had received a shipment of gunpowder from Canada and that Thomas 
Thorn had been convicted by Justice Penhallow for selling the Indians 
rum. Gyles hoped that "such meathods will Put a stop to Lickring...."^
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Though the Indians had helped to convict Thorm, they were still 
not placated. On August 22, it was said that "the eastern Indians 
continue to insult the People in killing their cattle, and robbing 
their Houses; They are all in Garrison as far as York this way.11' 
By this time the Council was almost as exasperated as the House. To 
calm the irate citizenry, it resolved to demand "satisfaction of ye
'fhe Boston Gazette, Aug. 22, 1720.
2Mass. Council, Aug. 23, 1720.
3Mass. Council, Sept. 2, 1720.
2
Indians for ye damages they have done...." They advised the governor 
to write to Vaudreuil about how the "Priests & others" encourage them.
Opinion within the Council was not unanimous, however. Samuel 
Sewall, Edmund Quincy and Jonathan Belcher broke with the majority 
and delivered a separate statement. They advised the settlement of a 
boundary not only because the Indians "have some Lands of their own," 
but also because they felt it was not "just for this Governmt. to 
encourage private persons to settle themselves," unless the boundary 
was decided. Nor did they agree with the government's policy of 
constructing forts on the Maine lands.
Nevertheless, the Council went ahead in its plans to strengthen *23
94
the Kennebec and to chastise the Indians.’ In October, the Council 
sent Colonel Walton to have a preliminary meeting with the Indians to 
plan a conference for late that fall. The Indians arrived with a 
French flag but, when Walton refused to talk with them because of it, 
they left it behind. The Abnakis promised to confer with their villages 
and to inform Walton when they would meet the commissioners.* 2
’The Boston Gazette, Sept. 5, 1720. Nor did Massachusetts forget 
the Indians. Their past relations with the Penobscots had been excel­
lent. They sent gifts to the chiefs of that village and the policy 
paid off. The Penobscots assured Gyles “of their peaceful inten­
tions...." They added that they had "been to advise our brother 
Narangawock Indians that hath a hunted you People, to Consider of 
them Selves & do so no more." Gyles had assured Shute that his "Privet 
informar" would warn him of "Enything Extrordenary." Mass. Council 
March 25, 1719/20; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, July 21, 1720, II, 
p. 255; Letter from the Penobscot Indians. Sept. 16, 1620, Mass. Arch. 
31: pp. 65-69; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 87-89.
2lndian Conference at Georgetown, Oct. 12, 1720, Mass. Arch. 
28; pp. 64-65; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXI I I, pp. 94-96; Flynt, 
Manuscript Commonplace Book, Mass. His. Soc., pp. 283-84.
^The House voted that John Leighton, Sheriff of York County, 
should accompany the forces to apprehend Rale. If the Indians refused 
to "surrender up the Jesuit" the commanding officer was to take hostages 
to be held until they did so. Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 4, 
1720; II, pp. 270-72. Lord pointed out that this was the first time 
that the "anti-priest" law of 1700 was applied to the Kennebec. Prior 
to this time the status of the territory was in doubt. History of the 
Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 125. As late as 1718 the Council of Trade 
was unsure if Massachusetts' claims to the lands between the Kennebec 
and the Penobscot should be granted. Norridgewock was situated on the 
east bank of the river. "Council of Trade and Plantations to the King," 
May 21, 1718, Cal, of St. Pap., XXX, pp. 254-55.
When the House of Representatives read Walton's report it was 
displeased. It thought the Council's measures inadequate for bringing 
the Kennebecs to terms. The Representatives promptly resolved “That 
it is deragatory to His Majesties Honour and very injurious to this 
Province, that Monsieur Ralle a French Jesuit and Missionary should in
3defiance of the Law, Reside in any part of this Province....1' The
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House asked that the governor take "effectual Methods for his Removal" 
and passed a resolution for two hundred and fifty men to be sent to 
Norridgewock to apprehend him. The Representatives decided that the 
Indians should make immediate restitution for their "many wrongs,"' 
and despite Walton's promises to the Abnakis, voted that they should 
come to Boston to do so.
The Council disagreed with the House's strong-arm measures and 
insisted that the commissioners be sent to confer with the Indians as 
planned. The Council requested that "three Gentlemen of Distinction, 
Ability and Integrity...be joined with Col. Walton in Seeing and Treat­
ing with the Indians...." The House refused and only military men 
represented the government.* 2
'Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Nov. 5, 1720, p. 272.
2
Mass. House Journal, Nov. 5, 1720, II, p. 273; Nov. 7; Nov. 8, 
1720, p. 275; of. also McFarlane, "Indian Relations in New England," 
pp. 73-74.
Conference with the Indians at Georgetown, Nov., 1720, Mass. 
Arch., 29: 65-74; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 97-108; the
conference is also mentioned in Flynt, Commonplace Book, Mass. His. 
Soc., pp. 285-86.
The conference opened on November 25, 1720. The Indians at once 
demanded "that the People may be removed from Merry Meeting" bay.3
The commissioners refused to discuss the issue until the Indians 
assured them they would make restitution "for ye Wrongs done us...."
The Abnakis replied that they knew that their young men caused the dis­
turbances but added that they had hindered them when they could.
"Then," the commissioners retorted, "you Ought...to punish them for 
their insolence & If you can't restrain them you shou1d...have deliver'd 
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ym to us...." The chiefs tried to explain that "If all those people 
were removed from Merry Meeting Bay, all other Differences between us 
would be easyly composed....11
’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Dec. 9, 1720, II, pp. 334-35.
2 lb id., pp. 338-39.
3|bid., Dec. 12, 1720, p. 341.
Ignoring their statement, the Englishmen demanded: "What 
security will you give us...for we will take your words no longer." 
After a long silence, the sachems asked "How many skins are we to pay...?" 
Arguing to the last, the Indians agreed to pay 200 skins and to surrender 
four chiefs within twenty-five days.
Not surprisingly, the House refused to accept the commissioner's 
report. Instead of sending the Indians to Boston to answer for their 
behavior, they had "presumed to Enter into a Treaty" with them. The 
House did not approve of the innovation and insisted that it was not 
in "the Honour or Interest of this Government, to have Persons retained 
in their Pay and Service, that have no regard to the Orders of the 
Government...." Even though the commissioners met the Indians on 
orders from the Council, the House decided to withhold their pay until 
"the Indians duly comply with what is stipulated on their part."’
Meanwhile, the Council capitulated and decided thatL.200 should 
be offered for Rale and that the government should provide another 
o
minister for the eastern service. A few days later a committee was 
named to consider the best means for "the Removal or Apprehension of 
Sebastian Ralle" and the Council found it opportune to send the 
Penobscots t_43 of goods for their loyal behavior.3 *2
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The Indians had promised to surrender four chieftains to the 
English, and they did so. On January 13, 1721, Joseph Bean presented 
the hostages to the Executive Council.’ In accepting the hostages 
the Council jeopardized its own "honour" and authority. The Abnakis 
soon regretted their moment of weakness and demanded that their chiefs 
be returned. Such a concession on the part of Massachusetts would 
have been a fatal sign of weakness. Unwittingly, a few commissioners, 
acting on their own authority, had created a major irritant between the
2
English and the Abnakis.
The conference was especially important because it was the 
pro-English Indians who spoke with Walton. Even they demanded that 
the English leave Merrymeeting Bay. To an important extent, then, 
opposition to the English settlements was independent of Rale. But 
when the English wished, at the end of the conference, to discuss the 
settlements, the Indians replied: "We have said all yt we were ordered 
to say." Though they had been directed by the whole village to oppose 
the settlements, their opposition was only nominal. The commissioners 
did not miss the opportunity, however, and reiterated English claims 
to the Kennebec.
The conference and the surrender of the hostages has been much 
remarked upon. H. C. Schuyler correctly said that the Abnakis feared 
"the English would use forcible means to obtain satisfaction for their
’Mass. Council, Jan. 13, 1720/21. For a biographical sketch of 
Joseph Bean (Bane) see: Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, I, p. 85.
2Lord noted that "for a moment, however, it apparently served to 
set aside another angry demand of the House for drastic military action." 
History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1, p. 126. Later, when the Indians 
grew angry at the government's retention of the hostages the colony had 
to refuse to free them or lose their argument on the eastern settlements. 
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recent forays....11' Parkman mentioned Rale's "great chagrin"* 2 at the 
capitulation of the peace party. Several historians have commented on 
the election, sometime in the fall of 1720, at which "a well known 
advocate of pacific measures" won.3 They failed to notice, however, 
the reason for the election of the pro-English party in the first 
place.
’H. C. Schyler, "The Apostle to the Abenakis, Father Sebastien 
Rasies, S. J., 1657-1724," Catholic Historical Review, I (1915-16), 
pp. 171-72. ~
2Parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict, I, pp. 232-33.
3Wi 1 1 iamson, History of the State of Maine, II, p. 105; Baxter, 
Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 106; Lord, History of the 
Archdiocese of Boston, I, p. 126.
^This is the misdated document in O'Callaghan under the title 
Memoire respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia. 1718, New York Colonial 
Documents, IX, pp. 878-81. It is properly entitled Memoire sur les 
Limites de l'Acadie, envoye de Quebec a Mgr le Due d'Orleans, Regent, 
par le Pere Charlevoix, Jesuite, Oct. 19, 1720, Arch. Col. C 11 E, 
vol. 2, pp. 76-85; Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 49-54.
Events of the previous summer had shattered French-Abnaki rela­
tions. There is no doubt that the Abnakis, and even the peace party, 
opposed the English settlements on Merrymeeting Bay. Some of these 
had the will to do something about it. They sent delegates to explain
4 
to Governor Vaudreuil "the situation in which they were placed." 
Vaudreuil's answer to their pleas for assistance was devastatingly 
inept and completed the internal rupture of Rale's mission. Vaudreuil 
assured the Abnakis that
he should never fail them, in time of need. But what assis­
tance, Father, will you give us? they asked. My children, 
answered Mr de Vaudreuil, I shall secretly send you some 
hatchets, some powder and lead. Is this the way, then, the 
Indians retorted, that a Father aids his children, and was it 
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thus we assisted you? A Father, they added, when he sees his 
son engaged with an enemy stronger than he, comes forward, 
extricates his son and tells the enemy that it is with him he 
has to do. Well, replied Mr de Vaudreuil, I will engage the 
other Indian tribes to furnish you aid. At these words the 
deputies retorted with an ironical laugh--Know, that we all 
who inhabit this vast continent will, whensoever we please, 
as long as we exist, unite to expel all foreigners from it, 
by they who they may.’
Thus, Rale's policy of supporting the Abnaki claim to the land
was dangerously aborted. Vaudreuil had lost, in one slip of the tongue, 
much of the influence he had had with the Norridgewocks. The governor 
and Intendant Begon feared that the Abnakis would capitulate to Mass­
achusetts. Begon did "not judge the Abenaquis of the present day,"
2 
Charlevoix said, "by the Abenaquis of former times...." The
Norridgewocks were obviously divided, even to the extent that Rale's
3
life was in danger. Yet the task of reuniting the village was in
his hands.
Only the missionaries, Charlevoix contended, had "the power...to
persuade them the Abnakis to submit to
4
general." By that was not actually the
the will of the Governor­
case. As subsequent events
’Memoir respecting the Abenaquis of Acadia, 1718, O'Callaghan, 
New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 880.
Rale, Missionary at Naurantsoak, did, indeed, make 
prevent this settlement, the consequences of which he 
did not consider himself bound to make any stronger 
because it would be an useless risk of his life....
^"Father
some efforts to 
foresaw, but he 
demonstrat ions,
He knew that a price had been set on the head of his confrere, Father 
Aubry, for the same reason, at the beginning of the last war, but this 
Father succeeded in removing the English, and had nothing to fear from 
any of the Abenaquis, circumstances which no longer exist.'' Ibid., 
My italics.
1 b i d. , p. 879.
100
were to indicate, Vaudreuil clearly followed Rale's lead. The governor 
wished to prevent Massachusetts' settlement of the Kennebec, but it 
is clear from Rale's previous actions, and letters that he was motivated 
by what he considered Massachusetts' injustice to the Norridgewocks.
Massachusetts had made a serious error in demanding that the
Indians surrender hostages. Rale used the incident to convince the 
Kennebecs that the English colony could not be trusted. The Jesuit 
was embarrassed that the Abnakis had voluntarily submitted. He tried 
to hide the truth about the incident by reporting that the Indians 
were beguiled into sending emissaries to the English who then held 
them against their will.’ He obviously knew differently. Surviving 
letters from Begon and Vaudreuil show that he understood the true cir­
cumstances of the incident. The letters show, moreover, that he was 
using every means to convince the Indians of the folly of their
2
actions. In doing so, he was not following orders from France. The 
policy is entirely consistent with his action since 1713, and it is 
equally clear that Vaudreuil and Begon cooperated with him and not
’Rale to Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
LXVII, p. 103. Rale wrote this letter after the outbreak of the war. 
He hoped that it would encourage aid from France for the Abnakis. He 
had an obvious reason, then, for hiding the fact that the Abnakis were 
divided among themselves.
zBegon to Rale, June 14, 1721, and Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25, 
1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 54-65. These were printed 
in the Mass. House Journa1, III, which also prints another letter of 
Vaudreuil to Rale, June 15, 1721, pp. 189-92. Oddly, Father Charlevoix 
author of the document describing the incident, follows Rale rather 
than his own document. Nor does he mention the disruptive meeting 
of the Abnakis with Vaudreuil in the summer of 1720 in his history of 
New France. Many French-Canadian historians, following, Charlevoix, 
are likewise in error. Charlevoix, History and General Description of 
New France, V, pp. 271-72.
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vice versa.
Sebastien Rale was determined to drive the English from Merry- 
meeting Bay. He was aware that the English had ordered the Indians to 
dismiss him and he resolved to use every means available to undermine 
the pro-English Indians in his village. The English planned to meet 
the Abnakis to hear their answer on Rale's dismissal. The Jesuit 
decided to "pack" the conference. He sent six Indians to invite the 
Abnakis at St. Francis and Becancourt to join the Kennebecs against 
the English. At his behest, Vaudreuil hastened to those villages to 
insure that they did so.'
Rale was desperate; many of the Indians of Norridgewock no 
longer listened to his words. He sent Vaudreuil a memoir on the senti­
ments that the governor should impress on the Kennebecs. Vaudreuil 
complied, and delivered a long harangue against the English. "I think 
you will find," Begon reported to Rale, that the governor's speech was 
"in the Sense proposed by you." Father LaChasse joined in to encourage 
the Kennebecs, then at Quebec. Likewise, after hearing from Rale 
Vaudreuil decided against writing an angry note to Shute. Instead, 
he accepted Rale's proposals: The Kennebecs must remain on their lands, 
and they must unite in "Speaking Firmly to the Englishmen."* 23
'Begon to Rale, June 14, 1721, and Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25, 
1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 54-65; Vaudreuil to Rale, 
June 15, 1721 ; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, III, pp. 189-92. 
Williamson understood that Vaudreuil went to St. Francis and Becancourt 
of his own initiative and that he excited the Indians and then informed 
Rale. His error is a result of a garbled translation of Vaudreuil's 
June, 1721, letter to Rale. History of the State of Maine, II, pp. 
105-06.
2Begon to Rale, June 14, 1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, 
p. 59.
3 lb id., pp. 55-57.
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Vaudreuil and Begon found it easy enough to agree with the 
Jesuit’s plans, but his intensity worried them. The two administra­
tors realized that nothing could be done to jeopardize the French 
alliance with Great Britain. Tactfully but emphatically, Begon told 
Rale the importance of acting judiciously. Three times he warned him 
about "The prudence with which we Deem ourselves obliged To act toward 
The English, so that we may not Commit ourselves."’
Governor Vaudreuil decided to send Rale's superior, Father 
LaChasse, to the Kennebec, He would be able to enlist the aid of the 
Penobscots, as well as the Indians of Canada. The governor had an 
ulterior motive, however. LaChasse was to explain to Rale what the 
governor resolved to do "until the Council of Marine has Explained 
Whether The King's intention Is that the French should join the 
Savages...or whether he will Content himself with supplying Them with
2
Munitions of War...." Vaudreuil, it seems, was taking no chances. 
It may have been that he had learned that his conduct was under some 
censure in France.3
Though a definite gamble, Rale's program was an unqualified 
success. Samuel Moody, sent to Arrowsic to learn if the Indians had 
ousted Rale, reported instead that their "design is to bring their
Arch. Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 69-75. McFarlane mistakenly noted that 
the correspondence between Rale and Vaudreuil "indicated that French in­
fluence was one of the chief causes for the Indian raids made on the 
Maine frontiers in the years 1720-21." "Indian Relations in New 
England," p. 134.
’Begon to Rale, June 14, 1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
LXV 1 1 , P» 57 o
LXVI1 ,
^Begon to Rale, 
p. 55.
June 14, 1721, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations,
3Memoi re secret de M. Dauteu i1 a M. le Due d'Orleans, Jan. 1720,
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Skins hither premptorily to demand their Hostages upon the Delivery of 
them."’ The Abnakis had no intention of dismissing Rale. Moody said 
they "insolently charge the Govern^ Folly in makeing New Demands,
before the Matter is finished referring to the skins which they are to 
pay." In July, Moody added that Rale and the Indians were at Arrowsic 
"Inquireing dayly after their Men,"3 and worst of all, the Penobscots 
had joined the Kennebecs.
On the 28th of July, 200 Indians marched with Rale, LaChasse, 
Castin the younger and a French officer to Arrowsic Island where they 
accosted the English. "The Indians," in Vaudreuil's words, "then threw 
down two hundred beavers, which they had promised for the cattle that 
had been killed, and demanded at the same time, where were the four
h
men they had conveyed to Boston as hostages for this payment."
When they were told that the governor would not surrender the 
hostages, the Indians had Father LaChasse read their letter. The 
Abnakis demanded: "Is it to live in peace with me to take my land 
despite me?" "Consider Great Captain," the Indians addressed Shute, 
"that I have frequently told thee to retire off from my lands, and I 
repeat it to thee now for the last time...It is not thine by gift; the 
King of France, thou sayst has given it to me; but has he power to give
1 Letter to the Gov. from Samuel Moody, June 5, 1721, Mass. Arch. 
51: 353; Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, pp. 462-63.
^Letter from Moody to Gov. Shute, June 19, 1721, Ibid., pp. 463-64.
3Letter from Samuel Moody to Gov. Shute, July 8, 1721, Ibid.,
pp. 464-65; For the order to the Indians for Rale's dismissal see: 
Mass. Council, Jan. 24, 1720/21; May 6, 1721.
’’’Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Begon to Louis XV, Oct. 8, 1721, 
O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 904.
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it to thee? am I his subject? The Indians have given it to thee. Some
Indians that thou has overreached by making them drink, have they the
power to give it to thee to the prejudice of all their nation...?11 As 
with most of the petitions that Rale inspired, the Indians’ letter 
ended with a terrible threat. "I wait then," the sachems said, "thy 
reply within three Sabbath days; if within this time thou dost not 
write me, that thou hast retired from my land, I will not tell thee
’Letter of the Abnakis to Governor Shute, Arch. Col., Se'rie F 
3, Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 502-07; Baxter, Pioneers 
of New France in New England, pp. 111-18; Also printed in Ford, ed., 
Mass. House Journal, Sept. 1, 1721, III, pp. 109-11. cf. also Memoire 
sur les Entreprises que les Anglois de Baston font sur les Terres des 
Abenakis sauvages allies des francois, Dec. 28, 1721, Min. Aff. Etr., 
vol. 339, pp. 132-36; Mass. House Journal, Aug. 24, 1721, III, p. 89; 
The Boston Gazette, Aug. 28, 1721.
2Govr Shute to the Canadian Governor, July 21, 1721, Baxter, 
Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 298-99.
3Mass. Council, July 25, 1721.
i.1 again...."
Shute was thunderstruck. He wrote Vaudreuil at once, though in
tactful terms. He felt sure, he said, that the French governor intended 
to live faithfully by the Treaty of Utrecht. He felt justified in 
asking Vaudreuil to censure the French officer and to recall Sebastien 
Rale. He added that if a war broke out between the English and the
2 
Abnakis he expected Vaudreuil's "Friendship and Assistance therein."
Without waiting for Vaudreuil's reply, Governor Shute and his
Council immediately dispatched men to the frontier and named commission- 
ers to meet the Indians at Arrowsic. The Indians' threat frightened *23
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the governor and he hastened to calm them. The English settlers, much 
alarmed at the confrontation, fled the frontier. Shute, after much 
hesitation, took the Council’s advice and issued a Proclamation "to 
Command and Require that all Persons by Law fit to bear Arms who have 
deserted the Frontiers immediately and without Delay return to their 
Habi tat ions...."’
Governor Phillips of Nova Scotia thought the incident was "no
o
more than a drunken inspiration," but Massachusetts was more alarmed. 
Upon hearing that "the Indians refuse to treat with our Commissioners," 
the House began to consider "the best methods for securing the Eastern 
Settlements."^ The House not only proposed to add 150 men to the 350 
already on the Kennebec, but thought it necessary to send 300 of them 
to Norridgewock. The representatives angrily demanded that both Rale 
and Castin be surrendered. If the Indians opposed the invading force, 
the troops were to "proceed to kill and destroy them by force of 
Arms...."24' Pains were taken to pass an act prohibiting trade with the 
Indian rebels. The Council quickly agreed and demanded that the
’The Boston Gazette, Sept. 23, 1721.
^Governor Phillipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations,
Aug. 16, 1721, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII, p. 388.
^The Boston Gazette, Aug. 28, 1721; Ford, ed., Mass, House 
Journal, Aug. 28^ 1721, FT I, p. 94.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Sept. 7, 1721, p. 124; Sept.
8, 1721, p. 126.
Indians "under pain of being prosecuted with utmost severity, to deliver 
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up the Jesuits and other Heads and Formentors of their Rebellion at 
Boston by the first day of November....11’
’Ibid., Sept. 5, 1721, p. 117. Only crusty old Samuel Sewall 
objected to the Council's decision. He said that "the Indians shewed 
a great Reluctancy against Erecting Forts higher up the River; and 
against the arrival of a Multitude of New Inhabitants;.... They also 
desired the Running of a Line between the English, and them; and made 
some Proposals on their part, which were rejected; but no Proposals 
for fixing Boundaries, were offered to them." Samuel Sewall, "A 
Memorial relating to the Kennebeck Indians," Me. His. Soc., Col 1ect ions, 
1st ser. (Portland: The Society, 1853), 111, PP- 351-53.
2Vaudreuil to Rale, Sept. 25, 1721. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
vol. 67, p. 63; Mass. Arch. 51: 358-59.
Governor Vaudreuil was smugly satisfied with the outcome of the 
march on Arrowsic. "For my part," he wrote to Rale, "1 Am of opinion 
that, If they have taken a Sincere resolution not to allow The English 
On Their Land, they Must not hesitate to Drive them Therefrom as Soon
2 
as possible...." Though he told Rale he could not give the Abnakis
men, he said he would provide them with ammunition.
Vaudreuil‘s task was not made easier by the king and ministry.
The Governor received nothing more concrete than vague orders to en­
courage them to oppose the English. Begon and Vaudreuil had differ­
ent ideas. "M. de Vaudreuil is persuaded," they wrote the king, 
"that if his Majesty permit him to adjoin some French with the Abenaquis, 
the English will be forced to abandon all their settlements on the 
lands belonging to these Indians...." Negatively, he warned the 
king that if he did not do so he feared "that they will unite with the *2
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English against us....11’
Undoubtedly with Rale's encouragement, the Indians sent a 
petition to the king. They asked him to stop the English "or to enter 
into the war which they are resolved to make for the defense of their
2
country." Rale was determined to make it clear that the ministry could 
no longer avoid a decision on the Abnakis, and a memoir was sent the 
French Procurer for the Jesuit missions asking his aid.3
The English and the Abnakis could not have been closer to war.
English indecision, as well as that of the Abnakis', seriously hampered 
mutual discussion of the issues. No black and white relationship can 
be drawn between Rale and the causes of the conflict. Many of the 
councillors, and even Shute himself, realized that Massachusetts bore 
her share of the guilt. From the political quarrel between the Council 
and House a policy inadvertently emerged. It was a product of the 
House's militancy and the Council's wavering hesitancy. Even more basic 
was the inadequate and often presumptuous treatment of the Indians. If 
indeed they were subjects of the British Crown, their rights were only
^Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to Louis XV, Oct. 8, 1721, 
O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 906; Arch. Col. C 11 
A, vol. 4-3, p. 234; Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 61; Le Roy aux 
Sieurs de Vaudreuil et Begon, June 8, 1721: The king said, it should 
be noted, that he was pleased with Rale's opposition to the English. 
Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 54; Arch. Col., F. 3, Collection 
de Moreau St. Mery; vol. 10, part 1, pp. 170-72.
2Parolle des Abenakis au Roy, Oct., 1721, Arch. Col., Serie F. 3, 
Collection Moreau St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 499-501.
3Extrait de quelques lettres de Jesuites Missionaries de Canada, 
au Pere Davaugour Leurs Procurer en france, depuis la fin d'aoust, 
jusqu'au commencement de Decembre 1721, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, 
pp. 179-80.
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vaguely defined.
The importance of Rale's influence is undeniable. His personal 
distrust of the English, and to what they symbolized for his mission 
is a key aspect of the conflict. Much less well-defined was the role 
of the government of New France. Their attention to the Abnakis and 
to Rale's irate missives was only cursory.
In 1716 they had assured the ministry that the construction of 
chapels at Norridgewock and at Meductic would cement the alliance with 
the Indians. Those chapels were completed in 1720 but they hardly 
attached the Indians to the French.' Had Vaudreuil and Begon been 
observant, the Indians would not have revolted against them and the 
Jesuits, Had they been attentive, they would not have had to submit to 
Rale's direction. Vaudreuil and Begon did not tell the ministry how 
they had dangerously ruptured the Abnaki alliance. Even if they had, 
it would not have been important. The ministry, too, was indifferent. 
This was Rale's cause. As time went on it became clear that he would 
succeed or fail, alone, with the Abnakis.
Rale said his chapel was "commodious and well adorned," and 
Vaudreuil found it "well built." In a letter to Shute, however, Rale 
heatedly complained about its construction. Financed by the king and 
the Abnakis, Rale hired English workmen for the job. He contended 
that the laborers worked spasmodically and had overchared the Indians. 
He claimed that the belfry was so badly done that "the two workmen 
that covered it, not without fear, advised not to put a bell there, 
asuring 'twould fall down as soon as ‘twas rung." Rale to Nephew, 
Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, vol. 67, p. 87; Vaudreuil 
at Begon au Conseil de Marine, Oct. 26, T720, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 
42, pp. 27-28; Letter from the Indians to the Gov. Translated 1720, 
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 89-93; Mass. Arch. 31: pp. 97- 
100.
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CHAPTER V
SEBASTIEN RALE'S WAR
With the declaration of war in July, 1722, the Abnaki problem 
took on new, specifically intercolonial overtones. What had been, 
essentially, a contest between Abnakis and Englishmen for control of 
the Kennebec lands, became obscured by what Governor Shute regarded 
as unwarranted French interference. Whatever legitimate claims the 
Abnakis may have had were submerged by Massachusetts’ fear of French 
intervention and Governor Vaudreuil's blustering threats increased the 
tens ion.
Despite Massachusetts' conviction that Vaudreuil was, through 
Rale, the sole cause of the conflict, the war remained a local one. 
Vaudreuil did encourage the Canadian and Nova Scotian Indians to aid 
the Abnaki cause. He did procure guns, ammunition, and subsidies for 
their support. He could not, despite his personal inclinations, openly 
join the war effort.
Massachusetts’ determination to squelch the so-called rebellion 
led, inevitably, to Sebastien Rale. As the most visible evidence of 
French influence the Jesuit was singled out as responsible for 
Massachusetts' frontier difficulties. After 1722, their concern was 
misplaced. Though Rale encouraged the Indians' resistance in the early 
years of the conflict, once Massachusetts had declared war, control 
of the situation passed out of his hands. Rale could not give the 
Indians guns, ammunition, or men. Naturally, the Abnakis turned to 
Vaudreuil and through him to the French king and ministry. Massachusetts, 
however, did not perceive the power shift and continued to demand Rale's 
I 10
remova1.
The end came tragically for Rale. With its hands tied by the 
delicate European situation, the Council of Marine did not give the 
Abnakis the aid the Jesuit had hoped for. Rale had not naively supposed 
that the English would willingly retire. By 1722 it was clear that 
house burning and cattle killing would not frighten the settlers from 
the Kennebec. Moved by Rale's initial persuasion the Indians decided 
that they must fight to retain their lands. Vaudreuil promised his 
unswerving support and cooperation. Though he was severely hampered 
by the ministry's pragmatic caution, the governor stood firm in that 
deci s ion.
Fannie Hardie Eckstorm has suggested that the defeat of the 
Abnakis seriously embarrassed the officials of New France.' She has 
asserted that Vaudreuil and Begon invented the myth of Rale's valient 
death and martyrdom to hide the loss of their most important outpost. 
She never does explain just how such a fabrication would absolve them 
of the responsibility; her conclusion is unwarranted when all the facts 
are examined. Events before that decisive attack show that Vaudreuil 
had nothing to hide from his superiors. Vaudreuil did everything in 
his power to aid the Abnakis. Everything, that is, except involving 
French soldiers in the effort. He was expressly forbidden to become 
directly involved. If the attack on Norridgewock was a drastic blow to 
the security of the colony, the governor was not at fault. Events had 
moved independently of his control to that conclusion. He tried, 
unsuccessfully, to convince Massachusetts that she should leave the
Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 551ff
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dispute to the arbitration of an international commission but the English 
were determined to protect their self-declared rights.
In November, 1721, Massachusetts had still done nothing to 
chastise the Indians for their march on Arrowsic the previous July. 
When the House reassembled in the fall it quickly demanded the Council's 
reasons for the delay of the proposed attack on Norridgewock. Provoked 
by the Council's non-commital answer, the House drew up another resolve 
against the Indians. It named and ordered seven chieftains seized and 
renewed the t.200 reward for Rale or any other priest found in the 
province. After an amendment, the Council agreed to the measure.’
Though the Indians threatened violent retribution at Arrowsic 
and though they now had Vaudreuil's sympathetic support, they still 
made no major move against the English. Had the English appeased the 
Abnakis peace would have been assured. Two incidents infuriated the 
Abnakis. Not only did the English refuse to return the hostages, 
they also captured Joseph D'Abbadie de St. Castin for his role in the 
march on Arrowsic. Castin was invited aboard a vessel which then "set 
sail, and carried him to Boston." The action completely alienated 
the Penobscots, for Castin was a tribal member through his mother.
’Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, III, Nov. 9, 1721, pp. 141-4-2; 
Nov. 10, p. 143; Nov. 15, p. 150; Nov. 16, pp. 152-53; Nov. 17, pp. 
156-59.
2Rale to Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVI I, 
pp. 109-11; Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council of Marine, 
Oct. 17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 910; 
Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 14-3-44; Collection de Manuscripts, III, 
p. 85; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, No~ 17, 1721, III, j>. 156. 
Mass. Council, Oct. 19, 1721; Robert LeBlant, Une figure legendaire de 
l'histoire Acadienne; LeBaron de St. Castin (Dax: Editions P. Pradeu, 
193^)» PP- ”3ff.
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Equally explosive was the peacetime march on Norridgewock in 
the winter of 1722. Captain Westbrook's objective was simple: to 
seize Rale and the principal offending chiefs. He could not have chosen 
a better time. Except for the Jesuit and the older Indians, the village 
was almost deserted. The young men were scattered throughout the woods 
hunting. Sebastien Rale, however, was warned of Westbrook's approach 
by two young Indians. The old Jesuit barely had time to consume the 
Blessed Sacrament and to gather the sacred vessels before fleeing.
He made good his escape, but the next day the English followed, hot in 
pursuit. Rale raced to the snow-laden forests. He could not run far 
for he had to leave his snow-shoes behind, and he was encumbered by 
his previously broken thigh and hip. Rale later said that the English 
came within eight steps of the tree which hid him. Miraculously, the 
soldiers did not discover his tracks and he escaped detection. Return­
ing to the settlements the English again stopped at Norridgewock to 
plunder the Church and Rale's house. They found, much to their surprise 
and alarm, several letters from Vaudreuil and Begon to the Jesuit .’
The letters startled the English. They conclusively proved 
Rale's connection with the administrators of Quebec. The Council 
immediately prepared and sent a letter to Vaudreuil castigating him for
2 "instigating the Indians to commit hostilities against the English."
^Rale to his Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
vol. 67, LXVII, pp. 113-14; Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council 
of Marine, Oct. 17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, 
p. 910; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 124, pp. 285-86; Col lection de 
Manuscripts, III, pp. 85-86; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, March 6, 
1721/22, III, p. 163; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, 
p. 120; The New England Courant, February 12, 1721/22.
2Mass. Council, Feb. 9, 1721/22; Feb. 19, 1721/22. 
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Shute despatched copies to Great Britain, reasserted Massachusetts' 
claim to the Kennebec and maintained his contention that the Abnakis 
were subjects of the British Crown.’ But the House was not as enthus­
iastic as before. The representatives undoubtedly feared a confronta­
tion with the French, for they refused to pass a resolve of the joint 
committee for Rale's apprehension and the enlistment of the Five 
Nations against the Abnakis. Moderately, the house considered it best 
to name another committee to consider the problem.3
’gov. Shute to the Council of Trade and Plantations, March 13, 
1722, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXIII, p. 27; Baxter, Pioneers of New France 
in New England, pp. 303-04.
2Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, May 30, 1722, IV, pp. 101-02.
3 I b i d., June 22, 1722, p. 41.
^Lettre du Gouverneur Shute a Monsieur Le Marquis de Vaudreuil, 
March 14, 1722, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 70-72; "Same to 
Same," April 3, 1722, Ibid., pp. 74-77.
Governor Shute thought that Vaudreuil was the key to the conflict. 
The letters had, unfortunately for the Abnakis, convinced the English 
that it was the French who must be dealt with. Shute conveniently 
forgot the Abnakis1 continual protests as well as the reasons for their 
forays on the frightened Kennebec settlements. He thought the protests 
were only a smokescreen to cloak the French influence. He did not 
realize that Vaudreuil had not caused the conflict and he absolutely 
refused to recognize the Abnakis as French allies.
Shute wrote Vaudreuil and demanded that Rale be removed from
English territory without further "abusing his character and profes-
4sion." "Is it thus," the governor queried, "that we follow the example *23
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of our masters who live in peace?11 Self-righteousness came as easily 
to Vaudreuil. He suggested in his reply that the territory be considered 
neutral until their kings had decided its status. He reminded Shute 
that like it or not the boundaries had not been settled. Father Rale 
was not on English territory, or on French land either. He was spiri­
tual guardian, and though Vaudreuil did not describe the role, temporal 
advisor to a sovereign nation. He reiterated his counter-claim that 
the Abnakis were French allies and were under the protection of France.’ 
There was nothing new or innovative in Vaudreuil's reply. In 
December, 1721, the Council of Marine had responded in much the same 
vein to Vaudreuil's request for military aid for the Abnakis. The 
ministry expressed its view at the British court: the Abnakis were 
allies, and if the English harassed them, Louis XV could not refuse 
them his protection. The borders must be settled and the English 
settlements abandoned, the ministry had continued. The British, none­
theless, were not inclined to complacently accept the French demands 
or to settle the dispute. At the end of May, they had still not 
replied though the French had asked to be informed of their decision 
before March. On June 6, 1722, the British made their attitude clear. 
The Council of Trade wrote to Governor Burnet that "as there is at 
present no great prospect of settling the boundaries...you will do 
well to extend our settlements with proper precautions as far as you *
’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Gouverneur Shute, June 7, 
1722, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 78-84.
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can.
Unlike the Council of Marine, the Abnakis were not hampered 
by international considerations. They were infuriated by the attempt 
to seize Rale and by the arrest of Castin. They continued to kill 
cattle until they had planted their fields. That finished, they 
descended on the lower Kennebec where they captured sixty-five terrified 
Englishmen. They released them all except for five held in ransom 
for their chiefs in Boston. The following week six Indians attacked a 
fishing boat. Trying to save themselves, the English defenders killed 
several Indians. The House of Representatives thought the incident 
serious enough "to suspect that the Eastern Indians will take the first 
opportunity of falling upon" the English settlements.
Despite their stand the previous winter, however, the House 
refused to use force against the Indians. The Council also rebuffed 
the joint committee's advice to send another expedition against 
Norridgewock. The councillors suggested that one officer with two or 
three soldiers be sent to demand the release of the English hostages. 
After deciding to mend relations with the Five Nations, the House even
3 
suggested that the Indian hostages be swapped for the English prisoners.
’Le Conseil a Monsieur le Cardinal DuBois, Dec. 22, 1721, 
Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 67-68; Pour etre porte a Monsiegneur 
le Due d'Orleans, May 28, 1722, Arch. Col. C 11 A, vol. 124, p. 210; 
Council of Trade and Plantations to Governor Burnet, June 6, 1722, 
Cal, of St. Pap., XXXIII, pp. 83-84.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Mar. 7, 1721/22, III, p. 68;
Gov. Shute to Mr. Popple, June 18, 1722, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII1, pp.
89-90; Mr. Cummings to Mr. Popple, June 20, 1722, Ibid., pp. 90-91; 
The New England Courant, June 18, 1722; Mass. House Journal, June 22, 
1722, IV, p. 42.
^Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, June 28, 1722, IV, pp. 54-55;
June 29, pp. 60-61; July 5, pp. 68-69; July 6, pp. 72-73; July 7, p. 78.
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Unfortunately for all concerned, the House’s pacifying measures 
were much too late. By the end of July the Kennebecs had burnt 
Brunswick and Johnson Harmon had killed eighteen Indians. Governor 
Shute could not evade the issue and, submitting to pressure, issued a 
declaration of war against the Eastern "rebels, Traitors and Enemies."' 
A hundred more men were sent to the frontier and when the House met, 
it approved the governor's policy and set a bounty on Indian scalps.
After the English had declared war, the Abnakis were led and 
inspired by Governor Vaudreuil. Oddly, Sebastien Rale, after his long 
years of political intrigue, was left out of the picture. His efforts 
were limited to writing two autobiographical letters to arouse the 
French public against the English. But Vaudreuil was no longer bound *3
’The war has had various names. Most popular and most misleading 
is 'Lovewell's War1 after the colorful scalp hunter who unwittingly be­
came the hunted. But that did not happen until 1725. Better, though 
still imperfect, is 'Dummer's War.' But the victorious lieutenant- 
governor did not declare the conflict. Quite unexpectedly he was inun­
dated with executive responsibility when Shute fled the divisive factions 
of the General Court.
zThe New England Courant, July 16, 1722; The Boston Gazette, July 
23, 1722, and July 30, 1722; Mass. Council, July 24, 1722; The New 
England Courant, July 30, 1722; and August 13, 1722; Mass. Arch. 31: PP. 
106-08; Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, August 8, 1722, IV, p. 81; Moody, 
"The Maine Frontier," pp. 348-4-9. Hutchinson interestingly noted that 
the English "chose to call the proceedings against them a prosecution 
for rebellion but, if a view be taken of all the transactions between 
the English and them from the beginning, it will be difficult to say 
what sort of subjects they were, and it is not certain that they under­
stood they had promised subjection at all." History of Massachusetts- 
Bay, II, p. 203.
3Rale to Nephew, Oct. 15, 1722, and Rale to Brother, Oct. 12, 1723, 
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 84-119. For the controversy on 
their composition see Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," pp. 541-78; 
and Henri Bechard, "A propos de deux lettres du Pere Sebastien Rasies, 
S. J.," Sciences Ecclesiastiques, II (1949), pp. 191-218. Bechard's is 
the most trustworthy account for Eckstorm's article is marred with 
many serious errors of fact and interpretation.
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by the Jesuit's representations, if indeed, he made any. After the 
summer of 1722, the Abnakis could be better served by the administra­
tors of New France.
The Abnakis did not stop asking Vaudreuil for munitions or for 
French soldiers to help them. The governor could not commit himself 
and avoided a direct reply. Instead, he sent Father Loyard to France 
to plead their cause. Indeed, the implication is, that until he had 
explicit orders from France, he actually restrained the Abnakis from 
open warfare.’ He did not do so from any concern for the English of 
course. His sole objective was to avoid direct involvement by New 
France.
Father Loyard did his best to prod the cumbersome royal bureaucra­
cy. Through lengthy memoirs he stressed the importance of the Abnaki 
alliance to the future of New France. if France wished to retain 
Canada, Loyard warned them, they must aid the Abnakis. "...It seems 
at least necessary that £the CourQ complain loudly of the English 
violations of the Treaty of Utrecht..." the Jesuit argued. He thought 
it especially important to increase the annual gratuity to each Abnaki 
village.
The king, not surprisingly, agreed that the English were violating
’Messrs, de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council of Marine, Oct.
17, 1722, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 911; Lettre 
de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Conseil de la Marine, Oct. 22, 1722, 
Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 88-89.
2Memoire sur les pretentions des Anglois dan la partie meridionale 
de la Nouvelle France, s. d., Arch, des Col., C 11 E, vol. 2, pp. 214-27; 
Memoire de P. Loyard: Sur I'Etat Present des Abenauis, 1722, Thwaites, 
Jesuit Relations, LXVII, pp. 120-25.
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the treaty of peace. Time and again the royal officials stated that 
the Abnakis were French allies and that their interests must be pro­
tected. Finally, their resolves resulted in inane orders to Governor 
Vaud reu iI.
As early as June, 1723, the king had ordered Vaudreuil to protect 
Abnaki interests, without however, giving them men. Vaudreuil was 
warned to observe the keystone of French foreign policy: peace must 
be preserved with the British crown, regardless of cost. The ministry 
did not think it too dangerous to the peace to give the Abnakis a 
special grant to support their families while they engaged in war.
Later, the Council of Marine elaborated its view. It directed Vaudreuil 
to explain to the Indians of New France that the British intention was 
to make themselves masters of the whole continent. Since the English 
could not attack the French, Vaudreuil was to say, they had resolved 
to destroy the Indian allies of France.’
The declaration of war, and the open hostilities between the
English and the Abnakis, occasioned a passionate exchange of notes 
between Quebec and Boston. Both Vaudreuil and Shute took uncompromising 
positions and neither accepted the advice of the other. On October 28, 
1723, Vaudreuil wrote Shute a heated plea to leave the Abnakis in 
peace. He told the English governor what Shute knew only too well: the 
settlement of a boundary depended on an international commission. The 
Abnakis were allies of France and Utrecht had provided that both France
’Copie du Memoire du Roy a Mrs. de Vaudrail et Begon cy devant 
Gouverneur general et Intendant en Canada, June 9, 1723, Min. Aff. Etr., 
vol. 7, part 1, pp. 312-16; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 45, pp. 75-78; 
La Ministre a Vaudreuil et Begon a propos de la guerre des Abenaquis, 
Oct. 14, 1723, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 45, pp. 5-6.
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and Great Britain respect the native alliances of each nation. Unfor­
tunately for the Abnakis Shute would not accept Vaudreuil’s claim of an 
alliance. In fact, the English went further and asserted that the 
Abnakis were unquestionably subjects of the British crown, albeit 
rebellious ones. Nor was the situation eased by Vaudreuil's threats 
of open warfare in support of the Abnakis.’
Vaudreuil's letter was called "Insolent." Governor Burnet of
New York added that Vaudreuil was frightened by the declaration of
2
war by the Iroquois. Actually, Vaudreuil had assured the ministry 
that the Five Nations would maintain their neutrality. Governor 
Dummer also found Vaudreuil's letter preposterous. He immediately sent 
a return note to Quebec asserting that he and his government had lived 
according to the terms of Utrecht and that the war was instigated by 
Vaudreuil and Sebastien Rale. He closed by reiterating his request 
for Vaudreuil's support in getting the Abnakis to submit to English 
author i ty.
Dummer was too crafty a politician to be deluded by hopes for 
French aid. He encouraged, instead, a second march on Norridgewock 
which was made by Captain Harmon in the winter of 1723. Harmon failed
’Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Gouverneur de Baston, Oct.
28, 1723, Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 89-91; Baxter, Baxter 
Manuscr i pts, XXI I I, pp. 158-59; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New 
England, pp. 334-36; Lettre de Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct.
6, 1723, Collection de Manuscripts, 111, pp. 91-93.
2The New England Courant, Nov. 25, 1723; Gov. Burnet to Charles 
Delafaye, Dec. 16, 1723, Cal. of St. Pap., XXXIII, pp. 392-93.
3Governor Dummer to Vaudreuil, Dec. 20, 1723, Baxter, Pioneers 
of New France in New England, pp. 337-38; Cal, of St. Pap., cf. also 
Address of Lt. Governor, Council and Representatives of the 
Massachusetts Bay, Dec. 26, 1723, Cal, of St. Pap., XXXII I, pp. 405-06. 
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to reach the village, for the winter was warm and the river was open. 
The whole campaign was badly handled because of the weather, and even 
the Indians were uncommonly quiet. Captain Westbrook was successful, 
however, in reaching and burning the Penobscots* village.’
Massachusetts also had recourse to a further expedient against 
the Abnakis which seemed to promise success. Early in the fall of 
1722, the Five Nations had agreed to mediate the conflict between the 
English and the Abnakis. Actually, Dummer did not expect to settle the 
conflict peacefully; he realized, nonetheless, that the Iroquois might 
frighten the Abnakis into their senses. The delegates sent one of their 
number with some Englishmen to Norridgewock. They met no Indians, 
however, for they had gone to Quebec for the winter. They found, in­
stead, a note on the chapel door written by Rale. He warned the 
English not to burn the deserted village for if they did he could 
assure them violent retaliation. Though the note surprised the Iroquois 
by its arrogance, they refused to ask the Abnakis to dismiss Rale.
Later, the Iroquois sent several delegations to the Abnakis in 
Canada. One group went to St. Francis to win the Canadian Indians by
'fhe New England Courant, Feb. 11, 1722/23 and April 1, 1723; 
The Boston Gazette, March 4, March 11, June 3, 1723.
2
Journal of the Proceedings of Delegates of the Six Nations, 
Oct. 10--0ct. 27, 1722, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXIII, pp. 110-27; 
Mass. Arch. 29: pp. 75-98; Journal of Alexander Hamilton, Baxter, 
Pioneers of New France in New England, p. 322; The Boston Gazette, Nov. 
12, 1722; Nov. 19, 1722. Baxter mistakingly reported that the letter 
had been left by Rale the previous winter when Norridgewock was attacked 
by Westbrook, On that occasion Rale had fled and had no time for a 
lengthy note. Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 120-23; 
Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct. T4~ 1723, Arch. Col., C I 1 A, 
vol. 45, pp. 8-9.
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threats and promises. The Iroquois invited them to take their families 
to the lands of the Five Nations. They warned the Abnakis that if they 
united with the Kennebecs, “the Iroquois £wou1 d] declare equally against 
them...."’
Frightened, the Indians of St. Francis replied that they were 
willing to make peace but only on condition that the English returned 
the Abnakis* land and prisoners. Those terms were repeated in the 
presence of Alexander Hamilton, an English prisoner, whom the Abnakis
2 
proposed to send to Boston as their messenger.
Hamilton reported to the House of Representatives on August 13, 
1723. Vaudreuil's letter which Hamilton delivered was received with 
hostility, for the returned hostage told them that Vaudreuil had 
supplied the Indians with arms. He surrendered his journal to the 
government as a graphic description of several instances of unneutral 
French conduct. The previous May, for example, the Indians had con­
sidered taking the initiative by returning their prisoners to the 
English. In Hamilton's words, Vaudreuil told them: “I think it a 
piece of Inadvertency of you to Trust the English Generosity by sending 
these Captives to them unless you first have yours Delivered here....* 11 
Vaudreuil realized that the Abnakis were alarmed by the Iroquois 
threats. He was correct in soothing their fears for by September the
’Abstract of Messrs de Vaudreuil and Begon's Despatches, with 
the report of the Minister thereupon, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial 
Documents, IX, p. 934.
^Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct. 14, 1723, Arch. Col., C
11 A, vol. 45, pp. 9-12.
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Five Nations were less eager for war.’
With or without the Five Nations, Massachusetts stepped up her 
campaign against the Indians. Another expedition set out for 
Norridgewock in the winter of 1724. Under the command of Captain 
Moulton, the troops were again unsuccessful. Though the Abnakis had 
retired to Canada, Rale's house was ransacked and more papers and books 
taken. Surprisingly, Moulton did not destroy the village, though the 
Penobscots' village had been burned the previous winter. Williamson, 
following Hutchinson, suggested that Moulton was a "discreet" man who 
thought the Indians would treat the English with like charity. Neither 
commentator noticed the peculiarity of this manner of thought in a
2
mi 1i tary man.
Much more controversial was the successful attack in the summer 
of 1724. Characteristically, historians have divided into two camps 
on the question. The English have followed the sworn reports of the 
English attackers, or actually, the sworn testimony of Captain Harmon. 
Most writers have supplemented Harmon's two accounts by carefully look­
ing at Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay, which critically 
examines Captain Moulton's version as well. The French view rests 
with three men, Governor Vaudreuil and Fathers LaChasse and Charlevoix, 
who in turn followed the surviving Kennebecs. Fannie H. Eckstorm has
’The New England Courant, Aug. 19, 1723, Alexander Hamilton's 
Journal, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, pp. 325-26; 
Ford, ed., Mass. House Journal, Aug. 13, 1723, V, p. 113; The New 
England Courant, Sept. 9, 1723.
2
Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts-Bay, II, p. 231; Williamson, 
History of the State of Maine, II, pp. 124-25. For a biographical sketch 
on Col. Jeremiah Moulton see: Noyes, Genealogical Dictionary, II, p. 499.
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modified these two older views.
Eckstorm reports that Rale was forewarned that the English were 
on the way to Norridgewock. While she attributes the warning he 
received to the prophetic mutterings of an Indian shaman, or witch 
doctor, Rale's last letter suggests otherwise.’ Returning from their 
latest expedition, the Indians told the Jesuit that 200 men were coming 
to "drive them out of their camp...." Rale thought, with some justifi­
cation, that the possibility was remote:
But I said to them, how could that be, seeing we are daily 
surrounding and making inroads upon them.... Besides, in all 
the war you have had with them, did you ever see them come 
to attack you in the spring, summer, or in the fall, when they 
knew you were in the woods.2
Rale's statement was correct, the English did avoid campaigns in the
3 
summer when the troops were susceptible to disease.
The most serious error Eckstorm made was her claim that Rale 
"need not have lost the mission if he had taken a warning given him in 
ample time." But Sebastien Rale neither ridiculed the Indians' fear 
of an invasion nor convinced them to stay at Norridgewock. He told 
Father LaChasse that the Indians
hearken to all my reasons aforegoing, but follow their own.
They design to quit the village for a fortnight, and to go five 
or six leagues up the river, they proposed it to me, and I have 
given my consent.
’Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 574.
^Father Ralle* to another priest, Aug. 12/13, 1724, Cal. of St. 
Pap., XXXIV, p. 429; Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, 
p. 251. “ ................
3Hilton to Lt. Gov. Dummer, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, IX, p. 
142. Hilton said: "This is what Offers upon this Expedition and I 
humbly conceive that the winter time is the onely time ever to march 
against the Indian Enemy...."
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Rale wrote the letter on the afternoon the English attacked. The
Indians' retreat was only hours too late.’
Five days before, on August 19th, four companies of soldiers 
under Captains Harmon, Moulton, Brown and Lieutenant Bean had left 
Richmond Fort near the upper end of Swan Island. Arriving at Ticonic 
Falls on the 20th, they proceeded by land on the 21st, leaving behind
2
Lieutenant Wright with forty men to guard the seventeen whaleboats.
On the first evening of the two and a half day march to 
Norridgewock, the English surprised the old chieftain Bomazeen with his 
family. His daughter was killed and his wife taken captive. The event 
was of no small importance. The New England Courant reported Harmon's
3
testimony that Bomazeen escaped from the troops. Harmon contradicts 
himself, however. He says that the sachem was killed on the evening 
of the 23rd, after the fight, at some distance from the village.* 2* Later 
he reported that Bomazeen's body was found among the chieftains slain 
that afternoon.5
My italics. Father Ralle^ to another Priest, Cal. of St. Pap., 
XXXIV, 12/23 August, 1724, pp. 429-31; Baxter, Pioneers of New France 
in New England, pp. 252- ; Mass. His. Soc., Collect ions, 2nd ser., VIII,
pp. 245-49; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 566.
2The Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724; Penhallow, Hi story of the 
Wars of New England, p. 102.
3fhe New England Courant, Aug. 24, 1724; Hutchinson, following 
the Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724, doesn't mention Bomazeen's 
presence at all. Both news accounts come from Harmon. Hutchinson, 
History of Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 235.
4New England Courant, Aug. 24, 1724, said that when some of the 
troops left the village to gather their packs they met the sachem and 
killed him.
^Hutchinson again follows the News-Letter and says Bomazeen's 
body was found among the slain. History of Massachusetts Bay, 11, p. 
237. ‘ ~ ............
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To complicate matters further, another tradition says that Bomazeen 
was shot in the river as he attempted to ford it.’ But none of these 
versions answer some of the underlying questions. If indeed he did 
escape, as the English documents would seem to indicate, why didn't he 
warn the village? The English were led, though Eckstorm denies it, 
to the village by Bomazeen's wife. Did she do so while hoping that
2
her spouse had warned the defenders?
Nearing the village around noon of the 23rd, the attackers 
decided to divide their forces. Captain Harmon, commander-in-chief 
for the expedition, oddly did not actually lead the attack but preferred 
to scout the corn fields, leaving the task, responsibility, but not 
the glory to Captain Moulton. The commander by default proceeded 
directly to the village. At this point, the ensuing attack becomes 
obscure. Moulton's account, as given by Hutchinson, contradicts one 
of Harmon's two accounts to the Boston newspapers.
At question in this conflict of the English sources is the pro­
blem of the stockade, despite the fact that Eckstorm confidently 
asserted its existence.
Both Governor Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse reported that the
’Penhallow, a contemporary, reports that Bomazeen was "shot in 
the river, as he attempted to make an escape. They afterwards killed 
his daughter and took his wife captive...." History of the Wars of 
New England, p. 102.
2 lb id., Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," fn. 36, p. 554.
3
Harmon did not explain the division to the General Court. The 
officials and newspapers reported that the victory was due to his 
leadership, cf. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 235. 
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village was not enclosed,’ though there is still extant a map drawn by
Joseph Heath in 1719 with a written description of the fort as being
Built with Round Loggs nine foot Long one end set into the 
Ground: is 160 foot Square with 4 Gates but no Bastions;
within it are Twenty Six Houses Built much after the English 
manner, the Streets reguler, that from west Gate to the East 
is 30 foot wide; their Church stands 4 perch without the East 
gate, and their men able to Bear Arms, are about Three Score.* 2
Letter from Father de la Chasse, Superior-General of the 
Missions in New France, to Father***, of the same Society, Oct. 29, 1724, 
Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, LXVII, p. 233; Lettre de Monsieur le 
Marquis de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct. 25, 1725, Collection de Manu­
scripts, III, p. 109. There is nothing unusual about the date of these 
letters. Like all official papers, they were written in October just 
before the ship left for France.
2
This map may be found among the papers of the Pejebscot 
Proprietors at the Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.
3New England Courant, August 24, 1724; Eckstorm, "The Attack on 
Norridgewock," fn.75, p. 5^9; Herbert Mil ton Sylvester, Indian Wars of 
New England (Boston: W. B. Clarke Company, 1910), III, p. 234.
Interestingly, Harmon's accounts in two Boston newspapers and
Hutchinson following Moulton make no mention of the stockade. Eckstorm 
states that the New-England Courant mentions the east gate. The news­
paper actually said, less substantially, that the plan for the offense 
was to place the troops in such a way that the Indians "could in no 
way avoid them but by running into the River." Certainly a stockade 
was not essential to that stratagem. Sylvester, probably using French 
sources, reports that "the old stockade had disappeared."3
Even the other English version does not solve the problem. 
According to Harmon's other story, action immediately ensued after 
their "approach within Pistol Shot" of the Indian town. But Hutchinson 
says that the village
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about 3 o'clock suddenly opened upon them. There was not an 
Indian to be seen, being all in their wigwams. Our men were 
ordered to advance softly and to keep a profound silence. At 
length, an Indian came out of one of the wigwams and, as he 
was making water, looked round him and discovered the English 
close upon him. He immediately gave the war whoop and ran in 
for his gun. The whole village, consisting of about 60 warriors, 
besides old men, women and children, took the alarm, and the 
warriors ran to meet the English, the rest fled to save their 
1ives.’
Though the two accounts are diametrically opposite, neither makes pro­
vision for the stockade in the advance. It would seem, in either case, 
that the Indians would have had time to close the gates. It cannot 
be proven that the gate was left open so that Rale might flee to 
safety. Eckstorm only supposed that his house was outside the “en­
closure" as it was at Penobscot.But there is no substantial evidence 
of that and Heath's map does not mention it. Even if we accept 
Moulton's account we cannot establish the stockade's existence.
Eckstorm has emphasized the issue because she believed that Vaudreuil
and LaChasse had much to hide in the loss of the most important Abnaki
village. But they had not evaded the loss of Penobscot though it
3
was as important as Norridgewock. They did not hide the fact that the
Abnakis had fled to Canada at the beginning of the war. How could the 
ministry hold Vaudreuil responsible for a defeat in which their denial 
of aid had played so vital a part?
However the battle was touched off, a terrible slaughter followed
It was a warm, sultry August day. Rale was relaxing in his house
’Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724; Hutchinson, History of 
Massachusetts Bay, 11, p. 236.
^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 568.
^Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, Oct. 14, 1723, Arch. Col., C 11 
A, vol. 45, p. 7.
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writing a letter to his superior, Father LaChasse. The Indians were 
escaping the heat, slumbering in their cabins. The English took them 
by surprise. Rale rushed from his letter and the savages panicked. 
They fled to the river in confusion. Some took to their canoes for­
getting, in their haste, their paddles. Others tried to swim the river, 
not much more than sixty yards wide at that time of year. The English 
relentlessly pursued, firing upon them. They judged that about 50 men, 
women and children made the opposite shore, though Vaudreuil and 
LaChasse report that at least 150 made good their escape.’
The English then returned to the town, where meanwhile Rale was 
valiantly defending himself in his house. Lieutenant Jaques broke 
down the door and found the Jesuit reloading his gun. Jaques shot him 
when the doughty old priest shouted he would neither give nor take 
quarter. Moulton, who had given orders to take the man alive, always 
doubted Jaques' word. The suspicion is highly significant, for the 
erstwhile lieutenant was Moulton's son-in-law. Harmon, however, dis-
2 
played no such doubt in his oath before the Executive Council.
There was a young English boy in the cabin whom Rale shot and 
stabbed in his fury at being caught unprepared. Though Eckstorm's 
account is admittedly conjectural, and she erroneously believed that
’Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724; The New-England Courant, Aug. 
24, 1724; Boston Gazette, Aug. 24, 1724; Hutchinson, History of 
Massachusetts Bay, II, p. 236; Letter from Father de la Chasse, Thwaites, 
Jesuit Relations, vol. 67, LXVII, p. 233; Lettre de Monsieur le Marquis 
de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct. 25, 1724, Collection de Manuscripts, III, 
p. 109; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 573.
^Boston Gazette, Aug. 24, 1724; Boston News-Letter, Aug. 27, 1724; 
New-England Courant, Aug. 24, 1724. The latter contended that both Rale 
and the sachem Mogg refused to surrender. Hutchinson, History of 
Massachusetts Bay, II, pp. 236-37.
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Rale was infuriated by his holding of the Indians at the village at 
this of all times, it is a tenable one; "There was no deliberate 
malice in the act, no deep-seated moral obliquity, only the unreasoning 
madness of a tempest of emotions, rising cyclonic from profound calm."’ 
There will always remain, nevertheless, at least some suspicion of the 
incident. It is asking too much of English and French alike to accept 
such an action of a priest. It should be said, too, that the story 
rests only with Harmon, who swore to its truth before the Council and 
who gave the story to the Boston newspapers. It could be justly asked 
if the man's testimony could be trusted. He did, after all, give two 
varying accounts of the encounter that day. He did not explain that 
he was not present at the action. Hutchinson only says that the story 
rests with Harmon, the implication being, moreover, that Moulton had
2been silent on the incident.
French historians have never fully accepted the English version
3
of the disaster. In the first place, the English documents have been 
inaccessible. The French also distrusted those secondary accounts
lEckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 575.
^Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts Bay, II, pp. 236-37.
3A few have accepted part of the narrative. Goyau, for example, 
said that not all of LaChasse1s account was true. Lauvriere repudiated 
the claim that 1000 men attacked the village. Religious historians 
have also questioned the French story. H. C. Schuyler, in the single 
paragraph given the incident, said Rale "remained in a cabin defending 
himself." Shea is also critical, cf. Georges Goyau, "Le P. Sebastien 
Racle," pp. 193-95. Emile Lauvriere, "Les Jesuites en Acadie," 
p. 208. Schuyler, "The Apostle of the Abenakis," p. 173. Shea, 
History of the Catholic Missions among the Indians Tribes of the United 
States, 1529-1854 (New York: Charles Dunigan & Brother, 1855), p. 150; 
It is notable that the acceptance of the English account does not 
follow national ties. Kingsford, for example, rejected the French 
sources and accepts Hutchinson. Kingsford, History of Canada, III, pp. 
190-91.
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which sketch Rale as a religious bigot. Nor has there been any clear 
acceptance of the whole story by the English themselves. Bancroft, 
whom the French widely cite, accepted LaChasse1s account of the attack.’ 
Then too, they had their own sources to rely upon.
’George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery 
of the American Continent, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1868),
III, pp. 336-37.
r\
zEckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 567. 
3(Jn the nature of the Jesuit Relations see: J. H. Kennedy,
Jesuit and Savage in New France, p. 78. Also see Henri B^chard's 
refutation of Eckstorm: "A Propros de deux lettres du Pere Sebastien 
Rasies, S. J.," pp. 191-218.
It is clear that the French view is no mere fabrication.
Eckstorm's over-reaction to the inconsistencies in the French documents 
needlessly ignores the nature of the accounts. Furthermore, she fails 
to notice similar inconsistencies among the English accounts. Father 
LaChasse was not "making history" as Eckstorm declares when he wrote 
Rale's eulogy. Nor, it needs be said, was he writing it either. 
Seen in the tradition in which the letter properly belongs, it is 
really quite innocuous. As Eckstorm notes, the letter was intended 
for publication but that fact is not extraordinary. The Jesuits had 
been writing chronicles of their missions for over a hundred years.3
LaChasse reported what he heard from the |ndians--but he did so 
with embellishments. His technique was not malicious but only a 
literary device. Certainly a eulogy is not the place to seek a dis­
passionate review of the case. LaChasse's enthusiasm did not stem from 
a desire to conceal the facts; there was no need to do so. There was, 
however, a real need of inspiring support in France for the sorely *III,
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beleagured Abnaki nation. Pious support for the missions in France 
was much less than it had been in previous years. Jesuits were not in 
vogue at the court and the superior-general's pleas since 1713 had 
fallen on deaf ears.
In Rale's death the superior-general had an issue to fire the 
popular imagination. He did not invent a "myth" about Rale's life. 
He had known, admired, and loved Rale since his arrival in New France. 
In diplomatic endeavours for the Abnakis the two had been comrades-in- 
a rms.
Eckstorm asserts but does not conclusively prove that Vaudreuil 
and LaChasse "knew that there were not eleven hundred English and 
Indians involved in the fight...."’ It is not improbable that the 
Indians invented the number to salve their own pride. Nor is the 
impression on their part necessarily infantile. The precipitate attack 
and chaotic retreat was obviously confusing. It is true that LaChasse 
knew the village had been enclosed; he was there in July, 1721. But 
the stockade's existence cannot be proven and LaChasse had no reason 
to disbelieve the Indians.
Eckstrom's claim that the English plan of attack was consistent
2 
with the plan of the village while "the French account is not" is not 
wholly supportable. In the first place, it is not known how the attack 
occurred. Governor Vaudreuil did not romanticise the account as LaChasse 
did. He described the sudden attack without exaggeration. The Indians 
who survived the first volley tried to hold the English while the women
’Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 551.
2 Ibid., p. 552.
132
and children raced for the river. Without dramatic effect, he described 
Rale rushing from his house only to be immediately cut down by an 
English volley.' It is this account from the Abnakis that has inspired 
the popular view of the Jesuit's unselfish death. Eckstorm was reacting 
not only to the inconsistencies in the French sources but also to their
2
uncritical acceptance.
Vaudreuil's account is not surprising. When the Indians returned 
the following day they found Rale's body with the dead chieftains in 
the center of the vi1lage--hence, the story of the Jesuit’s heroic
3
death. Eckstorm thought it improbable that there were any remains left 
to be mourned as the village was burnt by the retreating forces.^ But 
the English slept in the village. With a hundred and twenty-eight 
men to bivouac, it is likely that the English removed the bodies from
'l_ettre de Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil au Ministre, Oct. 
25, 1724, Collection de Manuscripts, III, p. 109.
2
For various versions of this popular acceptance of the French 
account of Rale's death see: William Allen, The History of Norridgewock 
(Norridgewock: Edward J. Peet, 184-9), p. 40; Rufus King Sewall, Ancient 
Dominions of Maine (Bath: Elisha Clark and Company, 1859), p. 249; 
Henrietta Danforth Wood, Early Days of Norridgewock (Skowhegan: The 
Skowhegan Press, 1941), p. 3; Henrietta Tozier Totman, "Sebastien Rale," 
in Maine, My State (Lewiston: The Maine Writers Research Club, 1919), 
p. 150; A. J. Coolidge and J. B. Mansfied, History and Description of 
New England. Maine (Boston: Austin J. Cooli dge, i860), p. 233; John 
S. C. Abbott, The History of Maine (Boston: B. B. Russell, 1875), p. 
314; Sprague, Sebastien Rale, p. 41; Charles E. Nash, "The Indians of 
the Kennebec," Illustrated History of Kennebec County, Maine, Henry D. 
Kingsbury and Simeon L. Deyo, eds. (New York: H. W. Blake & Company, 
1892), p. 62.
3 Ib i d.; Charlevoix, History and General Description of New France, 
V, p. 279; Letter from Father de la Chasse. Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, 
vol. 67, p. 235.
^Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridgewock," p. 571. 
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the cabins into the center of the village. The returning Indians under 
standably concluded that Rale died surrounded by the village sachems.
New England happily learned of Norridgewock's destruction.
Captain Harmon arrived in Boston to "great Shouting and Triumph."
Crusty old Samuel Sewall muttered "The Lord help us to rejoice with 
Trembling."’ The Reverend Colman preached that
in a special manner, the wonderful victory obtained August 12, 
1724, over the bold & bloody tribes at Norridgewa1k, and their 
sudden destruction that memorable day, was the singular work of 
God;--And the officers and soldiers piously put far from them­
selves the honor of it. The plain hand of providence and not 
their own conduct, facilitated and quickened their march...And 
he, who was the father of the war, the ghostly father of those 
perfidious savages, like the son of Beor, was slain among the 
enemy, after his vain endeavours to curse us.* 2
’sewall, "Diary," VII, pp. 342-43.
2Penhallow, History of the Wars of New England, p. 11.
3Mass. Council, Aug. 22, 1724; Mass. Arch., 52: 34.
Testifying before the Council, Captain Harmon was made a
Lieutenant-Colonel for the good services of Captain Moulton. The
General Assembly happily resolved.
to pay unto the said Co 1 10 Johnson Harmon the...sc’ sum of One 
Hundred pounds for his service in the destruction of the s^ 
Sebastien Ralle, the s^ sum to be divided among the Officers & 
Soldiers....3
In retrospect it seems incredible that Rale's death has aroused
such intensity of feeling. Admirers and detractors alike agree that he 
was an extraordinary man. Shrouds of infamy and sanctity alike have 
been thrown upon him though either claim is extreme. But it is prepos­
terous to say that he was motivated by an inveterate hatred of the 
English. It is equally absurd to lay at his feet the burden of war
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guilt. The record speaks for itself. He encouraged no atrocities. 
Not one Englishman was killed before an Abnaki was. No Englishmen 
were abducted until, in Abnaki eyes, four of their chieftains were. 
Nor were the settlements harassed until they had passed an explicitly 
declared line--a line of which the English were quite aware but chose 
to ignore.
It cannot be said that Sebastien Rale was a French agent. His 
nationality was incidental to the commitment he had made to the Abnakis. 
He feared, but willingly accepted, the Abnakis trading with the English. 
Though he opposed the continual English encroachments on the Kennebec 
he remained a realist. He accepted the existence of Brunswick, 
Topsham, and Georgetown but barred further expansion. He was no sly 
intriguer in his opposition--he described his point of view to Governor 
Shute who promptly rejected it, time and again. A French agent would 
hardly deliberately attract such attention. The causes of the war 
were thus complex and the "villain theory" must be discarded as simplistic. 
The very readiness of the English to attribute the Abnakis1 mischevious- 
ness to his influence is, in itself, enough to discredit that view.
The widely divergent views of Rale stem not from any deviousness 
in his actions. Rather, the conflict of interpretations has come from 
a polarization of secondary sources. The English hastened to condemn 
what they saw as a mad, Jesuitical plot against their dynamic fore- 
bearors. The French were no more impartial. They supported the martyr 
myth because Rale had opposed the English heretics. The French view 
was written primarily by clerics; the English by secularists. Thus, 
Sebastien Rale emerged not as a man, but as a shadow of two cultural 
fictions.
135
Religion had little to do with the actual conflict. It was, 
truthfully, an exacerbating circumstance. But it was the conflict 
between the Abnakis and the English for the land that was endemic; 
English missionary efforts were sporadic in the extreme. Rale and the 
Abnakis were the tragic victims of an overly cautious Council of Marine 
and the unswerving determination of Massachusetts. Rale had attempted 
to protect the Abnakis from themselves as well as from the English 
settlers. He was neither a religious fanatic, nor a political schemer. 
Themselves victims of their accelerating expansion and contradictory 
view of the Indians, the English could not compromise with Rale. The 
conflict mushroomed and he became a marked man. Sebastien Rale was 
a daring man, confronting and checking every English move. He remained 
on the Kennebec throughout the war though the Indians pleaded that he 
return to Quebec. Sebastien Rale died in the way he lived; protecting 
his Indians and defying the English to the end.
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CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE: DEFEAT AND SUBMISSION
Rale's death resulted in another barrage of letters between
Vaudreuil and Dummer. The latter made himself clear enough: "I 
cannot but esteem it an open Violation of the Treaty of Peace...for you 
to Commissionate Qebastien Ral^j to reside amounghst" the Abnakis.’ 
Not to be outdone in verbal warfare the crusty French governor replied 
that he would leave the settlement of the "Cruelty Committed by your
2
Order on the Person of ffather Ralle" to their respective kings.
The Abnakis were, of course, extremely angered by the loss of
Norridgewock. But they were exhausted by the war. To avert their 
total collapse, Vaudreuil told Dummer that he would not refuse his 
"Mediation to you to bring the Abenakis Indians & their Allies to 
Peace...."3
Eckstorm thought that Vaudreuil was in an untenable position. 
Surprisingly, Norridgewock's loss did not mean the immediate end of the 
war. The Indians did move to Canada but continued their regular forays.
’Letter Lt. Gov. Dummer to Mons. Vaudreuil, Sept. 15, 1724, 
Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 106-07; Mass. Arch. 52: 48-4-9;
William B. Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook and others 
Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine, 1722-1726 (Boston: George E. 
Littlefield, 1901), pp. 74-75.
2M. de Vaudreuil to Lt. Governor Dummer, Oct. 29, 1724, Mass. 
Arch. 52: 77-84; Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp.
80-83.
3m. de Vaudreuil to Lt. Governor Dummer, Oct. 29, 1724, Mass. 
Arch. 52; 77-84; Trask, ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp.
80-83.
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The English believed, as John Schuyler put it, that Vaudreuil was "very 
sory and weary of that warr...." Eckstorm, following Schuyler's lead, 
overlooked similar English sentiments.'
Dummer's draft instructions for the Commissioners to be sent to 
Vaudreuil show his quandary. With the usual demand for the return of 
the English captives and for Vaudreuil's neutrality, the English con­
sidered resorting to two blatantly false threats. The Commissioners 
were to warn Vaudreuil that their alliance with the Five Nations could 
prove dangerous to New France and that all the British colonies would
2
unite to "prosecute and pursue them to the Uttermost...."
Both the Iroquois and the other colonies refused to aid
Massachusetts.3 New York, for example, denied her help in "Committing
Letter John Schuyler to Lt Gov. Dummer, Nov. 21, 1724, Baxter, 
Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 233-34; Eckstorm, "The Attack on Norridge­
wock," p. 565.
2
Instructions for the Commissioners for Canada, Baxter, Pioneers 
of New France in New England, pp. 346-47.
3Governor Burnet to the Duke of Newcastle, Cal, of St. Pap., 
XXXIV, p. 270. Massachusetts complained to the king in June, 1725, 
that she had "not been able to prevail on the other gov'ts to furnish 
their respective quotas ...in case of a war." Address of the Lt. 
Governor, Council and Representatives of the Massachusetts Bay to the 
King, June 25, 1725, Ibid., p. 400.
^At a Council held at Fort George in New York, Dec. 16, 1724, 
Mass. Arch. 4; 90-95; Letter, Gov. Wm Burnet of N. Y. to Lt. Gov.
Dummer, Dec. 16, 1723, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 234-35.
h.
of Hostilities within the territory of the french King...." Governor 
Burnet even warned Dummer that Vaudreuil would discover their "feeble­
ness" if he ignored Massachusetts' strong threats. Restrained,
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Massachusetts' instructions to her Commissioners contained no threats.’
Meanwhile Dummer sent Vaudreuil a staunch defense of English 
rights. The Indians were subjects of the British Crown, he noted, saying 
that they had admitted the fact in their many treaties with Massachusetts 
They had "quitted claimes to the Lands bought & possessed by the 
English..." in a treaty with the then governor, Sir William Phips, in 
1693. Dummer claimed all territory south of the St. Lawrence, forgetting 
the often admitted necessity of a settlement by commissioners. Par­
ticularly remarkable was his feigned amazement at the Abnakis' "deceit­
fullness & self contradiction" in contesting Massachusetts' title to 
the Kennebec. Even a cursory examination of the tensions leading to 
the war points, inevitably, to the Indians' ignored claims. Finally, 
the Lieutenant-Governor replied with dignity: "We have alwaies treated
2 
the Indians with Sincerity...."
Mr. William Dudley, Colonel Samuel Thaxter and Mr. Atkinson 
carried Dummer's letter to Governor Vaudreuil. As official Commissioners 
they demanded Vaudreuil's neutrality and the return of the English 
prisoners. If the English had hoped that Vaudreuil would be convinced 
by reason, they were sorely disappointed. Vaudreuil refused to concede 
a single point. He asserted his own innocence and encouraged the 
Abnakis not to compromise with the English.
’copie de la Commission donne par le Gouverneur de Baston aux 
Deputes par luy envoy^s au Canada, Arch. Col., F 3, Collection Moreau 
St. Mery, vol. 2-2, pp. 535-36.
^Letter Lt. Gov. Dummer to Mons. Vaudreuil, Jan. 19, 1724/25, 
Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, X, pp. 175-78; Mass. Arch. 52: 106-09; Trask
ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, pp. 88-91.
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When the Commissioners met seven Abnaki sachems, at Vaudreuil's 
suggestion, they were discouraged. The Abnakis required that the 
English "quit their lands, restore their prisoners, rebuild their 
church, and indemnify them for...kiling Father Rasle, and for the ex­
pense of the war." The Commissioners were displeased with the confron­
tation. They rightly attributed the Abnakis continued hostility to 
Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse.’ Their mission was a total failure. 
The Abnakis would not submit and Vaudreuil was convinced that the 
English were exhausted by the war. He wrote the Council of Marine 
that though Dummer expressed "Himself with much haughtiness, M. de 
Vaudreuil is persuaded that he is extremely anxious for peace...."
In the end, it was Vaudreuil's and not Dummer's fears which 
materialized. Despite their past promises to Vaudreuil, the tepid 
Penobscots submitted, to the English. Vaudreuil, close to his own 
death, was disgusted. The Penobscots declared themselves "subjects 
of the Crown of England." They agreed that all forts might remain and 
finally bound themselves to "make all the other Indians, even those 
domiciliated in Canada, parties to this peace." The new French 
governor, de Longueil, hoped that the Indians of Canada as well as the 
Kennebec might convince the Penobscots to renew the war. Longueil
’m. Begon to Count de Maurepas, April 21, 1725, O'Callaghan, 
New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 941-45; Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 
4-7, pp. 203-11; Collection de Manuscripts, III, pp. 117-23; Abstract 
of M. de Vaudreuil's Despatch, August 7, 1725, O'Callaghan, New York 
Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 947-49; Vaudreuil au Ministre, May 22, 
1725, Arch. Col., C 11 A, vol. 47, pp. 83-88; Journal of Commissions 
to Canada, May 28, 1725, Baxter, Pioneers of New France in New England, 
pp. 350-53.
Abstract of Letters respecting the Abenaquis, April 24, 1725,
O'Cal laghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, p. 945. 
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accused Father Gaul in of inducing the Penobscots and the Micmacs to 
"make their peace." The ministry, not surprisingly, was furious and 
ordered Gaulin "to stir up hosti1ities...against the English."’
In their preliminary discussions with the English the Penobscots 
claimed that "the Snt Johns, and Cape Sable Indians have agreed to 
abide by what the Penobscot Indians shall agree to...." But not all 
the Abnakis were so anxious for peace. When the Penobscots agreed to 
a truce in July, 1725, the area included only that "Eastward of Kennebeck 
River."2
In November, 1725, the Indians went to Boston to conclude the 
peace. The Treaty's noteworthy provisions, that the Indians were 
guaranteed "all their lands...not by them conveyed and sold," and that 
"all trade and commerce...shaI 1 be under such management and regula­
tions as the government of Massachusetts province shall direct," was
3 
meant to correct two grievances that had caused the war.
The English clearly recognized the true causes of the war. 
"It's my Oppinion," said John Minot, that "some measures should be 
tacken to Assure them that some Considerable part of that Country 
should allwayes remaine to them & their children...." "And, as I 
remember," he noted significantly, "at the last treaty, they had no
’Abstract of Messrs, de Longueil and Begon's Despatches, Oct. 31, 
1725, O'Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, IX, pp. 955-56; Arch. 
Col., C 11 A, vol. 47, pp. 23-29.
2From John Stoddard & John Wainright, June 28, 1725, Trask, 
ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, p. 121; and "From Col. 
Westbrook," July 31, 1725, Ibid., p. 132.
3The Submission and agreement of the delegates of the eastern 
Indians, Dec. 15, 1725, Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England, 
pp. 119-23.
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assurance that their planting fields at Nerigwa1k...shou1d allwayes
QbeJ injoyed by them."’
The confirmation of the treaty, postponed from May, was concluded
in July, 1726. Dummer was pleased with the result but feared that the
Kennebecs would refuse to submit to it. "We mean," the sachem Loron 
assured Dummer, "in case any of the tribes should rise against us, or 
resist us, we will take effectual means to set them down by force." 
Though undoubtedly disgruntled, the Kennebecs did acquiesce. Finally, 
the sachem Toxas signed the document in July, 1727, and the Kennebecs 
resigned themselves to the situation. After thirty-nine years, peace 
was again a reality on the northern frontier.
Let there be no mistake about it. The conflict that Massachusetts 
had termed a rebellion, the opposition of the Abnakis to the pressures 
of an expanding frontier, was the inspiration of Sebastien Rale. The 
evidence stands for itself. From 1714 the moderate expressions of 
hostility against the new settlements were ignored. The Abnakis 
complaints against the colonists were not regarded as legitimate. It 
became evident to Rale that if discussion was unsuccessful, then force 
must be used to prove to the English that the Abnakis opposed their
’To Coll. Stephan Minot from John Minot, Oct. 4, 1725, Trask, 
ed., Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook, p. 146.
^Loren's statement, as given by Penhallow, must be questioned. 
In December, 1725, the Penobscots agreed that if any of the tribes 
refused "to confirm and ratify" the treaty they would "join their young 
men with the English in reducing them to reason." Later, they claimed 
that they had been misquoted. "I told you," Loren wrote, that "we 
would do on our side all we could to bring them back butt I have give 
you notice att the same time that I did not understand that we should 
strike on them, or that we should joyn our forces to yours to march 
against them" Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New England, p. 122; 
Indian's Letter, Jan. 26, 1726, Baxter, Baxter Manuscripts, XXI 1 I, p. 209. 
142
continued presence on the Kennebec. The aftermath of Rale's death 
goes far to illustrate his importance to the Abnakis' enthusiastic war 
effort. Left without leadership, and again split into pro and anti­
English factions it was inevitable that the Kennebecs would be forced 
to submit to Massachusetts overtures for peace. Without Sebastien 
Rale's persuasion and determination, the Abnakis could no longer 
present a united front against colonial expansion.
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